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For almost two decades, the conventional civil rights political em-
powerment agenda of black activists, lawyers, and scholars has fo-
cused on the election of black representatives.1 The belief that black 
representation is everything has defined litigation strategy under the 
Voting Rights Act.2 Through judicially enforced spurs to black elec-
toral success, black voters gain political self-confidence and legislative 
influence. 
A set of submerged premises and assumptions concerning the goals 
and strategies for achieving black equality underlie this empowerment 
agenda. 3 Through use of what I characterize as "the theory of black 
electoral success," this article identifies, organizes, and presents these 
related propositions. In black electoral success theory, empowerment 
is obtained through meaningful enfranchisement, which exists where 
blacks are elected. The theory thus promotes the election of individual 
1. I use the terms "black" and African-American interchangeably. I prefer the term black 
for two reasons. First, many of my observations about black political empowerment apply to 
other racial groups. The term black succinctly describes a racial identity and status based on 
color that is shared, to some degree, by other people of color with different ancestral lineages. 
See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 323, 335 n.50 (1987). Similarly, the black community is a convenient proxy for an 
insular group that is politically cohesive, historically stigmatized, economically depressed, and 
socially isolated. 
Second, although I also use the term minority, especially to convey the numerical status of 
blacks in this society, as Patricia Williams observes, minority "implies a certain delegitimacy in a 
majoritarian system." Use of the term "black" eludes this problem. See Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 404 
n.4 (1987); cf. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (three-judge court), 
ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in part on other grounds sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 
769-70 (1973) (protected minority does not have a merely numerical denotation; rather it refers 
to an identifiable and specially disadvantaged group). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 1983 codifies as amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 445. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, was amended in 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402, and in 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. Amended § 2 of 
the Act, which provides a nationwide private right of action, states: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting ... shall be imposed or applied •.• in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color •.• as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class 
of citizens protected by subsection (a) ..• in that its members have less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represent-
atives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to 
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: 
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected 
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
The term "representatives of choice" refers to "black" representatives. See supra note 1. The 
House Report accompanying the amendments defines representatives of choice as "minority can-
didates or candidates identified with the interests of a racial or language minority." H. Rep. No. 
227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1981). 
3. Although not synonymous, the terms empowerment, political equality, and effective repre-
sentation are used here interchangeably to convey the concept of "full enfranchisement." 
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black representatives as spokesmodels for political equality.4 Simply 
by virtue of election opportunities, black electoral success advances 
civil rights enforcement, government intervention on behalf of the 
poor, and black "role-model" development. 
Although pervasive and influential, the theory of black' electoral 
success has not been explicitly endorsed as a strategy nor articulated 
as a coherent conceptual model. Neither political science nor legal 
academic literature has provided voting rights lawyers, courts, or ac-
tivists with a clear theoretical understanding of their project. 5 Instead, 
black electoral success has been pursued somewhat unself consciously 
as the inchoate rationale and frame of reference for black political and 
legal empowerment. 
In this article, my goal is to organize the divergent themes of black 
electoral success strategy within one conceptual framework in order to 
give the themes more cogency and attention. 6 Having exposed the 
existence of a coherent theory, I then argue that the theory posits 
many of the correct goals but fails to provide a realistic mechanism for 
achieving them. The article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I de-
velop the ideological and statutory roots of black electoral success the-
ory. In Part II, I analyze the inadequacies of current voting rights 
litigation and its failure to realize the statute's original goals. I con-
clude in Part II by arguing that contemporary preoccupation with 
black electoral success stifles rather than empowers black political par-
ticipation for three reasons. First, black electoral success theory ro-
manticizes black elected officials as empowerment role models. By 
ignoring problems of tokenism and false consciousness, the theory pro-
motes black electoral success in order to legitimate the ideology of 
4. Spokesmodels are role models who also speak in a representational capacity on behalf of 
others. Cf. Star Search (Television Program Enterprises 1991) (contestants compete for best 
"spokesmodel" based on their physical attributes, poise, and ability to talk). In general, the 
notion of spokesmodels seems to apply only to the black community. See Reed, The ''Black 
Revolution" and the Reconstitution of Domination, in RACE, PoLmcs AND CULTURE: EssAYS 
ON THE RADICALISM OF THE 1960s 61, 67-68 (A. Reed ed. 1986) ("No 'white leaders' were 
assumed to represent a singular white population; social category 'black leaders' meant "certain 
blacks were declared opinion-makers and carriers of the interests of an anonymous black 
population."). 
5. Black politics, unlike issues concerning employment or schools, is considered "offbeat," or 
worthy of only occasional interest. See, e.g., D. PINDERHUGHES, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CHI-
CAGO POLITICS 253-55 (1987) (noting the absence of substantial body of research addressing 
paradoxes in American black politics); Walton, Foreword to J. ELIOT, BLACK VOICES IN AMER-
ICAN POLITICS at xi-xii (1988). 
6. I also position black electoral success theory within current voting rights legal scholarship. 
See e.g., Abrams, "Raising Politics Up'~· Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 472-75 (1988) (theory ofa "jurisprudence of political 
opportunity"); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial 
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 179-82 (1989) (theory of "civic 
inclusion"). 
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"equality of opportunity."7 
Second, even in jurisdictions with proportionate black representa-
tion, black electoral success has neither mobilized the black commu-
nity nor realized the promised community-based reforms. As an 
empowerment mechanism, electoral control of winner-take-all major-
ity-black districts ignores critical connections between broad-based, 
sustained voter participation and accountable representation. In addi-
tion, although it claims legitimacy as a practical enforcement mecha-
nism of the original goals of the civil rights movement, district based 
electoral ratification enforces only one of three original goals. While 
the current approach may result in the election of more black officials, 
it ignores the movement's concern with broadening the base of partici-
pation and fundamentally reforming the substance of political 
decisions. 
Third, the theory assumes that majority winners rule legitimately, 
even where such rule leads to permanent minority losers. The theory 
responds to minority disadvantage not by challenging majority rule 
but by providing a few electoral districts in which blacks are the ma-
jority. 8 Consequently, black electoral success theory simply recon-
figures winner-take-all electoral opportunities into geographically 
based, majority-black, single-m.ember districts. Representing a geo-
graphically and socially isolated constituency in a racially polarized 
environment, blacks elected from single-member districts have little 
control over policy choices made by their white counterparts. Thus, 
although it ensures more representatives, district-based black electoral 
success may not necessarily result in more responsive government. 
In Part III, based on my critique of the black electoral success 
theory, I put forth suggestions for a different approach to voting rights 
reform. Relying on what I tentatively call "proportionate interest rep-
resentation"9 for self-identified communities of interest, I propose to 
reconsider the ways in which representatives are elected and the rules 
under which legislative decisions are made. 
7. See infra note 202 (describing false consciousness). The legitimating power of black elec-
toral success was articulated, in the general context of civil rights law, by Professor Alan Free-
man in his essay, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW 96, 110-
14 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). 
8. The theory also assumes continued residential segregation. As developed infra notes 312-
14 & 342, not all blacks presently reside within majority-black districts. 
9. By disaggregating the majority and structuring decisionmaking to reduce the effect of prej-
udice, proportionate interest representation reflects an effort both to increase the number of black 
officials and to minimize the disadvantages accruing to black voters in a majoritarian system. In 
addition, the concept of proportionate interest representation embraces the civil rights move-
ment's vision of effective representation. This vision extended beyond electoral ratification and 
encompassed a broader theory of responsive government, the goal of which was to promise legis-
lative accountability to black political interests. 
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I. THE ROOTS OF BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS THEORY 
As both an activist and a litigation strategy, black electoral success 
theory evolved from the civil rights movement's empowerment vision. 
The movement viewed broad-based political participation and repre-
sentation as instrumental to community autonomy and to community-
based reform. The theory of black electoral success emerged in re-
sponse to pressure for judicial supervision of the movement's political 
agenda. To create a judicially manageable standard to enforce the 
V:oting Rights Act, litigation adopted and modified the theory. By 
focusing narrowly on electing black officeholders, however, the litiga-
tion strategy and the theory eventually eclipsed the movement's wide-
angled focus on transformative politics. 
The perception that blacks were not effectively represented in ma-
jority-white jurisdictions because of racially polarized voting formed 
the basis of the litigation strategy. Essentially activists holding this 
view believed that officials elected by a bloc voting white majority ig-
nored the interests of black voters without suffering any adverse elec-
toral consequences.10 Where such vote "dilution"11 was established, 
black electoral success theory justified majority-black remedial subdis-
tricts in which black registered voters exercised electoral control.12 
The litigation strategy posited electoral ratification within majority-
black single-member districts as an appropriate mechanism for ensur-
ing government accountability and responsiveness to black interests.13 
In this Part, I begin by presenting the civil rights movement's vi-
sion of representation, participation, and legislative reform. I then 
demonstrate how the voting rights litigation agenda altered that 
vision. 
A. The Civil Rights Movement's Theory of Political Participation 
The civil rights movement's vision of black political empowerment 
emanated from mass protests to achieve basic enfranchisement. 
Movement activists perceived the rights to register and cast a ballot as 
10. See, e.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub nom. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
11. See infra note 76 for a definition of vote dilution. 
12. Voting rights litigants noted that black electoral success usually depends on black electo-
ral control of small, majority-black subdistricts within a jurisdiction. 
13. Such geographically configured districts would ensure government responsiveness 
through the election of black representatives. The theory also posits that white elected officials 
would become at least minimally responsive to their newly voting black constituents. See, e.g., T. 
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 893 (1988) (one of 
the primary goals in winning the right to vote was to drive the white segregationist politicians 
from office). 
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foundational for political action, effective social change, and redress 
from, and representation in, government. These rights were important 
not only for blacks but for the advancement of a progressive agenda in 
general. I4 The movement was based on a redistributive theory of 
"representation and the right to participate," which engaged the polit-
ical empowerment agenda of both 1960s integrationists and 
nationalists. Is 
The focus on disfranchisement materialized in the early 1960s, re-
flecting a major shift from protest to politics. I6 Black voter registra-
tion and political participation gradually became the movement's 
dominant vehicle for implementation of its legislative agenda.17 
Although some activists initially failed to appreciate the dramatic po-
tential of voter education and registration, particularly in light of 
headlines generated by nonviolent integrated bus rides, electoral par-
ticipation soon became the way to redeem southern politics.Is 
The Kennedy administration, preoccupied with incremental re-
14. Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal government about 
our basic rights . . . . Give us the ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of good 
will . . . . Give us the ballot and we will help bring this nation to a new society based on 
justice and dedicated to peace. 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., quoted in Hamilton, Foreword, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs xviii 
(M. Preston, L. Henderson & P. Puryear eds. 1982). In suggesting that the most important step 
blacks could take was "that short walk to the voting booth," the NAACP, SCLC, and Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., anticipated that the development of "[a]n alert, independent, and aggressive 
Negro electorate" would become an important progressive political factor. Cf. H. MooN, BAL· 
ANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE 9, 11 (1948). 
15. See, e.g., Barnett, A Theoretical Perspective on American Racial Public Policy, in PUBLIC 
POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY 3, 39 (M. Barnett & J. Hefner eds. 1976) (nationalists, 
calling for black ethnic group unity, and black integrationists each pursued interrelated goals 
despite often heated rhetoric). For the nationalists the right to vote necessarily meant the right 
to constitute an "essential ingredient ..• of the sovereign principle,'' delegable only to "true 
representative[s]." See Delany, The Political Destiny of the Colored Race, in THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF BLACK NATIONALISM 195, 197-98 (S. Stuckey ed. 1972). 
16. See s. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS (1976); Negro Vote Surge Expected in South -Admin-
istration Experts Sure of a Political Break Through as Result of Recent Gains, N.Y. Times, June 
26, 1961, at 1, col. 6 ("The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and other leaders of the new 
militant movements - the sit-ins and Freedom Riders - have come around to agree that the 
vote is the key."); see also Nelson, Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of the New Black Politics, in THE 
NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 187 (since the mid-1970s, the black community has 
accepted the idea "that electoral politics provide[s] the best avenue for advancing black inter-
ests."); Preston, Black Politics and Public Policy in Chicago: Self-Interest Versus Constituent 
Representation, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 159-61 (politics is now the 
"cutting edge" of the civil rights movement). 
17. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 479 (voter registration defended during the early 1960s as a 
priority in order to build political protections for the movement, especially when the religious 
zeal faded); see also Williams, Black Political Progress in the 1970's: The Electoral Arena, in THE 
NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 74-75. 
18. See, e.g .• s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERA· 
TION IN AMERICA 87 (1967) (SNCC started its first voter registration project in 1961 because it 
believed that political power organized around the right to vote was the key to dismantling 
southern racism). 
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form, supported voter registration efforts because these efforts ap-
peared to be less threatening and disruptive.19 Robert Moses and 
other black voter registration activists, however, defended their work 
as the most promising response to indigenous efforts to transform local 
reality.20 
The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 following "sustained 
national pressure"21 to include all Americans in the liberal, demo-
cratic electoral process. Some commentators have argued that the 
Act, which was passed and signed into law barely four months after its 
formal introduction, represented the civil rights movement at its most 
commanding.22 Critics, however, have suggested that the Act's electo-
ral strategy reflects the triumph of tokenism.23 
Yet both proponents and critics agree that the Voting Rights Act 
united the black ideological spectrum. The Act's passage bridged the 
divergent aims of integration and nationalism24 in ways that both 
19. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 482. Some of the earliest efforts to change tactics from 
protest to politics were engineered by the Kennedy Justice Department "to coax [civil rights 
activists] out of precisely the kind of confrontational actions [such as the Freedom Rides] around 
which they were shaping their identities." Id. at 479. The Kennedy Administration pushed the 
merits of voter registration, extending promises of draft exemptions, foundation grants, lawsuits, 
newspaper coverage, prosecution of obstructionist white Southern officials, and federal protection 
for voter registration activists. Id. at 480-81, 619-20. But cf. id. at 680-83, 713, 787 (FBI failed 
to investigate certain complaints or simply gathered information for subsequent civil cases with-
out enforcing criminal protections against harassment or intimidation of voters). 
20. Id. at 330, 331, 486. 
21. R. WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT 150, 152 (1990) ("despite [the Voting Rights Act's] far-reaching implications, the legisla-
tion enjoyed broader, more sustained public support than any previous civil rights measure."). 
22. Id. at 152-53; L. KILLIAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE REVOLUTION, PHASE II: BLACK POWER 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 74 (1975) (victory seemed complete when President Johnson de-, 
clared on introducing the Voting Rights Act, "we shall overcome"); M.L. KING, JR., WHERE 
Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR CoMMUNITY? 34 (1967) ("[W]hen the 1965 Voting Rights 
Law was signed, it was proclaimed as the dawn of freedom .•.. "). 
23. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7; Reed, supra note 4, at 63. 
24. Integration and nationalism were the most salient characteristics of the African-Ameri-
can intellectual and political agenda in the 1960s. See J. GRANT, BLACK PROTEST 9, 13 (J. 
Grant ed. 1968) (although integration in American political and economic mainstream has been 
main tendency in fight for black rights, demand for positive assertion of blackness also persistent 
thread); Marable, A New Black Politics, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1990 at 18, 20 (black protest 
movements all based on fundamental racial ideologies of either integration or black nationalism). 
Compare M.L. KING, JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 10 (1967) (integration a basic 
aspect of freedom, meaning the freedom to choose where to live, to eat, to attend school) and 
Marable, supra, at 18 (racial integrationists consistently advocate elimination of all restrictions 
that keep blacks from participating fully in society's mainstream) with id. (black nationalists 
reject integration as a hoax, are suspicious of alliances with whites, and advocate self-help com-
munity based empowerment); c. LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS JN AMERICA 45 (1961) (na-
tionalism an involuntary, defensive response to escape hostile forces) and S. CARMICHAEL & C. 
HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 47, 54-55 (black liberation lies in group action acknowledging race 
as an overwhelming fact of life; goal is to build and strengthen the black community with its 
racial and cultural integrity intact and to obtain "an effective share in the total power of the 
society"). · 
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committed the black community to collective action in pursuit of 
political power and camouflaged the tension between assimilation and 
recognition of racial group identity and interests. Through concerted 
political action, integration and nationalism converged. 
For integrationists and many nationalists, the struggle for effective 
use of the ballot became "the number one civil right."25 Black activ-
ists saw political empowerment as a vehicle for mobilizing the black 
community, articulating a black social and economic agenda, and 
electing both authentic black and responsive white officials.26 
1. Political Participation: Mobilizing the Black Community 
The goals of community autonomy and participatory democracy 
inspired the consensus demanding meaningful access to electoral poli-
tics. The idea of community autonomy evolved from a group con-
sciousness that reflected a collective identity shaped by historic 
conditions and social realities. To differing extents, group identifica-
tion reflected a shared perception that triggered collective activity.27 
Group solidarity and a general mistrust of the fairness of existing re-
source allocation increased the likelihood of political activity.28 
Group consciousness connected conceptions of efficacy to political 
participation.29 Indeed, both integrationists and nationalists envi-
25. See, e.g., King, Civil Right No. 1- The Right to Vote, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1965, § 6 
(Magazine), at 26. Many black nationalists played an important role in the fight for the 
franchise, reflecting their "admiration" for America's "free institutions." THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF BLACK NATIONALISM, supra note 15, at 21, 146-48. 
26. See, e.g., J. GRANT, supra note 24, at 427 (independent black politics added economic 
power to concepts of freedom and political action); M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 37-38, 149-
50 (1967); M.L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T w AIT 166 (1963). King advocated full political 
participation by an enlightened electorate to elect blacks to key political positions, to liberalize 
the political climate in the United States and to influence the allocation of resources; see also 
Voting Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 377-80 (1965) (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and 
Chairman, LCCR) (eliminating voting restrictions means elected officials will become responsive 
to the will of all the people). 
27. See generally s. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOC-
RACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972); infra notes 47-49, 62 and accompanying text. 
28. Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk, Group Consciousness and Political Participation, 25 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 494 (1981); Shingles, Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Miss-
ing Link, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 76 (1981). 
29. Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk, supra note 28; Shingles, supra note 28; see also S. 
CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46 (group identity mobilizes participation; 
where blacks have a majority they will seek control; when they lack a majority they will seek 
proper representation and sharing of control). Stokely Carmichael's views are particularly inter-
esting because he worked in the civil rights movement doing voter registration work in the early 
1960s. Toward the end of the decade, identifying with a black nationalist ideology, he became 
one of the foremost advocates of "Black Power." According to Carmichael, even blacks associ-
ated with an integrationist ideology approved notions of group power. 
America has asked its Negro citizens to fight for opportunity as individuals, whereas at 
certain points in our history what we have needed most has been opportunity for the whole 
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sioned political struggle as the means to group salvation. 30 
The concept of participatory democracy31 was the heart of the civil 
rights "mass movement." Developing a political identity was critical 
to the movement's efforts to cultivate a grass roots base. Political or-
ganizing, particularly in support of black candidates, continued the 
movement's affirmation of self-worth and human dignity.32 Electoral 
politics awakened blacks to their humanity, their heritage, and their 
potential, as citizens, to participate equally in democratic self-govern-
ment. 33 As one activist observed: · 
I think one of the things that made the delegation of the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic party so hopeful, so expectant, was the fact that 
people had made a discovery that there is a way out of much that is 
wrong with our lives, there is a way to change it, and that is through the 
execution of this vote .... That's the way we arrived in Atlantic City -
really excited about the fact that we were at long last going to be able· to 
participate, to be represented. 34 
The movement's leadership continuously reinforced interaction 
with and equal participation by its "excited" grass roots base. Behind 
the movement's protest strategies were civil rights activists, the semi-
nal political campaign workers, with their "tireless enthusiasm for 
group, not just for selected and approved Negroes .... We must not apologize for the exist-
ence of this form of group power, for we have been oppressed as a group not as individuals. 
Id. at 49 (quoting paid advertisement by black church members affiliated with National Council 
of Churches). ·· 
30. For the former, salvation would come ~ the result of a perpetual engagement to make 
America true to its stated principles, extended on behalf of "the Negro people." For the latter, 
group salvation would result from the development of group identity, expression, and indepen-
dence. See, e.g .• s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 49; R. WEISBROT, supra 
note 21, at 206, 216; see also Delany, supra note 15, at 196-97 (right to vote must include right to 
constitute essential part of the ruling element). 
31. The focus on equality and universal suffrage was greatly influenced by the one person/ 
one vote language of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Some of the marchers from Selma 
to Montgomery in March 1965 carried "one man/one vote" signs. See, e.g., Eyes on the Prize 
(videotape segment five). John Lewis was arrested for carrying a "One Man/One Vote" sign 
outside a Selma, Alabama courthouse. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 900; cf id. at 587-88, 733 
(describing predictions that the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions would transform 
black voting the way Brown v. Board of Education changed education). 
32. See S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 104 (describing how voter regis-
tration campaigns gave blacks "a sense of being"). 
33. The capacity to participate made integration meaningful. See, e.g., Black Power, N.Y. 
Times, July 31, 1966, at ES, col. 1 (a paid advertisement by influential blacks affiliated with the 
National Council of Churches), cited in S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 48-
49. Political power, for nationalists as well, meant black people making decisions that affect their 
lives. Id. 
34. VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM 
THE 1950s THROUGH THE 1980s 197-98 (H. Hampton & s. Fayer eds. 1990) (quoting Victoria 
Gray) (emphasis added) [hereinafter VOICES OF FREEDOM]. Approximately 80,000 blacks par-
ticipated in "Freedom Vote," helping to dispel illusions about black political apathy. Id. at 181. 
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door-to-door persuasion"35 and their open welcome to "anyone who 
will work, regardless of affiliation or ideology."36 Civil rights workers 
planted themselves in the daily struggles of local blacks. They fol-
lowed an activist model of continuous community education and polit-
ical campaigning,37 as illustrated by attempts of the SNCC workers to 
teach blacks in the rural south how to pass literacy tests. 38 
For many black nationalists as well, political participation by a 
self-consciously black community was important. The nationalists be-
lieved that a sense of community and group solidarity would poten-
tially broaden political participation and include more blacks in the 
decisionmaking process. 39 Political enfranchisement would "make 
participants, not recipients, out of . . . a traditionally excluded 
[people]."40 
2. Political Participation: Promoting a Social 
and Economic Agenda 
Although basically engaged in liberal reform to provide a main-
stream vehicle for advancement, voting rights activists sought also to 
expand the liberal vision toward a redistributive agenda premised on 
equality of condition, and not just freedom from overt discrimina-
tion. 41 Rather than a self-limiting movement to assimilate blacks into 
35. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 194; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra 
note 18, at 103-08 (describing SNCC organizing efforts). 
36. Zinn, The Old Left and the New: Emancipation from Dogma, NATION, Apr. 4, 1966, at 
385, 387. 
37. Although the march from Selma to Montgomery directly preceded congressional action 
on the Voting Rights Act, the mass direct action efforts to achieve the ballot were not based on a 
single march but were built from extended campaigns and were accompanied by nightly mass 
meetings. Watters, Why the Negro Children March, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES 96 (A. 
Meier & E. Rudwick eds. 1970) (Selma voting rights campaign involved prolonged siege of dem· 
onstrations and mass meetings, day after day, week after week). Of course, the most famous 
mass meeting was the August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. See, e.g., T. 
BRANCH, supra note 13, at 840-49, 874; see also id. at 689 (describing blueprint for the Birming· 
ham, Alabama campaign combining small-scale sit-ins, boycotts, mass marches and other organ· 
ized efforts to publicize efforts, enforce economic pressure and overflow the jails). 
38. See, e.g., T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 573, 575-79. Septima Clark operated 95 citizen-
ship schools across the South during 1962. See id. at 576. 
39. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 39, 43, 47 (broadened political par-
ticipation means blacks choosing their own leaders and holding them responsible; it also means 
more black people becoming politically active; goal of black self-determination is full participa-
tion in decisionmaking processes); id. at 44 ("The concept of Black Power rests on a fundamental 
premise. Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this we mean that 
group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of 
strength in a pluralistic society."); see also Carmichael, What We Want, N.Y. REV. BKs., Sept. 
22, 1966 (black consciousness provides the basis for political strength). 
40. Hamilton, An Advocate of Black Power Defines It, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES, 
supra note 37, at 156. 
41. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 37 (integration and nation-
alism both mean improving the lives of blacks both politically and economically); M.L. KING, 
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the councils of government, the original civil rights message endorsed, 
through the right to vote, broad notions of freedom from hunger, pov-
erty, and discrimination.42 Both nationalists and integrationists sup-
ported a common agenda on issues of civil rights enforcement and 
social welfare spending.43 
American principles of equality and democracy were not the only 
factors compelling the representation of blacks through universal suf-
frage. Full political enfranchisement also would help complete the 
movement's "social revolution."44 Blacks, like Fannie Lou Hamer, 
advocated "true democracy" and not merely equality within the ex-
JR., supra note 24, at 11, 14, 53, 61, 62 (political agenda involves economic justice, including a 
minimum annual income). Even the Urban League, one of the more conservative civil rights 
groups, projected a reformist view of democracy. Whitney Young, in his address at the League's 
1963 national conference, expressed the group's underlying philosophy: 
..• democracy is more than a convenient institution through which privileges and material 
products flow to [white citizens]. For both [whites and blacks] democracy is a way of life, 
an ideal in which all share its rewards, as well as its responsibilities .... For the public 
official - whether city, state or federal - witnessing means greater concern for broad, 
democratic promises and human rights, rather than preoccupation with technical, constitu-
tional details and states' rights. 
Young, For Protest Plus "Co"ective Measures," in M. BRODERICK & A. MEIER, NEGRO PRO-
TEST THOUGHT IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 287, 289-90 (1965). 
From the time of the Niagara Movement, and the founding of the NAACP in 1910, black 
activists have adopted a protest platform that included: the right to equal treatment, increased 
public high school and college facilities, judicial reform, health care, and vigorous enforcement of 
the post Civil War Amendments. M. BRODERICK & A. MEIER, supra, at 48-50. 
42. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at xiii (civil rights leaders demanded equality of condition 
not just desegregation); see, e.g. S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 39-41 (polit-
ical modernization emphasizes human dignity, not sanctity of property, "free people," not. "free 
enterprise."); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 357 (Martin Luther King's version of rights would re-
quire radical transformation of existing social structures; King was concerned with ending pov-
erty and closing the gap between the rich and the poor); see also VOICES OF FREEDOM, supra 
note 34, at 180 (quoting Unita Blackwell who attended a voter registration meeting held in a 
church in Sunflower County, Mississippi, during Freedom Summer 1964): 
I was only told when I started off that ifl registered to vote, I would have food to eat and a 
better house to stay in, 'cause the one I was staying in was so raggedy you could see any-
where and look outdoors. My child would have a better education .... It was the basic 
needs of the people. The whites, they understood it even larger than that in terms of polit-
ical power. We hadn't even heard that word, "political power," because it wasn't taught in 
the black schools. We didn't know there was such a thing as a board of supervisors and 
what they did, and we didn't know about school board members and what they did. 
Id. 
43. See THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 17 (civil rights is a consistent black 
interest-group value and preference). For example, at the National Black Political Convention in 
Gary, Indiana in 1972, Coretta King and Black Panther Bobby Seale shared the platform at 
which a "Black Agenda articulated a revolution of values, a social transformation placing 'com-
munity before individualism, ..• a living environment before profits, ... justice before unjust 
order, and morality before expediency.'" Poinsett, Unity Without Uniformity, EBONY, June 
1972, at 45, 52. The Black Agenda contained eighty-eight recommendations, including propor-
tionate black political representation, reparations, free education through college, guaranteed 
annual income, national health insurance and a National Black Political Assembly to sponsor 
candidates, lobby for black issues, and make recommendations to the black community gener-
ally. Id. at 52, 54. 
44. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 880. 
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isting order.45 By registering and voting, blacks could get people 
"outa office that [they] know was wrong and didn't do nothin' to help 
the poor."46 
Participation in the dominant political system did not necessarily 
mean assimilating its substantive assumptions or power arrangements. 
Black nationalists in particular asserted that blacks could gain polit-
ical power without becoming indistinguishable from other groups in 
society.47 Instead of becoming absorbed by the political mainstream, 
blacks could change it. 48 
Preoccupied with development of group identity and political and 
cultural expression, the nationalists shifted black activist concerns 
away from integration and coalition building. The nationalists, how-
ever, still supported electoral strategies49 because they believed, as did 
the integrationists, that political participation would lead to more re-
sponsive, black community-oriented legislation. 
45. J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 244 (1987) (quot-
ing Ms. Hamer at the 1964 Democratic National Convention). 
46. H. RAINES, MY SOUL Is REsTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 249 (1977) (quoting Ms. Hamer). 
47. Indeed, black nationalists offered racial pride and solidarity as a means of transforming 
the social, economic, and political conditions of black people. In this sense, black electoral suc-
cess theory fit within a nationalist imagery that borrowed from the ethnic experience of group 
unity and determination to reinforce individual aspirations. S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, 
supra note 18, at vii, viii (black power means, inter a/ia, psychic control by blacks over their own 
lives; black consciousness involves a sense of "peoplehood" that relies on group pride and com-
munal responsibility); see also R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 201, 206. Even Dr. King saw 
group solidarity as part of his creative endeavor to reach the "Beloved Community" of interra-
cial brotherhood and harmony. Id. at 206. 
48. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at vii (black power will "con-
tribute to the development of a viable larger society"); L. KILLIAN, supra note 22, at 113, 125, 
161-63; Hamilton, supra note 40, at 156; Jennings, Boston: Blacks and Progressive Politics, in 
THE NEW BLACK VOTE 208-18 (R. Bush ed. 1984) (political participation can mobilize voters to 
alter the dominant substantive agenda while still retaining group consciousness). 
49. From the 1960s through the 1980s, black nationalists supported voter registration and 
electoral activity. Nationalists, interested in preserving racial-cultural differences pushed for sep· 
arate and equal black representation to give blacks greater self-consciousness and pride. By 
1972, when the National Black Political Agenda was passed by a convention of black delegates in 
Gary, Indiana, group representation was openly perceived by most activists as critical to effective 
voting rights. See, e.g., D. PINDERHUGHES, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CHICAGO POLITICS 232 
(1987) ("[b]lack nationalists of cultural and political dimension" actively involved in 1983 polit-
ical campaign for black mayor); VOICES OF FREEDOM, supra note 34, at 225 (in 1964 Malcolm X 
offered to assist with voter registration and committed to work with the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic party); Worry For Democrats: "Black Power Drive," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Mar. 27, 1972, at 82 (National Black Political Convention met Mar. 10-12, 1972, in Gary, Indi-
ana, attended by 3500 delegates to set up an independent black political movement backed by the 
voting strength of black registered voters) supra note 47;. Some groups, such as the Nation of 
Islam, went through a temporary period of electoral isolation that ended at least by 1984 when 
Jesse Jackson ran for President. See, e.g., Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Mus-
lim Politics, Focus MAGAZINE, PoLmCAL TRENDLETTER 3 (June 1990). 
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3. Political Participation: Electing Responsive Officials 
By concentrating on political participation, black activists hoped 
to achieve a fundamentally different political reality created in part by 
responsive government decisionmakers. Because access to the political 
process was measured, both pragmatically and ideologically, by the 
authenticity and responsiveness of elected candidates, the energy of 
the civil rights mass movement became focused on political organizing 
to elect black officials. 
In general, black political leaders would temper the rhetoric and 
overt racism of white elected officials. 50 In particular, black represent-
atives would, by definition, constitute a progressive force affirmatively 
promoting black interests. In addition, with blacks in office, white 
business and political leaders who wanted information about blacks, 
would no longer be dependent on their own menagerie of responsible 
"Negro leadership."51 Led by black elected officials, black voters 
would also be positioned both to articulate their own "interests" and 
to challenge racially motivated or insensitive legislation.52 Black 
elected officials thus ensure black voters a voice in the process of allo-
cating government benefits. 
Black electoral success generated interest in and captured the mo-
mentum of the first two civil rights concerns: mobilization and re-
form. The connection between black electoral success and 
mobilization was demonstrated during voter registration activity in 
the early 1960s. In Mississippi, some voter registration activists 
sought to run black candidates for Congress with the expectation not 
of winning, but of planting the idea of voting in the minds of blacks. 53 
50. See, e.g., Cutler, Using Morals, Not Money on Pretoria, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, at E23, 
col. 2 (Mississippi Sen. James Eastland, noted segregationist, apparently confided, "When 
[blacks] get the vote, I won't be talking this way anymore."); see also infra notes 254-58 and 
accompanying text. 
51. In 1963, for example, rather than consulting directly with the black civil rights leaders 
involved, Attorney General Robert Kennedy relied on a haphazard group of black entertainers 
and academics to explain events in Birmingham, Alabama. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 809-
11. Even more typical was Birmingham's Mayor Thompson's effort to appease civil rights re-
quests for negotiations by announcing "he would meet with a biracial committee of his own 
choosing, specifying Negro members who had praised his stand on segregation." Id.; see Wol-
man & Thomas, Black Interests, Black Groups and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process: 
The Cases of Housing and Education, in BLACK PoLmCAL ATrITUDES 183, 193-94 (C. Bullock 
& H. Rodgers eds. 1972) (describing indirect representation through practice of "consulting a 
few well-known black leaders or enlisting them in formal and highly visible advisory capacities"). 
52. Black representation would thus obviate difficult equal protection constitutional chal-
lenges to discriminatory policies. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISrRusr 86-87 (1980) (the 
right to representation attempts to protect minorities from denials of equal concern as subjects of 
legislative policy). 
53. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 560; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 
18, at 100-20. 
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In response to local white sheriffs' excessive use of force against civil 
rights activists, blacks were urged to "Get that vote and pin that badge 
on a black chest."54 Even the most inflammatory use in the late 1960s 
of the slogan, "Black Power," was an organizing tool to inspire polit-
ical organization, to promote racial pride, and to provide a vehicle for 
black leadership. ss 
Civil rights activists linked electoral success to community based 
reform by assuring that black representatives, who were authentic 
community-based leaders, would be the vanguard for a new social jus-
tice agenda. 56 For example, black electoral aspirations stemmed, at 
least in part, from the belief that a black sharecropper, if elected tax 
assessor, would take a different view of taxing the poor.57 
Election by a mobilized group of blacks was critical to the black 
official's legitimacy. The movement's unifying objective was to em-
power the black community, not simply its representatives.58 King, in 
particular, condemned electoral opportunism by black politicians deaf 
to the demands of their community.59 In addition, both the national-
ists and the integrationists sought to elect descriptively black 
officials. 60 
For the integrationist, litigation to achieve black electoral success 
incorporated the preeminent process theory of empowerment: mea-
suring political equality by the fairness of the process through which 
representatives were elected. Along with other liberal views about in-
dividual rights and democratic self-government, integrationists cheer-
54. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 200 (quoting Hosea Williams on the "Meredith March" 
in Greenwood, Mississippi, June 1966); see also S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, 
at 46 (a black sheriff can end police brutality; a black tax assessor can channel tax monies to 
improve services for black people). 
55. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 44-46, 98-120 (describing Black 
Panther Party efforts in Alabama to run blacks for office in a manner that would serve as a 
"model for democracy"); R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 204. 
56. Indeed, it is not mere coincidence that many prominent black elected officials and black 
candidates were once active in the civil rights movement. From Andrew Young to beleaguered 
former D.C. mayor Marion Barry, to Harvey Gantt, the 1990 Democratic nominee for U.S. 
Senator from North Carolina, many black political aspirants had their roots in civil rights strug-
gle. See, e.g., Smothers, North Carolina Democrat Sets Strategy in Taking on Helms, N.Y. Times, 
June 7, 1990, at B7, col. 1. 
57. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 235. 
58. From Gary to Miami Beach, EBONY, Sept. 1972, at 142 (national black assembly "would 
force white politicians to deal with the entire black community instead of with a few hand-picked 
black politicians"); Poinsett, supra note 43, at 27, 45 (people work to create black politics to 
empower all of black America - instead of only representatives). 
59. King noted that simply electing blacks was not enough. "Negro politicians can be oppor-
tunistic as their white counterparts if there is not an informed and determined constituency de-
manding social reform." M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 49. 
60. A. KARNIG & s. WELCH, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY 9 (1980) (or-
ganizing to elect blacks to public office logical extension of confluence of black attitudes). 
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fully argued that a group has its requisite degree of political power if it 
is able to elect a fair number of representatives. 
The nationalists asserted that the community could self-con-
sciously develop a strategy of social and economic transformation by 
participating in politics on the basis of group power. The nationalists, 
however, also soon supported the black electoral success strategy as a 
shortcut to achieving.recognition of group identity and to providing a 
mechanism for channeling group solidarity.61 Because black repre-
sentatives were both authentic community leaders and legitimated by 
black voter support, they compelled greater support than sympathetic 
white officials. Propelled by the basic "essentialism"62 of the national-
ist position as well as the undeniable reality of ethnic politics and ra-
cial group segregation, 63 both the integrationists and the nationalists64 
accepted a theory of representation based on four assumptions about 
black elected officials: (1) black officials were authentic because of 
their community and cultural roots; (2) they gained authority from the 
fact of election; (3) they were legitimate because of community mobili-
zation and enthusiasm; and ( 4) they were presumptively responsive 
members of a historically, socially, and politically stigmatized group 
"{ith strong and cohesive civil rights, redistributive, and community-
based agendas. 
B. The Evolution of a Legal Strategy of Political Empowerment 
The civil rights movement empowerment vision was a statement of 
strategy and faith. After passage of the Voting Rights Act, that vision 
collapsed. Litigation to enforce the Voting Rights Act transformed 
the original goals of broad-based voter participation, reform, and au-
thentic representation into the shorthand of counting elected black of-
ficials. In addition, judicial interpretation of the statute compressed 
the civil rights movement's capacious conception of political represen-
61. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46-47; see also supra notes 
29-30. 
62. See S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46-47. Black electoral success 
theory reflects the basic "essentialism" of the nationalist position. The theory locates meaning in 
the concept of racial identity as a social-cultural, historically derived structure. For some na-
tionalists, racial identity also has biological significance. For black power nationalists of the 
1960s and early 1970s, however, essentialism meant recognition of their group identity as a 
source of pride, culture, and as a politically animating force. 
63. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 9 (political organizing based on view that 
electing black officials would change laws by exercising control over parts of government 
structure). 
64. THE BLACK PoLmCIAN: Hrs STRUGGLE FOR POWER (M. Dymally ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter THE BLACK PoLmcAN] (diverse black leaders all stressed black political organizing); Clark, 
Foreword to id. (black power movement is an "effective smokescreen" behind which quest for 
"genuine direct political power for blacks could proceed with minimum interference"). 
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tation, redistribution, and participation into a narrow electoral focus 
on black representation. 
The 1965 Voting Rights Act was a landmark piece of legislation. 65 
The Act responded directly to the most urgent claims of activists chal-
lenging direct impediments to registration and voting. In drafting the 
Act, Congress was concerned with eradicating discrimination "com-
prehensively and finally" from every election in which voters were eli-
gible to cast ballots. 66 Passed67 and amended68 to promote black 
political representation, the Act contemplates the right to vote as the 
right to meaningful political participation and to an effective voice in 
government. 69 The right to vote is the right to effective representation: 
65. Commemorating the Voting Rights Act's 25th anniversary, Governor Douglas Wilder of 
Virginia, the first black elected governor this century, credited the important symbolism of his 
own election to the Act, one of "two landmark events which literally changed the face of this 
nation." Lewis, They're Wild About Wilder, Phil. Inquirer, May 28, 1990, at A9, col. 1. 
66. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(I) (1988). 
67. Some quarrel with the original legislative understanding of the right to vote. For exam-
ple, Abigail Tbernstrom writes that the 1965 Act was concerned exclusively with registration 
and voting, and later was transformed unwittingly into a statutory mandate for black electoral 
success, or "job corps" for black elected officials. See A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNTl: 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHI'S 11, 18, 22-30 (1987). Even Them· 
strom, however, concedes, that by 1970 Congress, the judiciary, and voting rights plaintiffs all 
acknowledged the importance of a meaningful right to vote, meaning the right to elect represent· 
atives of choice. Id. at 22, 31. Without engaging in a semantic exercise or an extensive legislative 
history of the 1965 Act, it is nevertheless significant that in bis message to a Joint Session of 
Congress transmitting the proposed 1965 legislation, President Johnson referred to the right of 
citizens to have a voice in electing their leaders as the cornerstone concern of the legislation. See 
111 CoNG. REc. HSOS9 (1965) (equal right to vote affirms dignity of man because it rests, inter 
a/ia, on most basic right of all, the right to choose one's own leaders). Even Republican oppo-
nents of the 1965 Act acknowledged the consensus "to free those of our citizens who now endure 
the near-tyranny of nonrepresentation." See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., lst Sess. at 
37-38, 53, (1965). 
68. See 115 CONG. REc. 5517 (1970) (joint view of ten members of the Judiciary Commit-
tee). The Senate sponsors of the 1965 Act supported its renewal in 1970 in part because the Act 
was so successful in encouraging blacks "running for office in Southern states to help assure 
adequate representation of all interests." Id. at 5520. 
69. For example, the Act defines "voting" to include "all action to make a vote effective." 42 
U.S.C. § 197l(e) (1988); see also supra note 67. As the Supreme Court announced one year 
before the Voting Rights Act was passed, "[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to 
full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies." Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (striking 
down whites-only preprimary selection process on the ground that the right to vote is a right to 
an effective voice in governmental decisionmaking); cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 
U.S. 358 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (blacks should enjoy the opportunity to elect responsive 
officials and have a significant voice in conduct of government affairs). Presidel)t Lyndon John-
son allegedly told Hubert Humphrey during the legislative struggle for the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act: 
Yes, yes, Hubert, I want all those other things - buses, restaurants, all of that - but the 
right to vote with no ifs, ands, or buts, that's the key. When the Negroes get that, they'll 
have every politician, north and south, east and west, kissing their ass, begging for their 
support. 
M. MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 371 (1980); cf. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY 
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 4 (1988) (right to vote is core symbol of democratic ideal that ordi-
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the ultimate instrument of reform.10 
Yet, within contemporary voting rights jurisprudence, mere electo-
ral control by black voters over their representatives has come to sat-
isfy the Act's conception of representation. In search of a statutory 
core value and judicially manageable standards, the courts have cob-
bled from the statute a right to minority electoral success. The courts 
have ignored statutory language providing for the "opportunity ... to 
participate [equally] in the political process" and instead have focused 
exclusively on language securing the "opportunity ... to elect the rep-
resentatives of [the protected group's] choice."71 Especially since 
1986, the courts have measured black political representation and par-
ticipation solely by reference to the number and consistent election of 
black candidates. 72 The submergence of black electoral potential and 
the subsequent emergence of black voting majorities capable of elect-
ing black candidates have become the preferred indicia of a statutory 
violation. 73 Issues of voter participation, effective representation, and 
policy responsiveness are omitted from the calculus. 74 
Given the development of voting rights jurisprudence, current ju-
dicial interpretation of the Act is not surprising. Initially, blacks fo-
cused primarily on first generation, direct impediments to elttctoral 
participation, such as registration and voting barriers. 75 Once these 
obstacles were surmounted, however, the focus shifted to second gen-
eration, indirect structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting 
elections. 76 
nary people would have a stake in government and their grievances addressed through the right 
to elect representatives). · 
70. As President Johnson declared when he signed the historic 1965 Act, "But only the 
individual Negro, and all others who have been denied the right to vote, can really walk through 
those doors, and can use that right, and can transform the vote into an instrument of justice and 
fulfillment." 111 CoNG. REC. 19649, 19650 (Aug. 6, 1965). 
71. See supra note 2. 
72. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 92-93 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Electoral 
success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims."). 
73. See Karlan, supra note 6; Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and 
the Voting Rights Act, 11 VA. L. REv. 1, 8 n.27 (1991). 
74. See, e.g., Mack v. Russell County Commn., No. 90-712 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (three-
judge court), cert. pending 59 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1990) (issue is confined to changes in 
black voting constituency not relative power of black elected officials). 
75. The first generation of voting litigation, and the 1965 statute which represented the con-
gressional response, were concerned with the complete and total exclusion of blacks from the 
electoral process. The initial structure of the Act itself focused on the suspension of literacy 
tests, the deployment of federal registrars, and federal administrative review of local registration 
procedures in covered jurisdictions. Success under the Act was immediate and impressive. The 
number of blacks registered to vote rose dramatically within five years after passage. See Karlan, 
supra note 6, at 183-84. 
76. "[D]ilution is a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, 
combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength 
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With its winner-take-all rules, the at large election format, insti-
tuted by many southern jurisdictions in response to increased black 
registration, essentially allowed a bloc voting racial majority to control 
all the elected positions. Fifty-one percent of the population consist-
ently decided one hundred percent of the elections. In addition, 
although everyone had one vote, some votes were qualitatively less im-
portant than others because of the voter's or the candidate's race or 
both. As a result, the black minority was permanently excluded from 
meaningful participation. 11 
Thus, second generation voting rights litigation focused on "quali-
tative vote dilution." Voting rights activists sought to elect more 
black officials, primarily by creating majority-black single-member dis-
tricts. Indeed, by 1980, the right most closely associated with the Act 
was that of casting a "meaningful" vote for someone who could get 
elected.78 
In 1982, Congress amended the Act to include the right to a mean-
ingful vote. 79 A "meaningful vote" became explicitly a vote for a via-
ble minority preferred representative. 80 In addition, the amendments 
of at least one other group." Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1, 
4 (C. Davidson ed. 1984); see Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified 
sub. nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), where the court considered: 
the essence of racial vote dilution .•• is this: that primariiy because of the interaction of ••• 
racial polarization ... with a challenged election mechanism, a racial minority with distinc-
tive group interests that are capable of aid or amelioration by government is effectively 
denied the political power to further those interests that numbers alone would presump-
tively give it in a voting constituency not racially polarized ••. 
590 F. Supp. at 355 (citations omitted). Structural barriers, such as at-large elections, dilute 
minority voting strength and make voting a futile gesture where the electorate is racially po-
larized. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 
1297 (5th Cir. 1976). At-large elections have been struck down under a constitutional theory of 
discriminatory effects, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), a constitutionally compelled in-
tent test, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), and a statutory results standard, Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
77. While pluralist theories of democracy contemplate minority losses, they do not envision a 
minority that always loses. See infra notes 170-73 (principle of "minority acquiescence" - that 
minorities are supposed to lose - does not contemplate systematic bloc voting). 
78. Encouraged by the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions as popularized by the 
slogan, "one person/one vote," a meaningful vote became a vote undiluted by discriminatory, 
though facially neutral election schemes. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the 
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 649-58 (1983), 
refers to this as a "substantive effects test," which he concedes may be appropriate for fundamen-
tal constitutional rights. 
79. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); see 
supra note 2. 
80. As amended, the statute states that a violation is established if blacks have "less opportu-
nity than other members of the electorate ... to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (1988) (as amended). By codifying the language of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 
(1973), proponents sought to embrace a line of cases with an· established, judicially manageable 
set of standards for ascertaining abridgement of minority voting rights. Blacks would henceforth 
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provided that dilution claims could be proved based on discriminatory 
results alone. 81 Although not sufficient to establish a violation, the 
absence of black elected officials is circumstantial evidence, according 
to the Act's text, of discriminatory results. 82 
From the perspective of its legislative history, the 1982 statute gave 
litigants a flexible tool and a broad mandate to challenge inequalities 
in the political process. Moreover, the statutory language seemed 
vague enough to cover a wide range of political disablements. 83 In-
deed, in light of this vagueness, supporters hoped a "core value" 
would be discovered, distinct from either proportional representation 
or discriminatory purpose. 84 To those reading the legislative history, 
it appeared as if Congress had, consistent with the Act's mandate to 
protect full exercise of the franchise by black voters, 85 avoided both 
finger pointing and finger counting. 86 Within the wide net cast by the 
statute, no particular factor could govern all cases. Yet, once the stat-
ute was enacted, the predictable search began for a justiciable formula, 
ostensibly structured around a central, measurable factor. Foreor-
dained by the nature of their adjudicative task, courts attempted to 
discover which factor could become the first among equals, the center 
around which to balance the other variables. 
The linchpin of pre-1982 constitutional dilution challenges had 
been unresponsiveness. 87 But unresponsiveness, an obvious metaphor 
for political exclusion, was elusive as an evidentiary tool and almost as 
enjoy the statutory right to elect candidates of their choice based on a functional view of their 
political circumstances as reflected in local historic, social, and economic relationships. Dillard 
v. Baldwin County, 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988); cf. Note, Defining the Minon"ty-Pre-
ferred Candidate Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 99 YALE L.J. 1651, 1665-67 (1990). 
81. The Act was amended in response to a 1980 Supreme Court decision cabining dilution 
claims to direct proof of intentional discrimination. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980). 
82. See supra note 2. The statutory disclaimer stated that "[t]he extent to which members of 
a protected class have been elected to office" is relevant, "provided [t]hat'nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). The Senate Report also identified minority 
electoral success as a probative factor. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, repn"nted in 
1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 193 (presence of minority elected officials is a 
"recognized indicator of access to the process") [hereinafter 1982 SENATE REPORT]. 
83. See Mississippi State Chapter Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 
1987); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910 (D.C.N.J. 1986). 
84. Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative His-
tory, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1399-400 (1983); Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 81, at 145, 159-61. 
85. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see also 128 CONG. REc. 14,302-341 
passim (1982). 
86. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. 
Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (D. La. 1983). 
87. See, e.g., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 
485 F.2d 1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane). Unresponsiveness was initially perceived as a 
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difficult and divisive as proving discriminatory purpose. 88 Thus, in its 
place, post-1982 litigators favored evidentiary factors more sensitive to 
sophisticated social science techniques and less malleable by unsympa-
thetic judges. These litigators drew from the one person/ one vote 
quantitative dilution cases, where the issue of impermissible vote dilu-
tion was measured by "objective" evidence of numerical deviations 
from absolute equality. 89 
Because arithmetic had proved useful in the quantitative dilution 
cases, voting rights activists advanced comparable solutions to their 
evidentiary quandary. Activists sought an easily identifiable, uni-
formly enforceable proxy for the judicial inquiry into dilution jurispru-
dence. Expert witnesses were hired to provide "objective" evidence of 
racial vote dilution.90 In particular, the capacity to prove racial bloc 
voting developed through application of computer technology to pre-
cinct by precinct election results. As a result, the "core value" for 
racial vote dilution cases shifted to reflect the value of social science 
evidence. The apparent ability of statistics to simplify and objectify 
racial bloc voting obviated the need for other "gauzy" sociological 
evidence.91 
In addition to its evidentiary sensitivity, litigation focusing on ra-
cial bloc voting had theoretical appeal. The "extent to which voting in 
the [jurisdiction was] racially polarized"92 provided a critical rationale 
for rejecting election arrangements that diluted and submerged black 
voting strength. If whites refused to vote for black candidates, and 
"core value" since it was the unwillingness of the governing body to respond to the needs and 
interests of the minority community that prompted judicial concern in the first place. 
88. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to Mobile v. Bolden: Ha~·e the 
White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L. REV. 1, 43 n.283 
(1982). Proving unresponsiveness involved the awkward task of identifying specific pieces of 
legislation sponsored and supported by particular legislators antagonistic to minority group in-
terests. The claim also could be conclusively rebutted with evidence of peripheral and insignifi-
cant "minority interest" legislation. Because unresponsiveness was judicially unmanageable, 
litigators convinced Congress to demote unresponsiveness to optional rebuttal. Unresponsive-
ness became a relevant factor only to the extent plaintiffs chose to prove it. See 1982 SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 82, at 29 n.116, reprinted at 207 n.116. 
89. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738-39 (1983). 
90. One of the most successful efforts involved the analysis of election returns using both the 
"interocular" test and "bivariate regression" to demonstrate polarization in the electorate, 
although sophisticated racial bloc voting analyses did not surface in dilution litigation until the 
late 1970s. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 
(1980). After the 1982 amendments, however, proof of racial bloc voting assumed primary im-
portance. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55 (1986). 
91. See Mobile v. City of Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 n.17 (1980) (dilution claim rejected based 
simply on gauzy sociological evidence). 
92. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1982) (listing typical, evidentiary factors to be 
considered within a totality of circumstances analysis). 
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whites were in the majority, then political market failure existed.93 
Although politics involves winners and inevitable losers, pluralist the-
ory depends on a fluid exchange between the two. If one group is 
permanently excluded, political remedies ultimately will be bypassed 
in favor of less mainstream altematives.94 
That whites and blacks voted in racial blocs ultimately became the 
preferred evidentiary linchpin. Many courts, however, still felt adrift 
in a sea of factors. Jurisprudential parameters establishing cause and 
effect, not just evidentiary anchors, were needed. 95 Courts demanded 
judicially manageable instructions which dictated where to draw the 
line between marginal and substantive claims. If dilution was the sub-
mergence of minority votes in a racially polarized electorate, then 
courts needed a mechanism for distinguishing that phenomenon from 
undilution. The courts looked to the language of the statute for an 
answer. 
Because the key statutory phrase characterized equal opportunity 
in the political process in terms of being able to elect "representatives 
of choice," judicial intervention appeared to be limited to claims that 
racially polarized voting denied blacks the ability to elect viable black 
candidates. Black electoral success, which apparently defined undilu-
tion, became the statutory metaphor for equal political opportunity.96 
93. See supra note 77. 
94. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning 
that political second class status for blacks provides short-lived, superficial tranquility because, 
without a reasonable judicial remedy, "the victims of discrimination" could not be long expected 
"to respect political channels of seeking redress"); see also infra note 107. 
95. Although racial bloc voting was relatively easy to prove, it seemed omnipresent; every 
election system in every jurisdiction with some black population was vulnerable. Yet, judicial 
intervention would not halt the private racial preferences of individual voters. Whereas racial 
bloc voting might explain political market failure, it failed to identify which election schemes in 
particular were responsible and remediable. 
96. The absence of proportional representation alone was not evidence of a violation. This 
absence, however, was still useful as a rhetorical device and to establish a baseline definitional 
floor of political inequality. At the same time, the presence of roughly proportional black repre-
sentation defined the limits of equality. As Justice O'Connor observes, proportionate representa-
tion is an inexact concept. In a jurisdiction that is 40% black, a governing body with either 30% 
or 50% black representation would be sufficient to establish "undilution." Thornburg v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30, 88-89 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As predicted by the 1982 amendments 
opponents, both the tool and the mandate became confined by judicial interpretation to the right 
to elect black representatives. But, contrary to opponents' claims, proportional representation 
was a ceiling rather than a floor. Even successful plaintiffs did not necessarily enjoy black repre-
sentation proportionate to the black voting strength in the community. McGhee v. Granville 
Cty., 860 F.2d 110, 120 (4th Cir. 1988). The phenomenon of the floor becoming the ceiling is not 
unusual in legal and other prescriptive discourses. See letter from Frank Michelman to author 
(Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with author). As long as black electoral success was consistent and 
proportionate, further scrutiny of black representation was discouraged. Thornburg v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. at 77, 80 (remanding House District 23 because blacks enjoyed consistent, proportion-
ate representation); see infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text. The quality of black represen-
tation was not investigated. Id. (describing black voters' unexamined claim in Durham that a 
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The right to a meaningful voice through voting thus became simply 
the right to elect minority "representatives of choice." 
The litigation model's conception of representation produced a 
very limited vision of the relationship between black voters and black 
elected officials. Neither the degree of responsiveness of the elected 
official nor the tendency of the electoral process to depress black par-
ticipation triggered coverage. 97 The fact of election was the threshold 
factor.98 Mere electoral ratification by black voting majorities suppos-
edly assured representational authenticity, authority, legitimacy, and 
responsiveness. 
In addition to proving the existence of dilution, black electoral suc-
cess also became the preferred remedy. Once a violation was estab-
lished, the cure was to subdivide larger, heterogeneous electorates into 
smaller, homogeneous, majority-black districts where black voters 
could elect candidates of their choice to the governing body.99 
Full exercise of the franchise was the Act's ennobling goal. But, 
juridical preference for easy-to-apply, judicially manageable racial vote 
dilution standards prompted the search for quantifiable and uniform 
measures of empowerment.100 Litigators sought standards they could 
meet by using less costly social science evidence. In addition, Con-
gress' failure to articulate a clear core value for defining political 
black elected through single shot voting was not adequately representing their interests because 
he was more directly beholden to white voters in the multimember district). 
97. I make this claim notwithstanding the language in the legislative history accompanying 
the 1982 amendments which recognizes the relevance of a "depressed socio-economic condition" 
to judicial enforcement of the Act. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 82, at 29 & n.114, 
reprinted at 206-07 & n.114. The role of the representative has simply not been explored. The 
only discussion in the ca5e law, for example, of the nature of representation involves some recent 
cases discussing judicial coverage under the Act based on the judicial "function." See League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en 
bane), cert. granted sub. nom. Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 111 S. Ct. 775 
(1991) (judges are not electorally accountable and are therefore not representatives subject to the 
Voting Rights Act). But cf. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200 (S.D. Miss. 1987), cited 
with approval in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 853 F.2d 1186 
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin Am. Citi-
zens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Houston Law-
yers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991). 
98. The statute tracks the electorally triggering approach taken by the Supreme Court in one 
person/one vote cases. See, e.g., New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 
(1989) (fact of election subjects board to constitutional scrutiny under the fourteenth amend· 
ment). According to the Eleventh Circuit, "The language [of Section 2] is only and uncompro-
misingly premised on the fact of nomination or election." Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 831 F.2d 
246, 251 (1987). 
99. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977); McGhee v. Granville County, 860 
F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988); accord Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315, 333 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971); see also Parker, Racial 
Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76, 
at 85, 111-13. 
100. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
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equality prompted voting rights lawyers to advance interpretations of 
the statutory scheme in response to complaints about the absence of 
black representation within the context of a viable, judicial remedy. 
Voting rights case law thus evolved within a racial justice model 
that accepted as its premise the fact that people of different races often 
lived and voted differently from each other. Rather than insisting that 
such separateness and difference be eradicated, as in the school deseg-
regation context, or that poor blacks, isolated from and stigmatized by 
an unresponsive government, be afforded equal government services, 
as in equalization of municipal services litigation, 101 the Voting Rights 
Act model of racial justice recognized racial difference. Group per-
spective was valued and legitimated by promoting electoral opportuni-
ties for black representation.102 Using the conjunction of racial 
identifiability and geographic insularity as a convenient proxy for soci-
etal discrimination and political group consciousness, the litigation vi-
sion of political equality promulgated four complementary 
assumptions that eventually became the theory of black electoral 
success. 
First, the litigation focused exclusively on electoral outcomes. The 
absence of black elected officials became both the symptom and the 
cause of political inequality. In other words, political equality was de-
fined exclusively in terms of the electoral opportunities afforded a 
"fair" number of authentic - meaning chosen by the community -
black representatives. 
Second, the right to political equality was granted as a premise. 
But as the concept to which the statutory right referred, "political 
equality" required definition. Ultimately, the phrase was defined in 
terms of the ability of black voters to elect black representatives in 
rough proportion to their presence in the population. 
Although the voting rights model explicitly rejected "quotas,"103 
choosing instead to speak in terms of "results,"104 numerical propor-
tionality sufficed to establish legality.105 If twelve percent of elected 
officials nationwide were black, presumably reflective of the percent-
age of blacks within the population, the litigation model of political 
equality was satisfied. 
101. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972). 
102. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 
(1977). 
103. See supra note 96. 
104. See Derfner, supra note 84, at 159-60. 
105. The voting rights model exemplifies the problem of racial proportionality as a remedy. 
Freeman, supra note 7, at 96, 102-03. 
1100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1077 
Thus, roughly proportionate black representation legitimated the 
electoral process. The idea underlying this concept was that only after 
previously excluded groups were successful within the electoral pro-
cess would the white majority learn to accept black representatives as 
colleagues in collective govemance;106 only then would blacks invest 
in the normal channels of electoral mobilization and eschew more 
activist protest strategies. I07 These themes formed the basis for the 
authenticity and electoral mobilization assumptions of a black empow-
erment theory of representation. 
Third, majority rule was unquestioned as long as the majority ad-
mitted a fair number of blacks to its decisionmaking council. Minority 
electoral presence "softened the harshness of the principal of majority 
rule." 108 By virtue of their electoral success within majority-black dis-
tricts, black representatives had representational presence, which was 
. equated with authority and responsiveness to their distinctive group 
interests. 
Fourth, political equality was judicially enforced by subdividing 
the electorate into single-member districts, a "fair" number of which 
were controlled by black voters. Single-member districting was the 
judicially preferred remedy for electoral discrimination.109 Moreover, 
the chosen enforcement mechanism, electoral ratification in majority-
black single-member districts, itself became a goal because it appealed 
as a pragmatic, political tool to both the integrationists and the 
nationalists. 
Both nationalists and integrationists contemplated that small dis-
tricts, controlled by black majorities, would be the best tool for ensur-
ing minority inclusion, encouraging greater citizen involvement in 
decisionmaking processes, simplifying organizing efforts, and reflect-
ing residential and social segregationist reality. 110 The emergence of 
black majority electoral districts became a justiciable proxy for black 
inclusion in the exercise of government authority. This remedy satis-
106. The model assumes that in majority-white jurisdictions, whites must overcome the last-
ing legacy of Reconstruction era stereotypes to vote for black candidates. See infra notes 164-79 
and accompanying text. 
107. See T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 880 (quoting John Lewis, then head of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), at the August 1963 March on Washington); S. 
KARNIG & A. WELCH, supra note 60, at 15 (until blacks given fair share of political power, 
danger of continued widespread violence); U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT. UNFULFILLED GOALS 63 (1981); Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and 
the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 571, 590 n.106 (1978). See gener-
ally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
108. See letter from Jim Blacksher to author (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author). 
109. See supra note 99. 
110. See, e.g., s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 15-16; infra notes 237-39. 
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fied the activists, who eventually abandoned a mass movement in ex-
change for election-oriented litigation campaigns.111 
As an enforcement mechanism, the black single-member district 
strategy achieved three separate functions: first, it provided a success-
ful litigation approach to challenge the failure of the election to pro-
duce elected black officials; second, it gave courts a justiciable 
standard to determine the problems and progress that were closely re-
lated to the ultimate limits of the voting rights inquiry; and third, as I 
argue in the next Part, it "inescapably closed the door" on the real 
goal of the civil rights movement, which was to alter the material con-
dition of the lives of America's subjugated minorities.112 
II. THE THEORY OF BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
Q: Now, why would you come from Crittenden County to partici-
pate in a fundraiser for a county race that was basically a local race to 
Phillips County? 
A: Well, the reason I would come, first of all, there are no blacks 
elected to a county position in eastern Arkansas and no blacks serving in 
the House of Representatives in eastern Arkansas and no blacks elected 
to anything other than school boards in districts that are predominantly 
black. And I feel like blacks should be elected to public office because 
they should have a chance to serve. 
And I want to help get blacks elected so little black children can see 
them serving and I want to dispell (sic) the myth that some whjte kids 
might have that blacks can't serve or shouldn't be serving at the court-
house. And when my little girl goes to the courthouse or when other 
little girls go to the courthouse, I want them to be able to see black 
people working up there. 
And if we can get some blacks elected at the local level, eventually 
we can - blacks will have the expertise and we can groom them to the 
point where they can run for the state legislature and other positions . 
• • • 113 ! 
Black electoral success theory defines descriptively black represen-
tation as a meaningful empowerment goal of structural reform legisla-
tion and litigation. The theory contains four basic assumptions: (1) 
the authenticity assumption; (2) the mobilization/electoral control as-
111. J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STUDY OF BLACK 
AMERICANS HOLDING GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE 20 (1976) (89% of black officials surveyed be-
lieved court actions very important in achieving real progress); C. STONE, BLACK POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 10 (1970) (age of demonstrations has passed to age of the ballot). 
112. See letter from Samuel Issacharotr to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (on file with author). 
113. Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), ajfd. by equally 
divided coun, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (trial transcript at 654-55) (testimony of 
black state legislator Ben McGee, who was elected to the Arkansas House from a majority-black 
single-member district created as a result of a successful voting rights challenge in Smith v. 
Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310 (1988)). 
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sumption; (3) the polarization assumption; and ( 4) the responsiveness/ 
reform assumption. District-based electoral ratification by black vot-
ers is the theory's primary enforcement mechanism. 
In this Part, I analyze each of these assumptions. I conclude that 
the black electoral success empowerment model fails to provide a real-
istic enforcement mechanism for establishing either leadership ac-
countability within the black community or representational 
effectiveness within the legislative deliberation and coalition-building 
process. The theory marginalizes black leadership and leads to token 
representation. Black electoral success theory has failed to compre-
hend, or even to examine, the nature of representation within collec-
tive decisionmaking bodies controlled by prejudice and external 
inequalities. . 
My critique of the black electoral success model rests essentially on 
three claims. First, the status of blacks as a discrete, disadvantaged 
minority cannot be addressed simply by mobilizing blacks to turn out 
on election day to elect more black candidates. Black representatives 
are not necessarily effective advocates for legislative responsiveness. 
Second, the prejudice and hostility facing blacks within the polit-
ical process cannot be eradicated by creating majority-black single-
member districts from which black candidates can be elected. Black 
legislators, especially those representing geographically segregated dis-
tricts, may be victims of prejudice. Thus, if racially polarized voting 
results in electoral market failure, then the concept of political em-
powerment must also address failed legislative decisionmaking. Mi-
nority empowerment requires minority legislative influence, not just 
minority legislative presence. In other words, blacks must develop ex-
plicit mechanisms for overcoming majority prejudice in the governing 
policymaking body. 
Finally, the first two claims will not be fully resolved until we focus 
on the concept of proportionate interest representation, which has re-
ceived virtually no attention from civil rights lawyers or scholars. By 
directly undermining the legitimacy of winner-take-all majority rule, 
proportionate interest representation responds to domination by a hos-
tile, permanent majority. 
A. The Authenticity Assumption: Black Elected Officials Are 
Authentic Role Models 
Authentic black representation, or "descriptive" representation, 114 
114. Descriptive representation is representation by culturally and physically similar per-
sons. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967); Grofman, Should Rep· 
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is the first important building block for black electoral success theory. 
Authenticity refers to community-based and culturally rooted leader-
ship. The concept also distinguishes between minority-sponsored and 
white-sponsored black candidates.115 Basically, authentic representa-
tion describes the psychological value of black representation. The 
term is suggestive of the essentialist impulse in black political partici-
pation: because black officials are black, they are representative. 116 
Thus, authenticity reflects the importance of race in defining the char-
acter of black political participation.117 
Authentic leadership is electorally supported by a majority of 
black voters and is, at its best, culturally similar to its constituency 
base. Thus, authenticity subsumes two separate concepts, the political 
and the cultural. Black representatives are authentic because they are 
elected by blacks and because they are descriptively similar to their 
constituents. In other words, they are politically, psychologically, and 
culturally black. 
1. Political Authenticity 
Authentic leaders are those elected by black voters. In voting 
rights terminology, electoral ratification from majority-black, single-
member districts establishes authenticity. These facts distinguish the 
authentic representatives from those officials who are handpicked by 
the "establishment," or who must appeal to white voters in order to 
resentatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING lssUES 
(B. Grofman ed. 1982). 
115. Authentic representatives need not be black as long as the source of their authority, 
legitimacy, and power base is the black community. White candidates elected from majority-
black constituencies may therefore be considered "black" representatives. Nevertheless, the term 
usually connotes a minority group member. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of 
Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1987) ("black preference is determined from elections which 
offer the choice of a black candidate"). Although some civil rights advocates acknowledge that 
whites who are sponsored by and elected within a majority-black constituency can and do repre-
sent minority interests, very few would support as authentic leaders whites who are elected 
within a majority-white constituency with some black support. Others claim that even minority-
sponsored white candidates elected within a majority-black jurisdiction, while sympathetic, are 
not generally perceived as aggressive advocates of black interests. As discussed infra, the real 
ambivalence asserts itself regarding the election of black representatives outside majority-black 
districts with some black support. 
116. See infra notes 253-55 (discussing responsiveness assumption). Representatives are any 
elected government officials, arguably including members of the judiciary. See supra notes 97, 
115. 
117. See, e.g., c. STONE, R. WHELAN & w. MURIN, URBAN POLICY AND POLITICS IN A 
BUREAUCRATIC AGE 17 (1986) (few factors are more important to contemporary urban politics 
than race or ethnicity); Fainstein & Fainstein, The Racial Dimension in Urban Political Economy, 
25 URB. AFF. Q. 187 (1989) (arguing that race plays a critical independent role in determining 
political outcomes and political roles for blacks). But cf. Marable, supra note 24, at 20 (race-
based strategy for social change minimizes growing class differences within black community). 
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get elected.118 Establishment-endorsed blacks are unlikely to be au-
thentic because they are not elected as the representatives of choice of 
the black community. 119 In addition, these officials are often marginal 
community members whose only real connection with black constitu-
ents is skin color. Electoral support by a majority of black voters is 
thus a convenient proxy for political authenticity. 
2. Cultural and Psychological Authenticity 
In addition to electoral ratification, authenticity refers to a cultural 
and psychological view of group solidarity. Black representatives are 
not just physically black. Because they grew up being black, these 
officials enjoy a cultural and psychic linkage that cuts across class 
lines. Black electoral success theory suggests that black elected offi-
cials, who are physically and culturally similar to their constituents, 
fulfill the black community's need for self-affirmation through "role 
models." 120 
From students protesting the absence of black college121 and law 
professors, 122 to church leaders ostensibly supporting black commu-
nity needs, 123 black activists and white sympathizers consistently de-
scribe their efforts, at least to some extent, in terms of finding and 
promoting black role models. By their presence, role models articu-
late black interests and represent the needs of aspiring young 
blacks.124 Role models are living symbols of the equal opportunity 
ll8. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thom· 
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (trial transcript) (blacks elected from majority-white multi-
member districts sail trim, meaning they defer to other blacks to introduce and promote 
controversial legislation that would affect black constituents); infra note 308. 
119. Defendant jurisdictions are challenged when they attempt to get credit for establish-
ment endorsed black leaders, unless they produce evidence that a majority of black voters also 
supported the candidate. See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989); Gingles, 
590 F. Supp. at 345. The litigator's approach is to examine voting patterns to determine whether 
the election system enables the black community to elect its own candidates or whether black 
officials are chosen instead by white voters. 
120. See, e.g., May, After 40 Years Making the Law, Rodino Now Teaches It, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 25, 1989, at Bl, col. 4 (black representative better serves as role model for black youths); see 
also supra note 4 (role models who speak in a representational capacity become "spokesmodcls"). 
But see infra note 147 (spokesmodels may not articulate community-based vision). 
121. Lee, Minority Issues Lie Behind Protest Over Cutting of Budget at CUNY, N.Y. Times, 
May 28, 1990, at Al, col. 5. 
122. See, e.g., Butterfield, Harvard Law School Torn by Race Issue, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 
1990, at A20, col. 1. 
123. Teltsch, Bronx Church Honors a 'Role Model: N.Y. Times, May 27, 1990, at A30, col. 
1. 
124. For example, some blacks claim that as teachers they have "a clear, racial representa-
tional function," meaning that they both "comprehend" and "represent" the needs and interests 
of all black students. See Bell, Statement, reprinted in MINORITY GROUPS NEWSLETfER 18 
May, 1990 (section on AALS) (advocating on behalf of black women role models and mentors); 
see also Austin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 574 (Many role models are "black 
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process.125 They reflect the importance of group consciousness to 
black psychic identity. 
Black elected officials are among the most prominent "role mod-
els." 126 The election of black representatives affirms that blacks are 
participating citizens who take an active interest in policy decisions 
that affect their lives. Authentic representatives also provide psycho-
logical uplift by affirming black culture, humanity, and group 
solidarity. 
In the electoral context, role models mediate the paradox of a rep-
resentative democracy in which all citizens are equal, but some are 
more equal than others.127 Including all sectors of society in govern-
ment operation is consistent with Madison's vision.128 In a representa-
tive democracy, however, all citizens cannot be directly involved in 
decisionmaking. Some citizens are either "actually" or "virtually" 
represented.129 Role model theory justifies the representative principle 
by referring to a black leadership aristocracy which leads other blacks 
by virtue of their own achievement and sense of social responsibil-
ity.130 The idea of a black leadership aristocracy was no doubt influ-
people who have achieved stature and power in the white world because they supposedly repre-
sent the interests of the entire black community. Such role models gain capital (literally and 
figuratively) to the extent that they project an assimilated persona that is as unthreatening to 
white people as it is (supposed to be) intriguing to our young."). 
125. For example, minority faculty assist minority student recruitment by suggesting the 
opportunity to provide mentors for minority students and "hint[ing] at a culturally and ethni-
cally heterogeneous campus environment." Minority Issues in Legal Education, LA w SERVS. 
REP., May-June 1990, at 4, 13; see infra notes 132-33. 
126. See, e.g., Ayres, Drug Trial Begins for Mayor Barry, Prosecution Says It Is a CaSe of 
Addiction and Deceit, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1990, at A2, col. 5 (in the recent prosecution of D.C. 
Mayor Marion Barry for drug use and perjury, "[t]he role model issue was unescapable."). 
127. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY PoLmcs FOR A NEW AGE 145-
47, 291 (1984) (principle ofrepresentation that rescues democracy from the problems of scale is 
itself inherently oligarchical; representation is incompatible with equality and social justice); cf. 
Abrams, supra note 6, at 479 (representative democracy embodies unresolved tension between 
equality of all citizens and the greater participation of a few as important policy decisionmakers). 
128. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) (rejecting elitist plutocracy). 
129. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 50-55 (1986); see also Guinier, Keeping the Faith, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 393, 427-29 (1989) (actual representation involves direct election by constituents; 
virtual representation consists of representation by someone elected by another constituency with 
common interests and sympathies). 
130. See Dubois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM 31, 45 (Amo Press ed. 
1969) (1903). In Dubois' view, the "talented," whose own ability would be maximized, would 
make racially unique contributions, thus raising up the level of the race they represented. J. 
DEMARCO, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF W.E.B. DUBOIS 46 n.61, 48, 51 n.73 (1983). The ideal 
political system would enfranchise the talented tenth whose own empowerment and sense of 
social responsibility would benefit the masses. Dubois advanced a theory of self-development, 
voluntary self-segregation, and personal intellectual achievement to create an avant-garde that 
convinced whites blacks were worthy of help. E. RUDWICK, W.E.B. DUBOIS: A STUDY IN 
MINORITY GROUP LEADERSHIP 291 (1960). 
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enced by W.E.B. Dubois' repudiated belief in a "talented tenth."131 
As role models, these black achievers presumptively represent 
equal opportunity. With few exceptions, their election signals that so-
ciety's institutions are "color-blind" pure meritocracies. 132 Role mod-
els, who convey the message "We Have Overcome," also inspire those 
not yet overcoming.133 Thus, in general, black role models are power-
ful symbolic reference points for those worried· about the continued 
legacy of past discrimination. 
Some critics assert that the authenticity assumption is a meaning-
less cultural and descriptive concept. For example, Abigail Thern-
strom, an outspoken critic of the conventional empowerment model, 
denies the empirical or theoretical validity of culturally similar repre-
sentatives, because whites can represent black interests.134 Thern-
strom attempts to revive the theory of virtual representation in which 
black interests are occasionally taken into account even if they are not 
actively promoted.135 Thernstrom argues that the single act of voting 
131. Id. Even though Dubois ultimately abandoned his early proposals for a talented tenth, 
the concept remained influential to the advancement of middle-class aspirations and opportunity. 
In many ways, treatment of the talented tenth became a barometer of the degree to which blacks 
bad overcome racism, both as a direct measure of equal opportunity for individual black 
achievers and as an indirect measure of the lowered racial barriers for those disadvantaged blacks 
still suffering disproportionate levels of poverty and deprivation. Cf. Brooks, Life After Tenure: 
Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 423 
(1986) (arguing that black middle class is in position to speak on behalf of black problems in 
general). 
132. In the electoral context, promoting black role models is important to convince other 
blacks that the system is working. See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Stud-
ies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 310 (1987); Freeman, supra 
note 7, at 96, 110. 
133. Black elected officials are not only important role models, but their election, even in a 
majority-white electorate, also legitimates them as group spokespersons. The spokesmodel the· 
ory of empowerment affirms the status of blacks as full citizens who can not only vote but can 
also bold elective office. The individual advancement of black elected officials inspires black 
constituents to believe in the system, and the individual elected official, as a racial spokesperson, 
attests reliably to the soundness of that belief. Especially since it was assumed that black role 
models were meaningful cultural symbols, then spokesmodels were even more meaningful 
bridges to those less fortunate. See, e.g., A. RAMPERSAD, THE ART AND IMAGINATION OF 
W.E.B. DUBOIS 81 (1976) (Dubois recognized the need for a process of "natural selection" of 
indigenous black leadership); see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1973); Aus-
tin, supra note 124, at 575 ("By their sheer visibility, [role models] are of service to those left 
behind. They are functionally useful in providing images for emulation •••. "). 
134. Tbernstrom's theory of representation is essentially that representation is a neutral out-
come reflecting voter preference. In the absence of intentional discrimination, efforts to ensure 
"black" representation promote legislative set asides or electoral "quotas." A. THERN5fROM, 
supra note 67, at 237-38. Thernstrom's theory of voting rights bas received considerable atten-
tion, in part because its proponent utilizes effectively the inflammatory language of quotas. See, 
e.g., Greenhouse, The "Quota" Dispute Battle Over Civil Rights Bill Involves Larger Debate Con-
sidering Race, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at AlO, col. 5 (in issues of race, no word is "more 
emotionally loaded or universally shunned than 'quota' "); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 
U.S. 52, 63-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (condemning "racial electoral registers" and race 
conscious districting which. encourages racial partisans). 
135. But see generally Guinier, supra note 129, at 427-29 (concept of color-blind, virtual 
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for any representative legitimates democratic self-govemment.136 
Themstrom's emphasis on color-blind, virtual representation ab-
stracts the black experience from its historical context.137 Virtual rep-
resentation ignores the existence of group identity within the black 
community. Themstrom's theory reduces electoral participation to 
the individual unit within the voting booth. At that level, the percep-
tion is most acute that one vote will have a negligible effect on the 
ultimate outcome.138 Moreover, in neglecting the role of blacks and 
whites as politically cohesive groups, Th,emstrom's electoral self-legiti-
mating focus fails to acknowledge the role that group identity plays in 
mobilizing political participation and influencing legislative policy.139 
Empirical research also refutes the efficacy of race-neutral theories of 
virtual representation.140 
Even when elected officials are unresponsive and voters do not par-
ticipate enthusiastically, some scholars suggest that voters are still vir-
tually or collectively represented if the legislature as a whole is 
representative.141 These scholars suggest that representation is an in-
stitutional rather than a personal relationship.142 Black electoral sue-
representation disenfranchises where interests of those "virtually" represented are not fungible 
with those "actually" represented). 
136. Actual participation by group members in an extended political process becomes super-
fluous because nondiscriminating representatives are responsive to their electoral constituency 
regardless of race. The assumptions supporting this hypothesis have already been carefully dis-
sected elsewhere. See, e.g., F. PARKER, BLACK VOTES CoUNT (1990); Abrams, supra note 6, at 
481-88 (individual ,preferences not easily aggregated nor translated into governing policies); 
Guinier, supra note 129, at 427; Karlan & Mccrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abi-
gail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act (Book Review), 4 J. L & POL. 751, 776-77 (1988). 
137. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 101 (ideology offungibility fails to deal with the concrete-
ness of black experience). _ 
138. See B. BARBER, supra note 127, at xiii (citing "crisis in participation"); Ackerman, The 
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1034-35 (1984) (citing 
problems of apathy and uninformed voting); Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating 
Political Alternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 185, 187 (1984); cf. S. VERBA & N. NIE, supra note 
27, at 31 (table 2-1). 
139. Most significantly, virtual representation is one step further removed from vicarious 
representation through political spokesmodels. At least the possibility of electing a descriptively 
similar representative mobilizes black voter turnout. Virtual representation, by contrast, offers 
nothing to animate participation. To the contrary, virtual representation undermines the funda-
mental values of participation in a democracy. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
140. For example, studies suggest that House members are most responsive to their most 
supportive constituency. R. FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 234 
(1978); cf. infra notes 152-53, 158. and accompanying text. 
141. Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 535 
(1978). 
142. Id.; H. EULAU & K. PREWITI, LABYRINTHS OF DEMOCRACY: ADAPTATIONS, LINK-
AGES, REPRESENTATION, AND POLICIES IN URBAN PoLmCS (1973) (voters may in fact be bet-
ter represented by legislators outside their district); cf. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 
144 (1977) (white voter in majority-black district with nonwhite representative will be repre-
sented by legislator elected from other majority-white districts to the extent voting is along racial 
lines). 
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cess proponents dismiss such arguments as self-serving, because 
"institutional representation" has widened the gap between whites and 
blacks143 and has resulted in general voter disenchantment. 144 
I, too, reject the criticism that authentic black representation is 
meaningless. Authenticity reflects the group consciousness, group his-
tory, and group perspective of a disadvantaged and stigmatized minor-
ity. Authenticity recognizes that black voters are a discrete "social 
group"145 with a distinctive voice. As I argue below, authentic repre-
sentation also facilitates black voter mobilization, participation, and 
confidence in the process of self-government.146 
Authenticity, however, is a limited empowerment tool. As a de-
scriptive matter, authenticity uses the nominally cultural to obscure its 
substantively political meaning. Although an important source of au-
thority and legitimacy, electoral ratification by black voters fails to 
furnish a consistent mechanism for establishing community-based cre-
dentials or leadership accountability. Electoral success by culturally 
and ethnically black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions does 
not necessarily mean that black concerns will be addressed.147 
For example, where "authentic blacks" are elected by whites with 
significant black support, electoral ratification by a majority of those 
blacks voting may not in fact send a recognizable message regarding 
substantive policies.148 Especially in winner-take-all electoral systems, 
"the aggregation device of the election garbles these messages, produc-
ing winners while obscuring the reasons for their victories."149 Thus, 
143. See A CoMMON DESTINY 6 (G. Janes & R. Williams eds. 1989); R. FARLEY & W. 
ALLEN, THE CoLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA (1989). 
J44. Oreskes, As Problems Fester, Voters Send Pink Slips, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at ES, 
col. 1; see also supra note 138; Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout in Primaries, Once Again, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 4, 1990, at B16, col. 4 [hereinafter Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout] (Committee for the 
Study of the American Electorate reports widespread decline in voter turnout). 
145. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 
ETHICS 250, 259·61 (1989) (concept of social group is distinguished from simple aggregate or 
association of people by its special history, identity, values, and expressive style; social group is 
defined primarily by members' sense of personal identity derived from group affinity and rela-
tional differentiations from other nongroup members); see also infra notes 256-57. 
146. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
147. See'infra notes 275-83 (election of authentically black candidates in majority-black dis-
tricts does not necessarily mean that those black elected incumbents will be responsive to the 
needs of the black community); see also infra notes 227-44 (authentic blacks not effective because 
they remain a discrete, insular legislative minority). 
148. Where electoral ratification is imprecise because, for example, the black elected role 
model is elected in a majority-white jurisdiction, cultural authenticity alone often substitutes as a 
mechanism for defining and validating the "black" leader. See infra notes 196-201. 
149. Abrams, supra note 6, at 487. Even where an electoral majority sends a clear message, 
the representative may have difficulty translating this message into substantive policy. She 
may be unable to persuade her legislative colleagues or she may feel obliged to support 
initiatives opposed by those who elected her. She may be subject to pressure from constitu-
ent groups or other organized interests not responsible for her election. Alternatively, a 
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even where black support provides a critical margin, 150 successful 
black candidates in majority-white electorates do not necessarily feel 
obligated to black voters.151 
B. The Mobilization Assumption 
The mobilization assumption claims that black electoral success 
directly affects black political participation at the grassroots level.152 
To the extent that blacks can be encouraged to participate in the polit-
ical process, the possibility of electing a "first" black tends to increase 
election day turnout. 153 Indeed, the courts and commentators have 
recognized that the inability to elect black candidates depresses black 
representative's incumbency may so insulate her from electoral pressures that she feels little 
need to respond to constituent demands. 
Id. Cf. Barnes, Into the Mainstream; 22 NATL. J. 262 (1990) (Virginia black governor Wilder 
"may become less accessible and less accountable politically to blacks whose demands will be 
competing for attention against those of Virginia's white-majority constituency - and those of 
Wilder's large campaign contributors"). 
150. The black "swing vote" is not usually critical unless there is a close split in the white 
vote. See Williams, Blacks Cast Pivotal Ballots in Four Key Senate Races, Data Show, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at A33, col. 3. Moreover, white political beneficiaries of the swing vote are 
often unaware of its decisive impact or deliberately ignore it because of even more decisive white 
support. Davidson, supra note 76, at 9-10; see also Stodghill, After the Victory Party, Frustration 
in the Black Community, Bus. WK., Jan. 8, 1990, at 49. 
151. In Virginia, where Douglas Wilder is the first black elected Governor since Reconstruc-
tion, some commentators have interpreted his victory as a "new black politics:" But cf. Ayres, 
Virginia Governor Baffles Democrats With Crusade for "New Mainstream," N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 
1990, at A22, col. 1 (Wilder considers himself "a governor who happens to be black, not a black 
who happens to be governor."); Smothers, supra note 56, at B7, col. 1. Others see Wilder's win 
as the triumph of a single-issue constituency in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions on 
abortion. In either case, given the narrow margin of victory, Wilder's ability to govern on other 
issues important to the black community is considerably vitiated. Cf. infra notes 170, 280 and 
accompanying text. 
152. Abrams, supra note 6, at 501 (Black election is a crucial aid to political morale "demon-
strating to minority voters that defeat is no longer inevitable, and that there is someone in the 
government who will respond to their interests."); see L. COLE, BLACKS IN POWER 110-18, 221-
23 (1976); J. CONYERS & w. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 6-7; Montague, The Voting Rights Act 
Today, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 56 (statement ofB. Grofman); Morris, Black Electoral Partici-
pation and the Distribution of Public Benefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76, at 
275, 277 (political efficacy and level of trust in government affect black turnout); see also A. 
THERNSTROM, supra note 67, at 122 (quoting Rolando Rios, legal director, Southwest Voter 
Registration Education Project) ("When Hispanic candidates do not get elected, he said, they 
cease to run, and without minority candidates, Hispanics do not vote."). 
153. D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 5 at 245 (quoting G. McWorter, D. Gills & R. Bailey, 
Black Power Politics as Social Movement: Dialectics of Leadership in the Campaign to Elect 
Harold Washington, 8-9 (1984) (unpublished manuscript, Afro-American Studies and Research, 
University of Illinois, Urbana)) (black organizations worked so closely not everybody knew 
"what group they were working under: Everybody seemed just to know.what they were working 
for: the election of Chicago's first Black Mayor.") (emphasis added); id. at 244-47; Pettigrew, 
Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORmES (H. Bryce ed. 1976) 
(black turnout declined second time a black candidate ran); see also S. KARNIG & A. WELCH, 
supra note 60; D. McADAM, PoLmCAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSUR-
GENCY 51 (1982); cf. Johnson, Racial Politics: Chicago's Raw Nerve, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1989, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 37 (The night in 1983 Harold Washington was elected Chicago's first black 
mayor, "black people literally danced in the streets of Chicago. They had voted in record num-
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political participation.154 
The mobilization assumption measures representational effective-
ness based on the ability of black candidates to increase black election 
day turnout. Both this assumption and the authenticity assumption 
presume that black voters will vote for, respect, be affirmed by, and 
seek services from black elected officials. Neither assumption, how-
ever, proposes an ongoing relationship between the representative and 
the represented. Nor do the assumptions provide a mechanism, other 
than electoral ratification, for measuring representativeness. In addi-
tion, authentic black elected officials may not effectively mobilize sus-
tained black participation, even when measured by the mobilization 
assumption's own terms. 
The mobilization assumption fails to anticipate the difficulties that 
black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions encounter when they 
seek simultaneously to appeal to white voters while retaining their 
black political base. 155 Black voters, who feel neglected and taken for 
granted by the black candidates "walking the tightrope," may not re-
spond to opportunities for increased black electoral visibility.156 
When blacks are elected by whites with symbolic black support, their 
victory represents a psychological, but not necessarily substantive 
triumph.157 
The mobilization assumption has also depended in large part on 
empirical evidence supplied by first-time election opportunities. The 
assumption fails to explain how black electoral success will generate 
sustained black election-day turnout. 158 Reelection opportunities may 
fail to mobilize voter participation, even in majority-black single-mem-
bers, charging to the polls by car, by bicycle, by foot, by wheelchair. There were elderly blacks 
who said they had never voted before. Now, finally, they had a reason to vote."). 
154. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (11th Cir. 1984); Hendrix 
v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 631-32 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of 
°Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. La. 1986), affd., 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); see also 
supra note 152. 
155. See supra note 151; see, also Smothers, Omen for Young: Low Black Turnout, N.Y. 
Times, July 19, 1990, at B6, col. 4 (in Andrew Young's Georgia statewide governor's race, candi-
date's campaign workers cited tactical difficulties wooing whites while retaining black support; 
Young had to "lean right and moderate his positions for whites while counting on blacks to see 
this as a tactic and not a theological conversion"). 
156. Smothers, supra note 155 (Andrew Young neglected black vote in appeal to moderate 
whites; as a result he received fewer black votes in Georgia precincts than Jesse Jackson did in 
1988 running for the Democratic nomination for President). 
157. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 108-09; Marable, supra note 24, at 21. 
158. Cf. R. FENNO, supra note 140, at 184 (elected office becomes a way oflife not just a job; 
incumbents enjoy the prestige, the policy influence, and name recognition); id. at 178 ("The first 
• term is the hardest. If you win election a second time, you're in for quite a while."); id. at 172, 
174 (elected officials are more involved with their constituency both before and immediately after 
their first election); id. at 191-93 (once their electoral base is solidified, their interaction with 
constituents decreases significantly, dwindling to providing access to a core group of constitu-
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her districts. Because it is the first opportunity to penetrate ~he previ-
ously all-white council that stimulates participation, once tlie council 
is integrated, the symbolic importance of electoral visibilify is reduced, 
especially where the representative has become a legislative token, in-
capable of influencing policy outcomes.159 
In addition to the above, by focusing exclusively on election day 
turnout, the mobilization assumption fails to address any theory be-
yond symbolic political power.160 The absence of a concept of repre-
sentation that demands direct, extended accountability undermines 
the ability of poor black constituents to participate effectively within 
geographically insular and politically cohesive districts. The mobiliza-
tion assumption ignores the need to encourage post election participa-
tion by black voters. As a result, their interests may simply be 
outweighed by the advantages of incumbency and the perks of 
patronage.161 
Even if a black candidate is elected, black voter participation 
within a relatively homogeneous, insular district may not seem worth-
while because one black representative may not be able significantly to 
alter public policy. Constituents within isolated single-member dis-
tricts have little influence over the behavior of representatives from 
other single-member districts. 162 
Moreover, where blacks form a core but passive electorate, some 
blacks may simply "manipulate racial symbols and language" to enlist 
ents; at the end of a lengthy career in Congress, for example, one representative did not even 
maintain a district office). 
159. See infra notes 185-95, 241-42 (discussing problem of extending influence beyond geo-
graphically insular, homogeneous single·member districts where the black representative is a 
legislative token). 
160. Black electoral success both within and without majority-black districts rewards black 
voters with "prestige" rather than "policies." See, e.g., A. REED, THE JESSE JACKSON PHENOM-
ENON: THE CRISIS OF PURPOSE IN AFRO-AMERICAN PoLmCS (1986); Reed, A Critique of Neo-
Progressivism in Theorizing about Development Policy: A Case from Atlanta, in THE PoLmcs OF 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 199 (C. Stone & H. Sanders eds. 1987) [hereinafter Reed, Neo-Progres-
sivism]; (political power often ineffective in delivering to core constituency where based simply on 
electoral strength) Reed, The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints, 1 CoMP. 
URB. & COMMUNITY REs. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Reed, The Black Urban Regime]. 
161. Especially for established incumbents, tension often develops between representing con-
stituent interests, on the one hand, and pursuing personal influence within the legislature, on the 
other. R. FENNo, supra note 140, at 215, 216, 218 (long-term incumbent experiences gradual 
erosion of local orientation in exchange for perception of governmental influence; legislative in-
fluence offered as a substitute for constituency access; allocation of resources to the reinforce-
ment of constituency support declines over length of representatives' service). Representatives in 
general tend to perceive a conflict between their role as ombudsman and lawmaker. M. JEWELL, 
REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 2 (1982). On the other hand, for some representa-
tives, interaction with constituents is a "security blanket." R. FENNO, supra note 140, at 218. 
The conflict between political responsiveness and career development is one that a passive, eco-
nomically depressed electorate is incapable of resolving. 
162. See infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text. 
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support from the poorest black constituents.163 Although these 
elected officials do not respond to constituent needs, under the authen-
ticity and mobilization assumptions, their election and reelection 
equals black empowerment. Yet, in such circumstances, neither as-
sumption generates sustained, empowering participation in the polit-
ical process. 
C. The Polarization Assumption 
The polarization assumption is based on evidence that, absent 
compelling reasons to do otherwise, whites and blacks vote for persons 
of their own racial/ethnic background.164 Thus, in majority-white ju-
risdictions, racial bloc voting by a white majority inevitably causes the 
electoral defeat of black candidates. Given racial polarization, black 
electoral success theory assumes that majority-black single-member 
districts are needed to overcome black electoral exclusion and to en-
sure black representational presence. The theory posits that, once 
elected, black representatives will garner white support and become 
effective minority participants in legislative negotiations and 
deliberations. 
As a general rule whites do not vote for blacks. Numerous court 
163. Marable, supra note 24, at 21 ("These charlatans rely on the old nationalist rhetoric of 
racial solidarity, but lack any progressive content and fail to deliver on a substantive agenda 
because they are detached from any social protest movement for empowerment or resistance."). 
164. For purposes of racial bloc voting, white ethnics are considered white. See, e.g., United 
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (Hasidic voters proportionately represented by white 
elected officials). Although blacks may prefer black candidates, they often do vote for white 
candidates, especially where no black candidate.runs. At the local level Carl Eggleston, the first 
black elected to the Farmville, Virginia, city council following a successful§ 2 lawsuit in 1984, 
experienced racial bloc voting after he rose to prominence in the State Democratic Party, and 
tried without success to gain reelection to the council from a majority-white district when he 
moved his residence. Mr. Eggleston explains his defeat as follows: 
I really thought I had a chance . • . . There were a lot of issues in the campaign, and the 
incumbent had voted wrong on a number of them and in general had lost touch. But I 
found out that the only issue people were interested in was race. Whites voted against me 
not on the issues, not on any stand I had taken, but just because I'm black •.•• People would 
come to the polls and talk out loud - I mean out loud - saying, "We've got too many 
blacks on council." 
McDonald, Votes of Confidence, Found. News, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 27, 31. 
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decisions, 165 anecdotal reports, 166 surveys, 167 and scholarly studies168 
have confirmed the existence of racial bloc voting. Based on this over-
whelming evidence, the polarization assumption concludes tJlat whites 
still harbor racial prejudice.169 Thus, mechanisms to surmount this 
165. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 
1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E. D. Ark. 1989); Brown v. 
Board of Commrs. of Chattanooga, Tenn., 722 F. Supp. 380, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); McNeil v. 
City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (C.D. ID. 1987); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 
495 (D.D.C.) (Young deposition at 9). 
166. See Applebome, 11/acks and the Election: What Was the Message?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
18, 1990, at A30, col. 2 [hereinafter Applebome, 11/acks and the Election] (racially charged con-
tests bring out white voters; white incumbent in North Carolina injected racial issues into the 
campaign in final days to win a massive white turnout that swamped black opponent); The 1990 
Elections State by State, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at BS, col. 5 (poll of North Carolina voters 
showed that 65% of whites supported Jesse Helms while 93% of blacks supported his black 
opponent); Applebome, Racial Politics in South's Contests: Hot Wind of Hate or a Last Gasp?, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (campaign commercial used white hands crumpling 
rejection letter as part of racial appeal against black opponent); see also Toner, Unseating Helms: 
Rival Charts Uphill Climb, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at Al2, col. 6 (although survey suggests 
35% of whites backed a black candidate in the North Carolina Senate race, many preelection 
surveys in other states found whites often reluctant to admit to unknown interviewer their preju-
dice against black candidates); Applebome, Drama ls Pas_t Tense in Georgia Race, N.Y. Times, 
July 16, 1990, at Al2, col. 1; 11reakthrough in Virginia, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 54. 
167. Attitudes in 11/ack and White, TIME, Feb. 2, 1987,_ at 21 (survey of attitudes); see also 
Guinier, supra note 129, at 420-21 n.123 (citing 1987 Joint Center for Political Studies/Gallup 
survey in which 55% of whites said they would not vote for a black mayor regardless of 
qualifications). 
168. Hahn, Klingman & Pachon, Cleavages, Coalitions, and the Black Candidate, 29 W. 
POL. Q. 507 (1976); Halley, Acock & Greene, Ethnicity and Social Class: Voting in the 1973 Los 
Angeles Municipal Elections, 29 W. POL. Q. 521 (1976); Walton, Black Politics in the South: 
Projections for the Coming Decade. in PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY, supra note 
15, at 77-100; see also F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 136 n.13; Bullock & Campbell, Racist or 
Racial Voting in the 1981 Atlanta Municipal Elections, 20 URB. AFF. Q. 149 (1984); Hero, The 
Election of Hispanics in City Government: An Examination of the Election of Fedenco Pena as 
Mayor of Denver, 40 W. POL. Q. 93, 94 (1987); Hero, Multiracial Coalitions in City Elections 
Involving Minority Candidates: Some Evidence from Denver, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 342, 344-46 
(1989) [hereinafter Hero, Multiracial Coalitions]; Hero & Beatty, The Elections of Federico Pena 
as Mayor of Denver: Analysis and Implications, 70 Soc. Sci. Q. (1989). 
169. Despite increased acceptance of blacks in social settings, many whites still harbor racial 
prejudice. See Delgado, supra note 132, at 316 n.87 (citing, inter a/la, G. ALLPORT, THE NA-
TURE OF PREJUDICE 79-80, 197-202 (1954)); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 339 n.91 (1987) (social stereotypes 
can and do create their own social reality; racism as a product of the unconscious is more com-
plex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of ignorant 
bigots; racism is part of common historical experience and, therefore, culture, arising from 
learned assumptions as well as from patterns of fundamental social activities); Pettigrew, New 
Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 688-89 
(1985)); Poll Finds Whites Use Stereotypes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at BlO, col. 2 (whites 
believe blacks are less hardworking, more violence-prone, less intelligent, and less patriotic). The 
Reconstruction era specter of black political control continued to fuel white antipathy during the 
Mississippi voter registration drive of 1963. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 718; see also A COM-
MON DESTINY, supra note 143, at 11 (despite substantial consensus, in the abstract, on the broad 
goal of achieving an egalitarian society, white resistance to equality continues, especially when 
contemplating frequent interracial contact of long duration); cf. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, 
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 154-55 (1975); A. CAMPBELL, WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD 
BLACK PEOPLE ch. 7 (1971) (citing evidence of unfavorable stereotypes of blacks). 
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prejudice and to ensure black electoral success are justified. 
According to the polarization assumption, racial bloc voting 
within the electorate eliminates pluralist bargaining among shifting in-
tergroup coalitions.170 Where members of the majority consistently 
refuse to vote for minority-sponsored candidates, blacks are unable to 
attract enough dissatisfied majority group members to create an effec-
tive race neutral majority. 171 White ethnic groups never encountered 
the problem because, unlike blacks, "an unjust combination of a ma-
jority of the whole,"172 was never so dominant as to silence white eth-
nic voices over an extended period of time. 173 
While pluralist theories of democracy do contemplate minority 
losses, they do not necessarily envision a minority that never wins. In 
other words, Madison's reliance on checks and balances to control 
"factions" was both a way to monitor the "special interest" problem 
as well as a hedge against the tyranny of a hostile majority. To fight 
permanent majority tyranny based on prejudice, voting rights litiga-
tion focused on promoting electoral opportunities for black 
candidates. 
The polarization assumption posits that black incumbency tends to 
diminish prejudice and weaken stereotypes of black incompetence.174 
Black elected officials will assuage white fears by engaging more inti-
mately in legislative deliberations after the election.175 Black represen-
170. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 52, at 135; Davidson, supra note 76, at 5-10 (hostile white 
majority has "panoply of weapons at its disposal"; even if minority exercises electoral influence, 
winning candidates do not always pay attention to minority interests after the election; postelec-
tion pressure from white constituents may nullify minority "influence"); cf. Goodman, De Facto 
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 315 (1972) 
("Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (blacks and poor whites) and unites 
groups (whites, rich and poor) that have little else in common than their antagonism for the 
racial minority. Race prejudice, in short, provides the 'majority of the whole' with that 'common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic 
society."). 
171. w. RIKER, THE THEORY OF PoLmCAL COALmONS 179-80 (1962) (blacks excluded by 
systematic agreement among whites who fear disequilibrium if any whites defect). 
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 346 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898). 
173. See, e.g., B. RINGER & E. LAWLESS, RACE-ETHNICITY AND SOCIETY 151-69 (1989) 
(duality of qualitatively different political treatment of racial minorities and white immigrants 
structured by constitutional underpinnings sanctioning two separate political-economic systems); 
see also supra notes 76-77. 
174. Black elected officials, by virtue of their status and tenure, tend to assuage white fears 
during their incumbency. The power of incumbency is supported by studies which suggest that 
black incumbents are in fact reelected with more white support. See L. COLE, supra note 152, at 
4-5; J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 143-45; see also Johnson, supra note 153, at 
37 ("among the white Cassandras who saw in a black man's election the impending ruin of their 
city, hate turned to mere dislike, and perhaps even to grudging respect, as the garbage still got 
picked up and the streets still got plowed"). 
175. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 732-735 (1985) (black 
representatives not necessarily pariahs since familiarity may diminish hostility); Karlan, supra 
note 6, at 216-18 (local governing bodies are intimate groups with ongoing relationships that 
March 1991] The Triumph of Tokenism 1115 
tation is "a crucial lever for obtaining the benefits patronage, 
contracts, public services - that must be bargained for in the political 
arena."176 Regarding black interests, black representatives will "exert 
special influence on their colleagues," providing "internal leadership" 
to which people defer.177 
Black electoral success advocates assume that prejudice results 
from ignorance and unfamiliar difference. Once knowledge of similar-
ities is present, or familiarity with differences is facilitated, these advo-
cates contend that black and white elected officials will rationally 
overcome prejudice and engage freely and equally178 in pluralistic bar-
gaining or dialogic debate.179 Particularly on the local level, in small 
scale, intimate settings, it is hypothesized that black representatives 
will persuade their colleagues to consider the interests or perspective 
enable a single black legislator to build legislative bridges; continuous, open voting opportunities 
also foster accommodation; institutional setting with debates, amendment processes and hearings 
encourages active participation of minority representatives); see also L. CoLE, supra note 152, at 
222 (the presence of black elected officials sensitizes white associates); Abrams, supra note 6, at 
500 (increasing number of black representatives creates opportunities for greater cross-racial in-
teraction and requires white officials to hear black officials articulate black interests); see also note 
178. 
176. Montague, supra note 152, at 58; see also Morris, supra note 152, at 277. 
177. In recent interviews, members of the House of Representatives have acknowledged the 
importance of black elected officials. Roberts, Letter Critical of Israel Stirs Political Fallout, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 25, 1988, at BS, col. 4; see M. JEWELL & s. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PRO-
CESS IN THE UNITED STATES 197-98, 211-12 (4th ed. 1986) (both national and state legislators 
take direct cues for decisionmaking from other legislators with specialized information); see also 
Barnett, The Congressional Black Caucus: Illusions and Realities of Power, in THE NEW BLACK 
PoLmCS, supra note 14, at 28 (black representatives seek to influence congressional legislation 
on behalf of blacks at every step; black elected officials are an "authority structure" within the 
black community). 
Some proponents of the polarization assumption go even further and suggest that coalition 
politics within the legislature may be more effective than attempts at the electoral level to break 
down racially polarized voting, especially because legislators have more voting opportunities to 
further the process of accommodation. These scholars hypothesize that the legislative process 
itself may maximize opportunities for a strong proponent of black interests to persuade sympa-
thetic but less informed colleagues. 
178. Robinson & Preston, Equal-Status Contact and Modification of Racial Prejudice: A Re-
examination of the Contact Hypothesis, 54 SOCIAL FORCES 911 (1976). 
179. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case 
of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989) (deliberative politics suggests an 
openness to persuasion by reasons; deliberation involves argumentative interchange among 
equals); Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in Amen"can Constitutional Argument: Voting 
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 448 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy] 
(strategic interaction, or classic pluralist interest-group politics, seeks coordination rather than 
cooperation based on self-interested bargaining not good-faith argument); Michelman, Law's Re-
public, 91 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REv. 29 (1985); cf. Abrams, supra note 6, at 500 ("Collegiality requires •.• that [white officials] 
give a hearing to the interests articulated by minority officials."); Sunstein, Beyond the Republi-
can Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548 (1988) (civic republicans emphasize rationale deliberation 
covering ends as well as means); see also infra note 179 (assuming, first, a critical mass of allies 
for moral support and resonance and, second, a disaggregated majority, even a lone black may 
effectively rely on normative persuasion or on bargains within a pluralist exchange, especially in 
a small body where a face-to-face encounter is an unavoidable fact of life). 
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of black voters.1so 
Black activists have long recognized that blacks cannot become an 
effective political majority without legislative allies. Yet, electing black 
representatives may simply relocate to the legislature polarization ex-
perienced at the polls.181 Indeed, some political scientists studying 
"the new black politics" in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta have 
challenged the working assumption that black electoral success will 
ultimately reduce polarization.182 Based on empirical studies of local 
black officials and city council members, these scholars argue that 
black representatives often become an ineffective, "seen but not heard" 
minority in the legislature.183 Because the individual black elected of-
ficial may not be able to overcome polarization to "infiltrate the deci-
sionmaking process" at the legislative level,184 the election of black 
representatives does not, by itself, translate into intergroup 
cooperation. 
Black representatives may be perceived as tokens or marginalized 
in the legislative process.185 Disillusionment produced by such mar-
180. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; see also F. Michelman, Justice Marshall's 
Bolden Dissent 5-6 (Nov. 28, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (classical interest-group pluralist 
account would claim that racial bloc voting is "harder to sustain within the face-to-face dealings 
among a commission of three members than in the mass-political conditions in which members 
are elected"; politically salient issues may split two white members and encourage alliance with 
lone black; from a less strategic, dialogic perspective, "immediacy of .•• Black presence ••• [and] 
Black voice ... in ... daily encounters and public deliberations .•. make the difference"; see also 
letter from Frank Michelman to author (Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with author) (despite distinctions 
between normative persuasion and pluralist exchange, within either perspective ·a single black 
may be effective within a dialogic understanding or hold critical swing vote, especially in a small 
legislative body where critical mass of allies more likely). But cf. infra notes 185, 204-09, 220-32 
and accompanying text. 
181. Abrams, supra note 6, at 502 n.269 (contemporary record of intergroup cooperation is 
mixed); Karlan, supra note 73, at 41-43 & n.159 (giving blacks some seats on a multimember 
body poses no immediate threat to continued white predominance in the political process; volu· 
minous literature on "tipping points" suggests gulf between black presence and influence); cf. 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1972) (having minority group representatives on jury 
does not assure outcome because they may simply be outvoted by majority). 
182. Nelson, supra note 16, at 187 (black political influence in Cleveland moving in reverse); 
Preston, supra note 16, at 159, 163 (black political representation in Chicago fairly large but 
ineffective); Stone, Race and Regime in Atlanta, in RACIAL PoLmcs IN AMERICAN CmES 125 
(R. Browning, D. Marshall & D. Tabb eds. 1990); Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note 160, at 
199. 
183. Supra note 182; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 7; J. WIL· 
SON, The Negro in American Politics: The Present, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE 
BooK 453 (1966) (the larger the black population, the greater the perceived threat, and thus the 
greater the resistance to intergroup participation and dialogue). 
184. See Coleman & McLemore, Black Independent Politics in Mississippi: Constants and 
Challenges, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs,supra note 14, at 131, 151 (blacks may enjoy individ-
ual, vicarious access through black representatives but not meaningful political access in which 
demands are authoritatively decided upon). 
185. Abrams, supra note 6, at 502; see also Michelman, Laws Republic, supra note 178, at 
1523-24, 1530-32; Michelman, supra note 129, at 50-55; see also infra notes 199-203 and accom-
panying text. 
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ginality may frustrate attempts-at further participation.186 Without 
allies, the mere presence of even authentic black representatives does 
not assure a cooperative environment where normative persuasion and 
open exchange of ideas prevaiJ.181 
For example, in Arkansas, blacks successfully challenged a legisla-
tive redistricting plan that had produced only four majority-black dis-
tricts.188 Black legislators elected from those districts testified that 
they were an ineffective minority in the overwhelmingly white state 
legislature.189 White representatives, including those representing dis-
tricts with a substantial, extraordinarily poor black constituency, testi-
fied that they had no black employees working on their staffs.19o In 
addition, these white representatives admitted to using racial slurs to 
refer to prominent blacks when conversing with other members of the 
legislature.191 The pres~nce of blacks in the electorate, one .. of the ba-
ses for the mobilization and polarization assumptions, failed to make 
these white legislators responsive, even though they represented sub-
stantially black constituencies.192 
Successful black candidates from majority-black districts are also 
frequently unable to form legislative coalitions that build on and ex-
186. Oreskes, See Blacks in New York: The Anguish of Political Failure, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
31, 1987, at Bl, col. 3 (failure of black elected officials to penetrate governing coalitions may 
reduce morale and participation within the black community in general). 
187. See infra notes 210-32 and accompanying text. In a collective decisionmaking body, 
decisionmaking generally proceeds from public discussion and debate of policy issues to enact-
ment of proposals using agreed upon mechanisms or decisional rules for ascertaining collective 
preference. Because of prejudice and inequality, black representatives may not participate mean-
ingfully in either the deliberative or voting stages of collective decisionmaking . 
. 188. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court). 
189. Trial transcript at IV-20, IV-30, 730 F. Supp. 196 (no. 89-004). Senator Jewell sought 
public office to "try and come in and see if I could do something inside and do so with complete 
integrity"; because black concerns meet a "very negative response." Representative McGee, un-
able to initiate legislation on the "real issues" of black concern such as "teenage pregnancy, 
housing, and education reforms,'' "decided that [his] role should be just to try and stop bad 
legislation."). 
190. Trial transcript at IX-51, 730 F. Supp. 196 (No. 89-004) (trial testimony of Nancy 
Balton, Rep. from Mississippi County). 
191. Trial transcript at 178-79, 730 F. Supp. 196 (No. 89-004) (trial testimony of Senator 
Paul Benham, Jr. who referred to Jesse Jackson as a "coon" in conversations with other state 
legislators); see also Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) (white 
state legislator voted against creating a majority-black Louisiana congressional district because 
"we already have one nigger bigshot" in reference to the black mayor of New Orleans); cf. Bus-
bee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 500 (D.D.C. 1982) (identifying a prominent member of the 
Georgia legislature as a "racist"). 
192. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Rep. Nancy Balton of Mis-
sissippi County voted against bill exempting very poor people from paying taxes to appease white 
middle-class constituents who felt that "poor people on welfare were living better than they 
were." In Mississippi County, per capita income is $5685 for whites and $2426 for blacks; 45% 
of black families, compared to 13.4% of white families, live in poverty.). But cf. infra note 239 
(black constituency size has positive impact on legislative support for black issues). 
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pand their numerical power base. In the Arkansas legislature, the dis-
trict court found: "Some white members, on being approached by 
black citizens in their own districts for help, referred these constitu-
ents to black legislators representing other areas. And black members 
have found it difficult to get white members to cosponsor soine bills of 
interest to black voters .... " 193 As the most visible members of a 
stigmatized "out-group,'' black officials may even be harassed by local 
officials attempting to suppress black political activity.194 At least 
within the black community, the perception is credible that black 
elected officials are selectively prosecuted.195 
On the other hand, where black officials are successful in increas-
ing their appeal to white voters, their ability and enthusiasm for advo-
cating on behalf of their black constituents may be undermined.196 
These officials may, for example, attribute their success to individual 
personality and campaigning rather than issues.197 These representa-
193. 730 F. Supp. at 214. 
194. See 130 F. Supp. at 210-11 (felony charges instigated by the county sheriff against a 
black lawyer and political candidate, the court concluded, were "designed to discourage (the 
black candidate] in particular and black political activity in general"); 730 F. Supp. at 212 (black 
attorney running for county judge threatened by "individuals wearing hoods," and subjected to 
official harassment by the county, which, after he lost, reduced its business with his funeral 
home, and paid premium rates to a "white" funeral home to bury black paupers). Even when 
blacks are elected by a landslide, they are often the victims of hostile gerrymandering to eliminate 
their districts. Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. 
Supp. 494 (D.C. 1982). 
195. Mathews, Hooks Says Prosecutors "Overzealous," Phila. Inquirer, July 10, 1990, at lOA, 
. col. 1 (NAACP convention delegates unanimously condemned unfair treatment of black elected 
officials by white prosecutors, citing as examples Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, Rep. Wil-
liam H. Gray (D. Pa.), Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson and former Atlanta Mayor Andrew 
Young; Executive Director Benjamin Hooks criticized as overzealous even the notorious prose-
cution of D.C. Mayor Marion Barry for perjury and drug possession); see also Farber, U.S. 
Dismisses Charges Faced By Rep. Flake, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 3 (many blacks 
viewed case as latest example of selective prosecution against black elected officials); Kaplan & 
Miller, Persecution or Prosecution?, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990, at 21 (enough high-profile cases 
make the perception of racial prosecution credible). 
196. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 112; Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note 
160, at 199; see also Applebome, As a Mayor Returns, Atlanta Is Rich and Poor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
7, 1990, at D4, col. 3 (black civic and political leaders claim Atlanta's black mayor Andrew 
Young "squandered" opportunity to help the poor, who are overwhelmingly black; Young 
"helped the rich get richer, but the poor just got poorer"; Young's record and agenda were not 
much different from that of Atlanta's white business-oriented mayors); cf. infra notes 260-283 
and accompanying text. 
197. See c. GREEN & B. WILSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EMPOWERMENT IN NEW 
YORK CITY: BEYOND THE PoLmCS OF PIGMENTATION 85-113 (1989); cf. R. FENNO, supra 
note 140, at 241 (House members believe that voters are "equally or more interested in using 
issue presentations as an opportunity to judge representative as a person"; treatment of persons, 
not issues, is centerpiece of representational relationship); M. JEWELL, supra note 161, at 14; W. 
RIKER, supra note 171, at 207-08; Freedman, One Struggle Over, Attention Turns to Guilt, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at HS, col. 1 (black elected officials consumed by "cult of personality"); 
Marable, supra note 24, at 18, 20-21 ("post-black politicians," recruited from the professional 
classes, favor programs with little kinship to traditional civil rights agenda). 
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tives may also be coopted. by the dominant majority and thus may 
effect little substantive change in policy. 19s 
Once assimilated. into the political mainstream, black officials may 
define their political agenda without reference to or consultation with 
a community base.199 Their reference point may instead become other 
members of the governing elite with whom they share personal exper-
iences and comparable "rank." With access to prestige rather than 
power, some bla.ck politicians may simply censor themselves in order 
"to play ball,"200 or characterize political patronage as constituent 
servicing. 201 
Recognizing that authentic black officials may not be effectively 
198. R. BROWNING, D. MARsHALL & D. TABB, PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUG-
GLE OF BLACKS AND HlsPANlCS FOR EQUALITY 1N URBAN PoLmcs 56-61 (1984) ("access to 
mayor's office did not lead to full minority incorporation into city bureaucracy"); A. KARNIG & 
s. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14; c. STONE, REGIME PoLmCS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-
1988, at 242 (1989) (Atlanta white business interests secured place in governing coalition to 
safeguard special privilege; business elite exercised preemptive power over black middle-class 
politicians); Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 117, at 189 (while black elected officials produce 
more government jobs and contracts for middle-class blacks, they fail to redirect government 
programs to benefit poor blacks); see generally Nelson & Van Home, Black Elected Administra-
tors; The Trials of Office, 34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 526 (1974). 
199. See Nelson & Van Home, supra note 198, at 529. Even where elected from majority-
black districts, black officials may be rewarded for individual achievement in unrelated fields. 
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thornburg v. Gin-
gles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (testimony at trial that only black elected to county office was former 
football star in Wake County, North Carolina). They may be effective public speakers but not 
spokespersons. See telephone interview with Norman Lockman, black journalist in Wilmington, 
Delaware (May 22, 1990) (black city council members in Wilmington are social workers, not 
power brokers); interview with Jerome Mondesire, Chief of Staff for the Philadelphia office of 
Rep. William Gray (May 6, 1990) (blacks often elect blacks to celebrate a cause not to advocate a 
legislative platform). They may become preoccupied with individual rather than group opportu-
nity. Id.; see also THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 204 (Detroit mayor Coleman 
Young's political alliances and policy preferences shaped by patronage and economic gain, not 
community service). To the extent assimilation is a legal strategy for diffusing the redemptive 
force of citizen's movements, coopting local leadership, and ultimately maintaining existing 
power arrangements, it is inconsistent with the original aspirations of voting rights activists. See 
generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, 
How THEY FAIL 181 (1979). 
200. W. Singham, The Political Socialization of Marginal Groups (1966) (paper presented at 
American Political Science Association annual meeting), cited in S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 18, at 15 n.4 (position within party hierarchy does not necessarily mean inclu-
sion within decisionmaking process; blacks often "go along with all that talk" to make sure of 
continued access); see also S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 12-14 (criticizing 
black elected officials who "play ball" to promote benefits of status and material gains for indi-
vidual black constituents); R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 208-09 
(1977) (where minority group members are numerically dominated in a "skewed" grouping -
less than 15% of an institution in which an overwhelming preponderance of another type is 
represented - they often have difficulty gaining peer acceptance and difficulty behaving "natu-
rally"); c. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 204-06 (1964) (describing cooptation of 
black Chicago congressman). 
201. See supra note 199. But see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2752 
(1990) (dissenting opinion) (recognizing importance of patronage as powerful means of achieving 
social and political integration for excluded groups). 
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representing the black community does not require that we label all 
black politicians "as victims of 'false consciousness.' ,,202 Authentic 
representatives are less able to participate effectively in intergroup de-
liberations primarily because of the dual effects of prejudice and mi-
nority status on group dynamics.203 
To consider effectively all viewpoints, deliberation requires sus-
tained communication and participation among equals.204 Effective 
deliberation also demands that group members be receptive to relevant 
information and willing to compromise. 205 Members of a deliberating 
body should share information, exchange views, and debate the issues. 
In addition, the deliberation ideal contemplates consensus and cooper-
ation derived from honest, good-faith interaction, and not heavy-
handed normative pressure. 206 
Testimony from recent cases207 and research into group 
processes,208 however, demonstrate the corrosive power of prejudice 
202. Ackerman, supra note 175, at 735-37. Ackerman defines false consciousness as minority 
group members' belief in unfavorable group stereotypes. I use the term to refer to tokenism in 
which individual advancement defines empowerment. False consciousness rationalizes the privi-
leged position of some minority group members. Ackerman's critique of a "social-psychologi-
cal" approach to analyzing minority legislative power may simply reflect a differing view of false 
consciousness or the still primitive development of legal analysis of group processes. 
203. See supra note 169 and infra notes 210-29 and accompanying text. This observation 
affects collective decisionmaking bodies operating under either a pluralist interest group analysis 
or dialogic confrontation and contestation. See supra notes 179-80. 
204. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17, 22-23 (A. 
Hamlin & P. Pettit eds. 1989); see Sturm, Toward a Jurisprudence of Public Law Remedies, 19 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1991). In shifting coalitions with no repeated and continual losers, all 
potential participants must be "acceptable role partners." s. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE 
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 172 (1988) (first component of 
dynamic deliberation is one of independence and equality; indeed, in context of jury delibera-
tions, courts often exclude from service people who might exert disproportionate influence); W. 
RIKER, supra note 171, at 162. 
205. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering ''Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical Research and 
the Jury-Size Cases, 13 MICH. L. REV. 643, 679-80 (1975); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-
34 & n.21 (1978) (likelihood of compromise important phenomenon for fulfillment of jury com-
mon sense function); S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 173 (openness to infor-
mational influence is second component of deliberation ideal). 
206. See S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 173; see also Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896); Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy, supra note 178, at 
448. I do not mean to imply, however, that all forms of pressure are coercive and necessarily 
opposed to honest interaction. Indeed, impassioned, personal, or dramatic appeals are consistent 
with fair political deliberation. See, e.g., I. Young, Justice, Democracy and Group Difference 10 
(Sept. 1, 1990) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at American Political Science 
Association) (deliberative process does not require emotional detachment nor rigorous adherence 
to specific rules of argumentation; formal rules of argument may silence just as much as physical, 
economic, or political domination). 
207. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Major v. Treen, 574 F. 
Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) (black legislators excluded from critical redis-
tricting meeting). 
208. See Latane, Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343 (1981); Latane & 
Wolf, The Social Impact of Majorities and Minorities, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 438 (1981). 
Some of the most important research is in studies of juries. The process of jury deliberation 
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on deliberations by collective decisionmaking bodies. Even where mi-
norities are proportionately represented, they may find themselves 
without allies.209 
To exert any influence, minority advocates must be consistent and 
confident. 210 Yet, to advocate consistently and sincerely on behalf of 
constituents with unpopular viewpoints a representative needs at least 
one ally.211 Moreover, absent substantial minority companionship at 
the beginning of the deliberative process,212 minority representatives 
may feel pressured to modify their position in response to the "consid-
erable stress" inflicted by prejudiced majority group members.213 
Black officials may not be treated with respect in a polarized delib-
erative process, especially if important debates take place in private, 
informal,214 small group settings.21s Formal rules and sanctions may 
limit public displays of prejudice and racism.216 In informal settings, 
reveals much about the group dynamics of managing minority and majority viewpoints, develop-
ing consensus, and respecting the contribution of individual members. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & 
H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462 (1966) (substantial minority viewpoint presence of 4 or 5 
jurors out of 12 at beginning of deliberations usually necessary to influence jury outcome); S. 
KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 169-88). 
209. See supra notes 181-83. 
210. Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL REV. 23, 26 (1986). 
211. Psychologists experimenting on the effect of group pressure in a deliberating body con-
clude that the presence of allies is critical to minority members' integrity and influence. See R. 
KANTER, supra note 200; Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion 
of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (G. Swanson, T. Newcombe & E. Hartley 
eds. 1952); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101-02 & n.49 (1970) (citing Asch's con-
formity experiments, Court reasons that in the context of jury deliberations, jurors in the minor-
ity are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them). But 
cf. S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 197 (it is the absolute, not proportional size 
that enables minorities to withstand normative pressure; the presence of a single ally is powerful 
determinant of ability to maintain independence). 
212. See Asch, supra note 211; see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 208, at 463 (for 
one or two jurors to hold out to the end, a substantial minority needs to exist at the beginning of 
deliberations). 
213. Maass & Clark, Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Year.s- of Minority Influence Re-
search, 95 PSYCH. BULL. 428 (1984); Nemeth, supra note 210, at 25 (high degree of stress may 
affect performance among minority group members); Nemeth & Wachtler, Creative Problem 
Solving as a Result of Majority vs. Minority Influence, 13 EUROPEAN J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 45 
(1983) (majority assumes differing minority is incorrect and manifests outright "derision" to-
wards minority); see also supra note 211. 
214. See Delgado, supra note 132, at 314-18 (describing the confrontation theory and the 
formality/informality axis generated by the theory). "It is a sad truth that, even today, many 
minorities find success and relative relief from racism only in highly structured, rule-bound envi-
ronments such as the Army." Id. at 321; see also Lawrence, supra note 169, at 341 n.100. 
215. See supra notes 181, 211-12 and infra note 218. 
216. This is the view presented in recent legal and political science literature. Delgado, 
Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1385-87; Lind, Thibaut & Walker, A 
Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Effect of Adver.s-ary and Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal 
Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L. REv. 271 (1976); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adver.s-ary Presentation 
and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972). Yet, "it is also true that 
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where conduct is less regulated, blatant "microaggressions"217 against 
minority victims are more likely. The dynamics of informal groups 
within the legislature may therefore constrain black/white interaction 
and deliberation. The number of persons within the deliberative body 
may also influence the willingness of majority group members to con-
sider minority viewpoints and to counterbalance bias. In smaller 
groups, minority group members may fail to make critical contribu-
tions and are less likely to participate effectively in the deliberation.218 
In addition, the rules governing the deliberative process may cir-
cumscribe a minority group member's infiuence.219 Differing deci-
sional rules do not promote fair deliberation to the same extent. 
Where decisions are made by a simple majority vote, deliberation may 
be incomplete and less inclusive of minority viewpoints.22° For exam-
ple, the "social climate" of deliberation in juries using majority deci-
sion rules is more adversarial because members of the majority can 
reach a decision without responding to opposing arguments.221 
demands for order, quiet, and 'civility' can also protect racism against effective, passionate chal-
lenge." Letter from Frank Michelman to author (Dec. 19, 1990) at 4 (on file with author). 
217. Delgado, supra note 132, at 305 n.30 (citing C. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three 
Years of Stress, Solomon Carter Fuller Lectures, American Psychiatric Assn. Meeting, Washing-
ton, D.C. (May 12, 1986)) (describing microaggressions as those "subtle, minor, stunning auto-
matic assaults ... by which whites stress blacks unremittingly and keep them on the defensive, as 
well as in a psychologically reduced condition"). 
218. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10, 233 (1978) (citing social science 
literature). Progressively smaller groups are less likely to engage in effective deliberation. R. 
HAsTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 228 (1983) (members of small dis-
senting factions "participate at lower rates in majority rule juries and are less satisfied with the 
jury verdict"). But cf. W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 51, 55 (in small groups, "considerations of 
maintaining the solidarity of the group and the loyalty of members to it probably often dominate 
considerations of maximum victory"; local governing bodies "are often operated as small groups 
in which considerations of loyalty and local solidarity outweigh rational calculations of advan· 
tage"; for example, in the South the zero-sum gain is between whites inside the system and blacks 
outside of it). 
219. Some commentators have noted that public voting may pressure group members to join 
the majority and generally to behave less cooperatively. See S. KAsslN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, 
supra note 204, at 203-04 (public ballot prompts "verdict-driven style" of deliberation; formal 
commitment to a position creates advocates, not factfinders); J. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 72-75 
(1987) (voting enables an internally conflicted group to act and recognizes that legitimate differ-
ences exist within it; yet where conflict persists, use of other adversary decision procedures be· 
sides majority rule voting may be less divisive; majority rule balloting may produce a permanent 
minority; more inclusive would be a rule of proportionate outcomes, distributing goods on the 
basis of the numerical strength of competing factions or other appropriations formula, or deci· 
sional lotteries). 
220. See, e.g., R. HASTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 218, at 228-30 (dissent-
ing or minority viewpoints are disadvantaged by nonunanimity rules); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTS· 
MAN, supra note 204, at 201-02; M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & 
Mech, The Decision Processes of 6- & 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-
Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1 (1975); Nemeth, Interactions Be· 
tween Jurors as a Function of Majority Vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSY· 
CHOLOGY 38 (1977). 
221. R. HASTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 218, at 112; see also Nemeth, 
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The presence of members of the riiinority group often exaggerates 
in-group solidarity among majority group members.222 Whether "to-
kens" or proportionately represented, black elected officials may fail to 
generate cross-racial alliances. In groups where one race greatly out-
numbers the other, group members may treat those in the minority as 
stigmatized racial tokens. In such "skewed" groups, cross-racial asso-
ciation, laden with cultural and racial overtones, is more difficult to 
sustain on an issue-by-issue basis.223 As a result, the numerical minor-
ity may be socially segregated and stereotyped even in small, informal 
deliberative bodies. For example, one black elected official proportion-
ately represented on a small city council operating by majority vote 
may be isolated and ignored. 224 
Thus, in order for minority groups to participate in winning coali-
tions, majority group members must be receptive to political bargain-
ing22s and deliberation. 226 Prejudice against minority group members 
inhibits admission to the governing majority, ensuring a strategically 
weak position as a permanent loser.227 In a racially charged ~nviron­
ment, the presence of black representatives may simply increase the 
supra note 220 (majority rule appears to suppress robust conflict, reduces the number of informa-
tional and opinion comments, shortens functional deliberation time, and undermines confidence 
in the outcome). 
222. See infra notes 223-24, 229. 
223. Some legislators resist alliance with minority group members because they fear their 
constituents will permanently identify them with "black" issues. See, e.g., Pelman, ''Black 
Party" Image Splits Democrats, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (white party activists 
complain that Philadelphia's Democratic Party is now seen by white voters as the "black party" 
since the city's black mayor is a black Democrat); see also R. KANTER, supra note 200, at 209 (in 
racially imbalanced groups, racially dominant group controls both the group's culture as well as 
the group; proportional representation of the minority, or at least 35% minority representation, 
is necessary to empower a minority within a working group); F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 135-
36 (blacks have difficulty foi;ming coalitions with white legislators on measures identified as black 
issues; bills identified with black caucus sponsors failed; only when white legislators take lead can 
blacks provide votes necessary to win). 
224. See A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14 (Blacks usually hold office as "one of 
a small minority unable to take decisive action - certainly not unilateral action."); see also supra 
notes 218-21. 
225. The model described here is essentially a pluralist one, because it remains the dominant 
political science explanation of contemporary political participation. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra 
note 127, at 14344 (pluralist model of "mainstream American political science" relies on self-
interested groups formulating and aggressively pursuing private interests within a framework of 
competitive legislative bargaining); D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 5, at 253-55 (pluralist theocy 
presumes equivalence between all political and economic demands, and incremental decision-
making based on bargainable issues). 
226. See supra notes 179-80, 187 and accompanying text (describing deliberative ideal of 
normative persuasion model). 
227. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 179-80 (where blacks excluded by systematic agree-
ment among whites, no whites defect; no white factions so dissatisfied as to attempt to bring 
blacks into controlling coalition; black participants unable to attract dissatisfied whites because 
of intense fear shared by all white participants that breakup .of white hegemony would yield 
devastating results). 
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value of white membership in the winning coalition.228 Indeed, the 
majority may appear to improve its own position by refusing to meet 
the demands of a minority.229 
Achieving some degree of reciprocity is essential to sustaining col-
laborative efforts.230 Yet, without institutional incentives for coopera-
tion, coalition-building serves only the temporary interests of white 
allies, who may limit their participation to issues that ultimately pro-
mote stability and majority rule. These allies may also choose to leave 
the coalition.231 Thus, some scholars, most notably Professor Derrick 
Bell, have concluded that black rights are recognized only when and 
to the extent that they coincide with the interests of those in power.232 
Finally, the mere presence of black officials in the legislature fur-
thers neither the goals of the integrationists nor the nationalists. The 
integrationists were always concerned with coalition building.233 They 
correctly perceived that electoral coalitions affect the ability of repre-
sentatives to govem.234 Thus, for some integrationists, coalition build-
228. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 95-96 (size principle reflects tendency of winning 
coalitions to minimize size in order to divide gains among fewer persons; role of minority opposi-
tion is to create value in coalition of the whole). Empirical studies suggest that black candidates 
frequently seek to create electoral coalitions with white liberals, but often fail. See, e.g., R. 
BROWNING, D. MARSHALL & D. TABB, supra note 198; see also Johnson, supra note 153, at 34, 
col. 2 (For blacks, the inevitable outcome of a rainbow coalition that does not emphasize black 
representation is that " 'black folks get all the rain and white folks get all the bows.' ") (quoting 
Thomas N. Todd); Holloway, Negro Political Strategy: Coalition or Independent Power Politics?, 
49 Soc. SCI. Q. 534 (1968); cf. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 7 (white 
groups solidify when confronted with black demands). 
229. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 139. 
230. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra note 198, at 8 (in the absence of coercion, achieving coopera-
tion requires constant effort, most often through mechanisms to ensure reciprocity). Especially 
where they are also dependent on support from the white majority, coalitions between minority 
groups may also be tenuous and susceptible "to disintegration in the crucible of day-to-day gov-
erning." Hero, Multiracial Coalitions, supra note 168, at 349; see also Guinier, supra note 129, at 
416 ("reciprocity in bargaining requires the active promotion of black interests, not just occa-
sional subvention" of civil rights issues; "black legislative issues can be ghettoized from the Left 
as well as the Right"). 
231. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 348 (volunteers from the ranks of the privileged can leave 
a cause with the same privilege of choice with which they joined); supra notes 223, 228; see also 
W. MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 25 (1984) ("whites became abolitionists out 
of choice; blacks were abolitionists out of necessity"). 
232. See, e.g .• D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LAW (1980); Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
233. See, e.g., M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 150; Rustin, "Black" Power and Coalition 
Politics, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1966, at 35; Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the 
Civil Rights Movement. COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 25. Dr. King consistently acknowledged 
the importance of coalition building. M.L. KING, JR., STRIDE Tow ARD FREEDOM 34 (1958); T. 
BRANCH, supra note 13, at 875; 884 (quoting Walter Reuther). 
234. C. STONE, supra note 198, at xi-xii (electoral coalition not equivalent of governing coali-
tion; political regime dependent on getting strategically positioned people to act together); Hero, 
Multiracial Coalitions, supra note 168, at 343; see also B. FERMAN, GOVERNING THE UN-
GOVERNABLE CITY (1985); J. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESrED CITY (1983); T. SWANSTROM, 
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ing was at the heart of govemability. The nationalists also expected 
more than token representation. For the nationalists black political 
power meant significant participation in political decisionmaking.235 
Thus, without "more meaningful structures, forms and ways of deal-
ing with long-standing problems," the nationalists felt that political 
participation did not empower black.representatives who enjoyed only 
a token or proportionate numerical presence. 236 
The polarization assumption ignores these insights. The assump-
tion's hypothesis about the nature of prejudice simply requires blacks 
to avoid direct electoral competition with whites. Given residential 
·segregation, the assumption supports district election structures to 
reconfigure a heterogeneous, polarized electorate into a homogeneous 
one.237 The assumption correctly perceives that district elections favor 
black electoral success "because black candidates seeking district seats 
can steer clear of direct competition with white candidates."238 Dis-
trict elections also provide greater opportunities to elect people of 
THE CRISIS OF GROWTH PoLmcs (1985) (arguing importance of coalition building and political 
struggle). 
235. See supra notes 4748 and accompanying text. 
236. Some nationalists anticipated the arguments advanced here. See S. CARMICHAEL & C. 
HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 173-77 (mere election of a few blacks will not solve problem of 
political representation; black visibility within present institutions of political representation is 
not black power). 
237. F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 136, 147 (black representation limited by number of 
majority-black legislative districts); Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the 
Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1265 nn.79·80 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Ra-
cial Geography] (black physical/geographic solidarity necessary for political power). But cf. 
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988) (for geographically dispersed mi-
nority living in pockets of residential segregation, minority districts may not capture all, or even 
most, minority voters; those outside the district are merely "virtually" represented). Compare 
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 383 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (no judicially manageable way to measure black influence in major-
ity-white districts). In a residentially segregated community, district elections use a territorially 
defined constituency as a proxy for interest representation. The use of single-member districts is 
also premised on the "ubiquity of territorially based representation in American government"; 
see F. Michelman, Justice Marshall's Bolden Dissent 9 (Nov. 28, 1990 draft) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
238. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 29. Most research reveals significant links 
between district elections and greater black electoral success. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 76, 
at 5-6; see also Campbell & Feagin, Black Politics in the South: A Descriptive Analysis, 37 J. POL. 
129, 143 n.28 (1975); Engstrom & McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying 
the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM. POL. SCI. 
REv. 344 (1981); Gelb, Blacks, Blocs and Ballots, 3 POLITY 45 (1970); Jones, The Impact of 
Lacal Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 URB. AFF. Q. 345 (1976); Kamig, 
Black Representation on City Councils, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223, 223 (Dec. 1976); Kamig, Black 
Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J. PoL. 134 (1979); Kramer, The Election of 
Blacks to City Councils: A 1970 Status Report and a Prolegomenon, 1 J. BLACK Sruo. 443, 449 
(1971); Robinson & Dye, Reformism and Black Representation on City Councils, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. 
133, 133-34 (1978); Taebel, Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure 
on Blacks and Hispanics, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. 142, 151 (1978). 
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lower income, education, and status. 239 
Thus, the assumption's predominant enforcement mechanism is 
black representational control of majority-black districts. This en-
forcement mechanism enables blacks, through their representatives, to 
put their case to the legislative majority. Given the prejudices and 
desires of that majority, however, the mechanism hardly guarantees 
blacks any real legislative influence. 
Although efforts to increase black representation have an in-
dependent value,240 prejudice may simply transfer the "gerrymander-
ing"241 problem from the electorate to the legislature. Black electoral 
visibility is useless if district-based electoral arrangements gerryman-
der legislative decisionmaking and reproduce in the legislature a mir-
ror image of a racially skewed electorate. With few exceptions, the 
litigation and activist strategy has thus far failed to anticipate the inev-
itable third-generation problem: the deliberative gerrymander.242 
Blacks elected from black single-member districts are less empow-
ered to influence their white colleagues, whose homogeneous white 
single-member district base enables them to ignore black interests 
without adverse electoral consequences. For this reason Themstrom 
and other conservative critics of the assumption's enforcement mecha-
nism assert that the preoccupation with creating majority-black dis-
tricts "ghettoizes" black issues.243 These critics argue that "minority 
239. See, e.g., F. PARKER, supra note 136 (single-member districts dramatically increased 
number of black elected officials in Mississippi); s. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, URBAN REFORM 
AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 35-36, 42-46, 50 (1984) (district electoral system helps new urban 
forces of ethnic-minorities, neighborhood-based groups, and those groups most spatially segre-
gated, such as blacks, to balance political power of conservative urban organizations; at-large 
systems disproportionately favor those with greater financial resources); cf. Ackerman, supra 
note 175, at 726-28 (discrete, insular minorities enjoy district-based organizing advantages). 
240. See supra notes 124-33, 145 and accompanying text; cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 $.Ct. 
803, 816 (1990) (black jurors' citizenship right to serve on juries affirms their status as equal 
participants in criminal justice administration); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) 
(same). 
241. As generally used, the term gerrymandering refers to political manipulation that un-
fairly excludes or disadvantages a distinctive group within the process of drawing district bound-
aries. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 338 (1960) (classic gerrymander altered municipal 
boundaries, created uncouth 28-sided figure and removed all but 4 blacks from city limits); Mc-
Donald & Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THB 
COURTS 178 (B. Groftnan ed. 1990); see also infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text. 
242. Deliberative or "legislative gerrymander'' is a term suggested to me by my colleague 
Seth Kreimer. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text (describing deliberate exclusion 
and diminution of black legislators from critical policymaking meetings or from sharing critical 
appropriations authority). 
243. A. THERNSTROM, supra note 67, at 7; Schuck, What Went Wrong With the Voting 
Rights Act, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1987, at 51, 55; Thernstrom, "Voting Rights" Trap, NBW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1985, at 21, 23. This same argument was made by congressional opponents 
to the 1982 amendments. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (additional views of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch) (arguing that majority-black single-member district would be nothing more than 
"political ghettos for minorities" in which "minority influence [would] suffer enormously"). 
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representation might actually be increased not by raising the number 
of black officeholders [elected from black-districts], but by increasing 
the number of officeholders, black or white, who have to appeal to 
blacks to win."244 
Both conservatives and liberals underestimate the enduring signifi-
cance of racial polarization to minority empowerment. Themstrom's 
call for virtual representation of minority interests by white politicians 
elected at large reinforces existing unfairness. By ignoring the phe-
nomena of racial bloc voting and white prejudice, Themstrom ratio-
nalizes current distortions in legislative deliberation and bargaining. 245 
Similarly, liberal justifications of majority-black districts overlook the 
negative impact that a prejudiced majority legislative faction may have 
on the effectiveness of black voters. Black representatives may tran-
scend electoral polarization only to reexperience legislative exclusion 
because of third generation legislative or deliberative gerrymandering. 
Recent voting rights scholarship also fails to consider fully the leg-
islative implications of the polarization hypothesis. For example, Pro-
fessor Abrams' model of interactive participation suggests that black 
interests are best represented by aggregating minorities and sympa-
thetic whites within multiracial districts.246 Abrams' extended, inter-
active participation model fails to recognize, however, that intergroup 
cooperation in a polarized environment requires structural support at 
each stage of the political process if black political influence is not to 
be contained at every opportunity.241 
Professor Karlan's cogent process-based civic inclusion theory is 
244. Thernstrom, supra note 243 at 21. 
245. See supra notes 185·92 and accompanying text. 
246. For example, Abrams promotes minority sponsored white candidates, elected from 
within a geographically splintered districting plan, to represent blacks. But these representatives 
may experience, despite the multiracial nature of their constituency, the same hostility from their 
colleagues as do black representatives. As a result, such coalition candidates may fail to advocate 
aggressively on behalf of their least popular, namely black, constituents. Instead, they may com-
promise the needs of the more stigmatized members of their electoral base in order to obtain any 
success on behalf of the coalition. See J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 144-45 
(some black officials elected by multiracial coalitions feel obligation to satisfy white constituents); 
cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 394, 427-29 (describing dilemma of black voters who are either 
taken for granted or ignored). 
For Abrams, the "generation of cooperative political behavior" is independent of black repre-
sentation, and a development that voting rights enforcement should pursue without prerequisites. 
This unwillingness to recognize the polarization hypothesis undermines her other\Vise important 
contribution. 
247. For blacks, in whose embryonic political life each gain has been both hard fought and 
ultimately evaded, special protection from normal political behavior is considered necessary 
before they can answer the question Abrams asks - "How do those who exert themselves effec-
tively within the system behave?" Abrams, supra note 6, at 490 n.218. Without structural sup-
port to protect blacks from majority prejudice and to insure effective representation of black 
interests, Abrams' interactive model of political influence is indeterminate and inaccessible. 
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also flawed. Essentially the theory would broaden the scope of judicial 
inquiry from current concerns about geographic districting to more 
substantive issues such as direct minority participation and decisional 
responsiveness to minority interests. Enforcement of dilution claims, 
if based on civic inclusion values, would transcend current judicial 
preoccupation with majority-black single-member districts and other 
easy-to-apply mathematical rules.24s 
Karlan's response to the polarization assumption, however, ends 
with legal protection to ensure minority presence. 249 In this sense, 
Karlan's vision is as optimistic as Abrams. Both scholars fail to con-
sider the enduring effect of racism and prejudice on members of both 
the majority and minority group throughout the political process.250 
D. The Responsiveness Assumption 
The responsiveness assumption suggests that black representatives 
share the original civil rights vision, which targeted the least well off 
members of the community. In this assumption, black voters gain 
substantive policy influence by electing racial compatriots with special 
attachment to and understanding of the black community and its dis-
tinctive interests.251 The assumption also portrays black elected repre-
248. Informed by the value of civic inclusion, Karlan's vision of voting rights litigation is 
interactive like Abrams' but more committed to authentic minority representation. Karlan, 
supra note 6, at 218 (promoting diversity of representation to ensure fuller deliberation based on 
a richer perspective and to legitimate the governing body as a democratic instrument). 
249. Karlan attempts to answer the wrong question: whether blacks are better off with sev-
eral mildly sympathetic whites or one aggressive "black" representative. In casting her vote with 
the "authentic" black representative, Karlan maneuvers around the implications of the delibera-
tive gerrymander. For Karlan, a process in which black voters elect black representatives who 
fail, because of majority prejudice or minority cooptation, to advocate forcefully on behalf of 
their constituents can still be a fair process as long as black representatives are allowed to partici-
pate within legislative deliberation and dialogue. 
250. Abrams denies its influence on voter choice. Karlan understands profoundly the perva-
siveness of polarization within the electorate, and she also takes important preliminary steps to 
address structural barriers that deny black representatives civic legislative inclusion. Karlan, 
supra note 6, at 237-48 (discussing supermajority decisional rules and the rotation of powers as 
potential remedies to legislative exclusion). But Karlan still tends to measure success by the 
number of blacks elected. Although Karlan acknowledges the Voting Rights Act's goal to recon-
struct society, a civically inclusive society would be more open, more accessible, but not necessar-
ily more equal. Legislative inclusion, although critical, does not produce equal outcomes 
dependably, especially when relying primarily on the ameliorative role of familiar, intimate asso-
ciation in small, collegial decisionmaking bodies. Id. at 240: "(W]hile the claim for equal polit-
ical access is always legitimate, the claim for a particular substantive outcome to the governing 
process is not." 
251. See supra note 177; Hamilton, Public Policy and Some Political Consequences, in PUBLIC 
POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY, supra note 15, at 237; see also Extension of the Voting 
Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the 
House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 365-80 (1982) (testimony of Henry Marsh, Mayor, 
Richmond, Va. and Michael Brown, Coordinator, Va. St. Conf. of NAACP); id. at 590-742 
(testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU); J. ELY, supra 
note 52, at 86-87; D. GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND 
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sentatives as the first line of defense against racist legislation.252 
Advocates of the responsiveness assumption believe that black 
elected officials will discharge their official duties differently than 
white officials.253 Black elected officials will intuitively understand the 
positions favored by their black constituents.254 Their black constitu-
ents also will enjoy a special relationship with black representatives.255 
Thus, increasing the number of black representatives effectively influ-
ences legislative policy debates and leads to more favorable substantive 
political outcomes. 
Empirical evidence of racial bloc voting supports the assumption 
that blacks, to a great extent, are ideologically homogeneous on many 
issues.256 Black voting patterns reflect two decades of consensus on 
ENTRAPMENT OF GHETTO YOUTH 22 (1980). Thus, membership in the "victimized" group sug-
gests a special sensitivity and loyalty to a victim perspective. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 895; 
S. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, supra note 239, at 23 (issue of concern to most black city council 
members appears to be civil rights); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 326, 333-35 (black Americans are 
the paradigm victim group of our history with distinct normative insights); Morris, supra note 
152, at 277. 
252. See supra note 52. 
253. See, e.g., F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 134-35; see also Applebome, King Holiday 
Observances Point Out Both Pain and Triumphs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at B4, col. 1 (first 
black mayor of New York City greeted marchers observing the Martin Luther King, Jr., Na-
tional Holiday, while marchers critical of white predecessor had been stopped by barricades 
holding them at the edge of City Hall Park; quoting march leader, "Today we marched as the 
included. The last time we marched in protest. Today we march to participate."). The core idea 
of the black advocacy perspective is that doing something about the problem of racial discrimina-
tion means attention to issues from the perspective of those experiencing discriminatory condi-
tions. Freeman, supra note 7, at 98; see also Ackerman, supra note 178, at 733 n.35, 735, 744-45. 
254. L. CoLE, supra note 152, at 114, 233. Black representatives themselves acknowledged 
special insights. "If you are a minority person you know what's needed. And what you do is go 
about the business of trying to fill that need." Id. at 89. 
255. M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 94 (1982) (black constituents 
do have special relation to black representatives, who represent a broader constituency than elec-
toral district); see also Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified subnom. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (trial testimony of Frank Ballance; black in North 
Carolina considered his own representative in the 1950s to be Harlem's black congressman 
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.). J. ABERBACH & J. WALKER, RACE IN THE CITY (1973); Sears, 
Black Attitudes Toward the Political System in the Aftermath of the Watts Insurrection, 13 MID-
WEST J. POL. SCI. 515 (1969) (blacks believe that black elected officials more trustworthy than 
white elected officials); see also Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), modified 
756 F. Supp. 1195, ajfd. 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991) (three-judge court) (some white state legislators 
refer black constituents from their electoral districts to black legislators representing other ar-
eas); L. COLE, supra note 152, at 109, 111; Lee, The Black Elected Official and Southern Politics, 
in THE BLACK PoLmCIAN supra note 64, at 85-86 (black elected official effective because of 
identification with frustrations of blacks who "know what it feels like to want someone in govern-
ment who can be trusted"). But cf. Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Focus 
MAGAZINE, TRENDLETTER, 2 (Apr. 1988) (reporting results of 1987 Gallup survey) (blacks 
write letters and lobby to a much lesser extent than whites). -
256. See e.g. C. Hamilton, Measuring Black Conservatism, in THE STATE OF BLACK 
AMERICA 47-51 (ed. J.D. Williams 1982); Seltzer & Smith, Race and Ideology: A Research Note 
Measuring Liberalism and Conservatism in Black America, 46 PHYLON 98 (1985); Welch & 
Combs, Interracial Differences in Opinion on Public Issues in the 1970's, 7 WEST. J. BLACK 
STUD. 136 (1983). Black voting patterns reflect near unanimity in contests in which a viable 
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the need for greater civil rights enforcement, social welfare expendi-
tures, and government intervention in domestic affairs.257 Thus, advo-
cates of the responsiveness assumption claim that if more blacks are 
elected, black voters will be able to reshape the way laws are made and 
tax dollars are spent to reflect their interests.258 
Four difficulties exist with the responsiveness assumption. First, 
the assumption relies too heavily on the singular advancement of au-
thentic individual black officials to transform the status of the group as 
a whole. Depending on black politicians to shoulder so much of the 
burden of redistributing resources and power is naive.259 Even when 
genuinely concerned, the status of black representatives as "assimi-
lated" members of the political establishment may threaten their com-
mitment to community-based models of reform.260 Thus, although 
feasible, the civil rights movement's goals of government intervention 
on behalf of the poor may not be generally acceptable to many 
politicians. 261 
Second, the responsiveness assumption fails because of the message 
already conveyed to black elected officials by the authenticity assump-
tion. The authenticity assumption converts black elected officials into 
group spokesmodels without continuously articulating either the basis 
for a cohesive, community agenda or the responsibility to develop any 
black candidate competes and in presidential contests in which blacks overwhelmingly support 
the Democratic candidate. See T. CAVANAGH, INSIDE BLACK AMERICA (1985). 
257. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text; cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 
51, 57 n.25 (1986) (black representatives are those black-community-sponsored candidates whose 
election reflects the community's "distinctive minority group interests"); S. WELCH & T. BLl!D· 
SOE, supra note 239, at 23 (civil rights is issue of concern to most black city council members). 
Some social science studies tend to support the assumption of consensus. See R. BROWNING, D. 
MARSHALL & D. TABB, supra note 198; N. NIE, s. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING 
AMERICAN VOTER 253-55 (1979) (no other group as distinctly liberal as blacks as a group in 
terms of position on central issues). 
258. See Herring, Legislative Responsiveness to Black Constituents in Three Deep South 
States, 52 J. POL. 740 (1990); Marable, Foreword to THE NEW BLACK VOTE, supra note 48, at 1; 
Morris, supra note 152, at 271. But cf. Bullock, Congressional Roll Call Voting in a Two-Party 
South, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 789 (1985); Whitby, Effects of the Interaction Between Race and Urbaniza-
tion on Votes of Southern Congressmen, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 505 (1985). 
259. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 13-14 (some people have clung to unrealistic 
hopes about black elected "supermen and superwomen" who could "cure the ills of three centu-
ries overnight"). 
260. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. See generally Reed, supra note 4, at 
67; Austin, supra note 124; J. Bond, Winning the Ballot, Losing the War: The Paradox of Mi-
nority Empowerment, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. Symposium, Mar. 3, 1990, at 3 (transcript on 
file with author) (lack of mobilized constituency base to provide "will" for change causes black 
elected officials to limit their agenda; in addition, class of locally elected black officials has been 
captured by black entrepreneurs rather than black community based activists). 
261. A. KARNIG & s. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14; see also D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 
59, at 109 (to serve constituents' interests black politicians in Chicago in the first decades of this 
century faced paradox of highlighting issues that provoke strong resistance from other organized 
groups). 
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agenda. The role model is a spokesmodel simply by virtue of being a 
black elected official. 
Yet, as already discussed, black politicians may be electorally suc-
cessful without being authentic. 262 The authenticity assumption im-
plicitly encourages black representatives to view their personal 
advancement as a group advantage' and to position themselves to seek 
higher status based on the attendant privileges of seniority.263 Elected 
from "safe" districts, black representatives can afford to spend less 
time "at home."264 Thus, black representatives may act even more 
independently than the responsiveness assumption contemplates. 
Third, the vision that prompted the shift from protest to politics 
may have overestimated the transformative possibilities of electoral ac-
tivity. Electing individual candidates, even those who are effective and 
accountable, may fail as a means of creating and redistributing polit-
ical power and economic wealth. 265 Of course, black electoral success 
alone cannot transform the depressed political and economic state of 
the black community, especially given that blacks are concentrated in 
politically impotent and economically isolated parts of urban metro-
262. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. This is consistent with game theories 
ofleadership incentives. See, e.g., W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 203-08 (pluralist system devises 
reward structure that encourages opportunism; system prefers leaders who want absolute power, 
prestige and maintenance of position). The benefits of incumbency may insulate the beneficiary 
from electoral pressure, undermining the assumption that electoral ratification insures substan-
tive policy advocacy. Abrams, supra note 6, at 487 n.214; see W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 207-
08. The promotion of professional political careers, exemplified in the 98% reelection rate of 
incumbents to Congress, affects white as well as black politicians; but then whites' expectation 
for government attention is lower. Even within state legislatures, the trend is toward longer 
tenure and professionalization of their positions. See M. JEWELL, supra note 161, at 5. 
263. See supra notes 147-51, 196-201. This is similar to the critique of the message conveyed 
by black middle-class success as that of individual advancement at the expense of social and 
group consciousness. 
264. See supra notes 160-63. But cf S. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, supra note 239, at 24 (black 
city council members appear more conscious of constituents and are more likely than whites to 
schedule regular meetings with them; casework may simply be more important to more needy 
black constituents). 
265. See supra note 198; Barnett, supra note 15, at 41 ("hodge-podge of well-meaning but 
limited social programs [cannot] actually end poverty"). White ethnic groups are often cited as 
successful models for political empowerment. But these groups used politics to legitimize and 
enhance preexisting social and economic assimilation. They viewed political participation as a 
primary means of assisting and facilitating the redistribution of economic and social goods that 
was already ongoing. See J. ELY, supra note 52, at 80-81; Barnes, supra note 149, at 264 (differ-
ence in assimilation for whites and blacks is that "other ethnic groups haven't felt as deprived 
socially and economically as the blacks," (quoting Professor Seymour Lipset, Stanford Univer-
sity)); Wildstrom & Stodghill, supra note 162, at 49; cf Pohlmann, Race-Ethnicity and Society 
(Book Review), 105 POL. Sci. Q. 165 (1990) (urban political machines had diminished as assimi-
lation agents when racial minorities attempted to press for political power). White ethnic groups, 
who were not as deprived socially and economically as are blacks, relied on politics for symbolic 
status recognition, not wealth redistribution. Barnes, supra note 149, at 264 ("What these other 
groups were looking for is sort of symbolic status recognition - 'We've made it in America.' 
The blacks are looking for more," (quoting Professor Lipset)). 
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politan areas where racial polarization continues.266 The limitations 
of black electoral success are also evident when blacks are concen-
trated in the least influential positions267 or are elected to posts in 
largely black municipalities without significant economic resources.268 
The theory is problematic regardless of whether black electoral mobili-
zation positively correlates with white legislative support for black 
issues.269 
In response, one might argue that if the goals of poor blacks are 
restated to appeal more universally to poor and working class 
whites, 270 then platforms benefiting blacks disproportionately need not 
alienate whites.271 Yet, as discussed in conjunction with the polariza-
tion assumption, representatives who retain a community-based or 
generally progressive consciousness may still be ineffective in a po-
larized legislature. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that race, 
not class, more often defines political preference. 272 
Fourth, the responsiveness assumption presumes that elections 
provide the policy issue control postulated by early political scientists 
of representation.273 Advocates of the assumption assert that constitu-
ents recruit like-minded candidates, who offer descriptive representa-
tion. In addition, constituents can vote out officials whose policy 
views or performance disappoint voter expectations or preferences. 
This latter assertion assumes that constituents monitor official behav-
266. Blacks are concentrated in urban cities in which, as a result of continued white preju-
dice and white flight, the resident "managerial" class of politicians administer a declining tax 
base in a crime infected urban environment. Cf. Freedman, supra note 197, at HS, col. I (black 
elected officials, with few exceptions, have become bureaucrats and caretakers). 
267. S. KARNIG & A. WELCH, supra note 60, at 24 (blacks have least representation in most 
desirable and prestigious posts). 
268. See id. at ISS (black representation concentrated in city councils where elected officials 
least likely to affect public policy). 
269. See supra notes 159, 262. 
270. See Wilson, How the Democrats Can Harness Whites and Blacks in '92, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 24, 1989, at A31, col. I. 
271. Some black activists, consistent with their protest roots and civil rights philosophy, have 
begun to promote a black political agenda of resource allocation that suggests• certain social 
goods - health care, housing - are recognized as basic entitlements. See Hamilton, supra note 
14, at xix-xx; cf. Cavanaugh, South Politics After Super Tuesday, (rights to basic social services an 
integral part of public policy in other industrial democracies). Many of these programs would 
also benefit poor whites, although a black agenda might target spending as "reparations" or 
geographically to benefit majority-black, inner city neighborhoods. 
272. A. Glazer, K. Brace, B. Norrander, R. Griffin, V. Campagna, D. Brady & L. Handley, 
Three Variations on a Theme by V.O. Key: Race and Politics, Race and Politics, and (the ever 
popular) Race and Politics (paper presented at Annual Meeting of Am. Pol. Sci. Assn., Sept. 
1988) (describing decline of class and the rise of race as fundamental cleavage line in American 
politics); cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 414-17. 
273. See, e.g., Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 51 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 45 
(1963). 
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ior beyond election day.274 
The responsiveness assumption adopts this theory of electoral ac-
countability based on the belief that constituents will punish unrespon-
sive representatives at the polls. Where constituents are poor, 
however, electoral activity may prove too costly,275 particularly if it 
involves organizing and campaigning against an incumbent.276 Even 
where constituents are not poor, electoral activity inevitably presents 
collective action problems.277 In addition, electoral ratification may 
simply reflect symbolic activity and not any in-depth knowledge of 
politics. 278 Unless the concept of political participation transcends 
election day activity, a constituent is not providing much substantive 
direction simply by casting a ballot.279 
In addition, election day votes may not adequately convey latent 
issue conflict within the black community if voters are encouraged to 
vote for authentic, but not necessarily reformist, black candidates. 
274. This is consistent with political science literature finding incentives for individual mem-
bers of Congress to respond disproportionately to constituent monitoring. See Fitts, The Vices of 
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1567, 1605-07 (1988). 
275. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.114 (Poverty depresses political partici-
pation.). 
276. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. Contemporary empirical evidence sug-
gests that most voters are ignorant of their representatives' policy preferences and are insuffi-
ciently motivated even to participate in elections. See, e.g., Preston, Black Politics and Public 
Policy in Chicago: Constituent Representation, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 
167; Polman, U.S. Election Fund Drops as Public Abstains, Phila. Inquirer, July 29, 1990, at Al, 
col. l; Primary Results: Setting the Stage for November, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at B6, col. 3; 
Reinhold, As Primary Victor, Feinstein Becomes Democrats' Hope, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at 
B6, col. l; see also Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout, supra note 144, at Bl6, col. 4. 
277. See generally M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). 
278. Empirical observations about the electoral process suggest the electorate is guided not 
by enforcing representative responsibility - the classic view that electoral ratification is the main 
technique for holding the representative responsible - but by vague moods about public policy 
in general. See, e.g., Eulau, Changing Views of Representation, in THE PoLmcs OF REPRESEN-
TATION 49-50 (H. Eulah & J. Wahlke eds. 1978); Wahlke, Policy Demands and System Support: 
The Role of the Represented, in id. at 74-75 (few citizens think about, communicate, inform 
themselves or are interested in legislative functioning and do not realize that voting is an oppor-
tunity for making policy demands or choices). Spokesmodels, for example, reflect the growing 
involvement of elected representatives in candidate-centered activities, promoting personal trust 
rather than an issue-based reason for voting. See supra note 197. Thus, even if black election 
'turnout exceeds that of their socioeconomic cohorts, voting for a candidate, without more finely 
tuned issue identification, provides primarily symbolic ratification. Electoral ratification is also 
an empty gesture if the representative does not seek reelection or faces only token opposition or 
opposition that does not focus on the representative's record. See infra note 279. Of course, 
some political theorists would argue that the failure to vote, or to cast an educated vote reflects 
contentment with the status quo, and performs the same function as extended political participa-
tion might. 
279. See supra notes 148-51, 163 (elections are imperfect devices for preference aggregation); 
see also supra note 255 (blacks tend not to lobby or write letters to their representatives, or to 
engage in the extended political process in proportion to their electoral participation or compara-
ble to white participation). But cf R. FENNo, supra note 140, at 207 (policy change most likely 
by replacing representatives not by converting them). 
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Although poor and working class blacks may be at the heart of a black 
electoral majority, they may not form part of the governing coalition 
put together by middle-class black politicians.280 Black electoral suc-
cess theory discourages poor blacks, who may not identify with their 
middle-class counterparts on every issue, from looking beyond their 
common racial identity.281 
In fact, issue cohesion within the black community is generated by 
common concern about civil rights enforcement, government interven-
tion on behalf of the poor, and increased opportunity for black mobil-
ity. 282 On these issues, black representatives may intuitively represent 
their constituents. But, unless the responsiveness assumption under-
stands the value of sustained voter participation over time and across 
issues, the emphasis on election day turnout may not forge a common 
identity if the opponent is also black, nor ensure responsive govern-
ment if the official must contend with countervailing pressures from 
white business elites.283 
III. BEYOND BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
Black electoral success theory has two major failings. First, the 
theory abandoned the civil rights movement's transformative vision of 
politics. In that vision, the purpose of political equal opportunity was 
to ensure fairness in the competition for favorable policy outcomes, 
not just fairness in the struggle for a seat at the bargaining table. In 
addition, legislative responsiveness would not be secured merely by the 
election day ratification of black representatives. Rather, legislative 
responsiveness would depend on citizen participation, legislative pres-
ence, and legislative success in meeting the needs of a disadvantaged 
group. 
280. C. STONE, supra note 198, at 205-07, 241 (challenge for black politics is finding a way to 
bring the poor into a coalition of the white business leadership and the black middle class; instead 
of promoting redistribution toward equality, Atlanta governing coalition of middle-class blacks 
and white business elites perpetuates inequality); see supra notes 148-51, 155-57, 160-63, 196-99. 
281. Barnes, supra note 149; see also supra notes 160-63, 266. 
282. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text. 
283. C. STONE, supra note 198, at 189-91, 195, 216 (selective incentives and business control 
shape Atlanta governing coalition; effectiveness of business centered civic network possible be-
cause voter contact shallow and ephemeral); Nelson supra note 16 (black regimes adopt "corpo-
rate center" development strategy that undermines reform platform); Reed, The Black Urban 
Regime, supra note 160 (political institutions and entrencned patterns of political behavior con· 
strain black mayors' impact on budgetary allocations, including service delivery patterns and 
composition of public employment; black regimes unable to affect high levels of poverty and 
unemployment); Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note 160, at 212-13 (proposals to reformulate 
allocative element of business development agenda to include niche for blacks are not redistribu· 
tive; consensus around development policy derives from political processes in which interests of 
black poor are not represented); see supra notes 196-200. 
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Second, black electoral success theory misses the point of the po-
larization hypothesis. The theory contains three proceduralist as-
sumptions: one, that technical access usually entails meaningful 
access to the political process; two, that procedural rules that ensure 
visibility and technical access draw a neutral line between majority 
rule and minority rights; and three, that political. choices should be 
made openly and within a process that includes minority representa-
tives. If, however, the majority constitutes itself based on prejudice, as 
the polarization hypothesis declares, then simply providing technical 
access for the minority group representatives yields very modest re-
sults at best.284 
Building on these criticisms of black electoral success theory, I 
propose to shift the analysis of black political empowerment in two 
ways. First, as a matter of broader democratic theory, voting rights 
activists and litigators should begin to worry more about the funda-
mental fairness of permanent majority hegemony in a political system 
whose legitimacy is based solely on the consent of a simple, racially 
homogenous majority. Consistent with fairness, equality, and legiti-
macy, the original civil rights vision suggests fundamentally different 
tradeoffs between majority rule and minority rights. 
Second, I propose to refocus on the problems affecting marginal-
ized groups within the legislative decisionmaking process. This re-
newed focus builds on the civil rights movement's view that the values 
for which our society stands are defined by what we do for the dispos-
sessed. Thus, a theory of representation that derives its authority from 
the original civil rights' vision must address concerns of qualitative 
fairness involving equal recognition285 and just results.286 For those at 
284. Cf. Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretation of Equal Protec-
tion, 58 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1029, 1044-45, 1048-50 (1980) (process-based approach does not require 
equalization of political influence; decisions to continue subordination of minorities can occur 
even if political process considers their interests); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1077 (1980) (protecting minorities requires 
theory of substantive rights). 
285. By "equal recognition," I mean equal status as full participants in politics. See Baker, 
supra note 284, at 1079 (describing equality of respect model). 
286. Beitz, Equal Opportunity in Political Representation, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 155, 167-
68 (N. Bowie ed. 1988) (any satisfactory doctrine of political equality must simultaneously ad-
dress three concerns of democratic decisionmaking about public policy: (1) its value by virtue of 
public cooperative enterprise, (2) the content oflegislation it produces, and (3) its contribution to 
political education of its citizens). The ultimate aim would be the promotion of just legislation: 
Although it may be too much to expect that by manipulating the structure of representation 
just legislation can be systematically promoted, it may at least be possible to minimize some 
of the familiar dangers to which representation schemes have historically been prone .... 
[especially] the danger that the majority in the legislature will pay too little attention to the 
interests and rights of popular minorities. 
Id. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 
ETHICS 250, 261 (1989) ("[A] democratic public ... should provide mechanisms for the effective 
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the bottom, a system that gives everyone an equal chance of having 
their political preferences physically represented is inadequate. A fair 
system of political representation would provide mechanisms to ensure 
that disadvantaged and stigmatized minority groups also have a fair 
chance to have their policy preferences satisfied. 
While at one level such an inquiry might explore basic issues of 
democratic principle, the scope of this article is more limited. I simply 
invite voting rights activists and litigators to consider on behalf of the 
Act's intended beneficiaries a different conceptual, remedial, and prag-
matic approach to the immediate problem of legislative responsiveness 
within the statutory framework of the 1982 Voting Rights Act. To 
achieve this limited but important objective, I propose the concept of 
"proportionate interest"287 representation. Proportionate interest rep-
resentation is a general term subsuming a number of implementation 
strategies. Proportionate interest representation addresses the black 
electoral success model's failure to develop a realistic enforcement 
mechanism for achieving legislative responsivenes~. 
A. Proportionate Interest Representation 
Proportionate interest representation disavows the pluralist con-
ception of fairness, which falsely assumes equal bargaining power sim-
ply based on access, or numerically proportionate electoral success for 
all groups.288 Fairness and responsiveness should be related objec-
tives. Yet, in a racially polarized environment, some systems may be 
procedurally fair but fundamentally unresponsive.289 For example, 
representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of [disadvantaged constitu· 
ent groups]."). 
287. "[P]roportional representation systems are non-zero-sum at the electoral level, since 
[those with less than a plurality] as well as [those with a plurality] are elected." W. RIKER, supra 
note 171, at 184 n.10. By contrast, in an at-large election system, or in a legislature governed by 
a simple majority, it is possible to get no seats or no legislation with 49% of the vote. See, e.g., B. 
Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society 4-5 (Oct. 19, 1990) 
(unpublished paper prepared for The Brookings Institution Conference on the 25th Anniversary 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) (proportional representation minimizes the number of wasted 
or nonwinning votes; wasted votes are those votes cast for a nonwinning candidate or in excess of 
the minimum needed to win a seat). 
The term "interest" refers to self-identified interests, meaning those high salience needs, 
wants and interests articulated by any politically cohesive group of voters. Interests, however, 
are not necessarily descriptive of an essentialist concept of group identity but are fluid and dy-
namic articulations of group preferences. Others use different terms to refer to a similar concept. 
See, e.g., I. Young, supra note 206 (arguing for a communicative theory of democracy based on 
specific group representation). 
288. Presuming fairness based on a naked, self-interested system of bargaining is not consis-
tent with information about prejudice. See supra notes 207-229. 
289. Baker, supra note 284, at 1061 (full counting of minority group preferences in process· 
based model overtly favors powerful and oppressive elements of status quo); Tribe, supra note 
284, at 1079; Young, supra note 286 (political equality depends on social and economic equality). 
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while improving the prospects of black electoral success, black single-
member districts may undermine the possibility of effecting true policy 
change. In a system shaped by irrational, majority prejudice, remedial 
mechanisms that eliminate pure majority rule and enforce principles 
of interest proportionality may provide better proxies for political 
fairness. 290 
At this stage, I am simply assuming, without definitive explication, 
that qualitative fairness is incompatible with majority bias, where such 
bias systematically tends to produce inequalities in preference satisfac-
tion291 because of prejudice.292 This assumption makes sense in light 
of our ostensible national commitment to ensuring that blacks achieve 
meaningful legislative representation, or "a fair chance to influence the 
political process."293 The implications of qualitative fairness as a prin-
ciple of remediation, and its complementary premises and enforcement 
290. The single-member district enforcement mechanism uses the maximum electoral poten-
tial of minority voters as a baseline for fairness. Proportionate interest representation suggests an 
alternative remedial standard, more closely related to the civil rights vision bench mark of policy 
responsiveness. If interest proportionality were a proxy for assessing political fairness at the 
remedy stage, it might be potentially more judicially manageable than unresponsiveness was as a 
measure of the violation itself. As a direct evidentiary proxy for establishing a violation, unre-
sponsiveness early on proved unworkable as a judicially manageable standard. See supra note 88. 
Notwithstanding its remedial value, however, interest proportionality may not be most viable as 
a litigation strategy. Unlike single-member district remedies, which are still rooted in a 
majoritarian and territorial tradition, proportionate interest representation, once it is more fully 
developed, may be feasible primarily as a settlement or political strategy. Cf. infra notes 304-05, 
313-14, 317, 351 and accompanying text. 
291. This conception borrows liberally from the work of Charles Beitz, who contends: 
[E]veryone has an equal right to have his or her political preferences satisfied; but since it 
will normally be impossible to satisfy all political preferences simultaneously, some compro-
mise is necessary, and the only compromise consistent with equality is that political deci-
sions should satisfy the [legitimate] preferences of each member of the population an equal 
proportion of the time. 
Beitz, supra note 286, at 165. Remediation of inequalities in preference satisfaction also involves 
equality of respect to cleanse pluralist politics of racist preferences. This is an intermediary, but 
more just version of pluralism, from which a civic republican model might follow. 
Although some may object to the arbitrary, checkerboard implications of this conception, 
those implications are not the only possible ones. Cf. A. LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL 
SOCIETIES 39-40 (1977) (proposing linkage as a partial solution to the checkerboard problem of 
proportionality); Young, supra note 286, at 261-62 (specific group representation for disadvan-
taged groups requires (1) group self-organization, (2) mechanisms forcing decisionmaker to take 
group perspective into consideration, and (3) group veto for policies directly affecting group). I 
intend to explore further alternative implications. See L. Guinier, Beyond Majoritarianism: The 
Political Equality Paradox (unpublished manuscript). 
292. Prejudice is defined here by two criteria: (1) the presence of a permanent, hostile, fixed 
majority which dominates the policymaking agenda; and (2) the resulting absence of interest 
satisfaction for disadvantaged minorities on issues of greatest concern. Where there is prejudice 
against a politically cohesive, permanent minority, that minority may be disproportionately dis-
advantaged or in the extreme case excluded altogether. 
293. Davis v. Bandemar, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (equal protection violation may be found 
"where electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influ-
ence the political process effectively"); see also supra notes 2, 69 and infra note 332 and accompa-
nying text. 
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mechanisms, can best be understood by referring to a concrete 
example. 294 
Suppose a jurisdiction contained two kinds of people: the yellow 
and the blue. The yellow people constituted 75% of the population, 
were geographically dispersed around the jurisdiction's perimeter, and 
were politically cohesive to the extent that a substantial majority 
would only vote for yellow candidates. A small group of yellow peo-
ple were more tolerant. Their interests were subsidiary, however, be-
cause they represented only 17% of the jurisdiction's total population. 
The blue people, who were concentrated in the jurisdiction's inner 
center, were also politically cohesive. As a numerical minority of 
25%, however, they never elected any blue people to the jurisdiction's 
four governing positions. 
Black electoral success theory would criticize the exclusionary at 
large election format295 in this jurisdiction because essentially it would 
allow a bloc voting racial majority to control all four of the elected 
positions. Because exclusionary at large elections require a 50% plus 
one majority to win any representation, 58% of the population (the 
yellow people minus the more "liberal" contingent) would decide 
100% of the elections. The blue minority would be permanently ex-
cluded from meaningful participation. In this situation, black electo-
ral success theory would focus on electing more blue officials by 
creating one majority-blue single-member district. With one blue leg-
islator out of four, however, the blues would only be technically repre-
sented if the other three districts contain only the politically cohesive 
yellows. 
A remedy based on qualitative fairness would retain the at large 
format but modify the threshold of exclusion.296 Instead of requiring 
the 50% plus one vote for election jurisdiction-wide, the votes needed 
for election would be reduced, for example, to 20% plus one of all 
votes cast.297 Any candidate receiving more than 20% of the votes 
294. I propose the proportionate interest representation approach primarily as a remedial 
alternative for statutorily protected groups. At this preliminary stage, I am not advocating pro-
portionate interest representation as the sole basis for finding a statutory violation, for judicial 
review in general, or as a universal principle of equal protection. 
295. An exclusionary format would utilize numbered posts, staggered terms and/or a major-
ity vote requirement to reduce election competition to head-to-head contests. 
296. The threshold of exclusion is the largest possible proportion of the voteiwhich fails to 
guarantee election. Rae, Hanby & Loosemore, Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of 
Exclusion, 3 COMP. POL. STUD. 479, 480 (1971). In exclusionary at-large elections, the threshold 
of exclusion is 50%. 
297. The degree of modification necessary could be determined on a case-by-case basis taking 
into consideration the local factors presently addressed in voting rights litigation such as the 
extent of polarization, the degree of socioeconomic disadvantage, and the use of other mecha· 
nisms, including those within the legislative process, that reduced minority influence. Altema-
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would be elected. All voters would be given four votes. They could, 
however, use their votes to express the intensity of their preferences 
through cumulative voting.298 In other words, voters could "plump," 
or cumulate, all foui of their votes on any one candidate. As a result, 
a politically cohesive numerical minority of at least 20% could elect 
one legislator.299 
In addition, because 17% of the population in our hypothetical 
jurisdiction are "liberal" yellows, the proportionality principle permits / 
a cross-racial electoral coalition. 300 Assuming the blues could be or-
ganized to take maximum advantage of their political cohesion, only 
84% of the blues (21 % of the total jurisdiction electorate and just over 
tively,an across-the-board minimum threshold of exclusion could be set to meet the concern that 
the tiniest politically cohesive minority not be empowered merely to fragment or destabilize the 
ability to govern. Depending on the number of open seats, the threshold would be more than 1 % 
but less than 50% to recognize sizable minorities with reasonable expectations of representation 
and legislative influence. This reflects the intuition that a group of 15% or 20% is less likely to 
accept the legitimacy of a system in which they are the permanent losers. Also given their size, 
their disaffection would be more destabilizing of the system in general. Finally, fringe groups 
with illegitimate preferences would be represented but if their preferences prevailed, the resulting 
legislation would be vulnerable under existing constitutional analysis. 
An across-the-board threshold of exclusion could also be developed on a state-by-state basis 
rather than nationwide, to take into account the varying state percentages of minority population 
and other local conditions. Whatever the exclusion threshold, it would be no more arbitrary 
than existing determinations establishing the number of seats on a council or local commission. 
298. Cumulative voting is a semiproportionate electoral method widely used in the corporate 
context to protect minority shareholders' interests. See R. CLARK, CORPORATION LAW 361-66 
(1986); c. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS (1951); Glazer, Glazer & 
Grofman, Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into the Equation, 35 
S.C. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1984) (explaining that the purpose of cumulative voting is to permit 
minority interests to gain proportional representation on the board of directors roughly commen-
surate with their share of ownership; each shareholder has number of votes equal to number of 
shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected; shareholders may distribute those 
votes among many candidates; by strategic distribution of votes, minority shareholders may at-
tain roughly proportionate representation on board). Some state constitutions or statutes contain 
provisions requiring cumulative voting to protect the interests of minority stockliolders against 
potential abuses of the majority rule principle. See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 2048 nn.10-11 (rev. perm. ed. 1987) (noting hine constitutional 
and ten state statutory provisions). The coexistence of cumulative voting rights with a corporate 
tradition of one vote per share and majority vote approval at both the director and shareholder 
level (with two-thirds vote required for certain fundamental changes) suggest potentially valuable 
analogies to the democratic political rules being considered here. Other devices to ensure minor-
ity representation in the corporate context, such as supermajority quorum requirements and 
weighted voting, are also relevant to the concept of proportionate interest representation and will 
be further explored elsewhere. See Guinier, supra note 291; see also Note, Alternative Voting 
Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 153-60 (1982). 
299. The formula for determining under cumulative voting the threshold of exclusioq is one 
divided by one plus the number of seats. See, e.g., Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, 
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76, at 249, 255-56. Cumulative voting allows minor-
ity voters to make precise calculations as to how many representatives they can elect. See infra 
note 309 and accompanying text. 
300. Cumulative and limited voting systems are election methods that foster and reinforce 
coalitions. Because these methods lower the thresholds of exclusion, blacks can successfully ex-
press their candidate preferences despite their minority status. Whites who share the civil rights 
vision of political transformation can also join with blacks to support progressive candidates. 
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the threshold of exclusion) would be needed to elect a blue candi-
date. 301 Thus, the blues could use their otherwise wasted votes (16% 
of the blues, 4% of the total electorate) to join the 17% "liberal" yel-
lows. Given the 20% plus one threshold of exclusion, the blue/yellow 
coalition of 21 % would also have enough votes to elect a representa-
tive. The legislature would then contain one blue member, one 
"green" member, and two yellows. The two yellows would no longer 
enjoy complete majority hegemony and the blue member would finally 
have a green "ally" to second her motions and to join with her in 
demanding access to the governing coalition. In this way, proportion-
ate interest representation would disaggregate the majority. 
If modifying the exclusion threshold alone did not yield propor-
tionate interest representation, winner-take-all majority rule by a per-
manent, hostile legislative majority could be modified. Where 
majority representatives refuse to bargain with representatives of the 
minority, simple majority vote rules would be replaced. "A minority 
veto" for legislation of vital importance to minority interests would 
respond to evidence of gross "deliberative gerrymanders."302 Alterna-
tively, depending on the proof of disproportionate majority power, 
plaintiffs might seek minority assent through other superm'ajority ar-
rangements, concurrent legislative ·majorities, consociational arrange-
ments, or rotation in office. 303 
301. The threshold of exclusion is only the threshold of victory under the most adverse cir-
cumstances. If more than five yellow candidates run, the blues might elect someone with less 
than 20% of the vote. 
302. Alternatively, a minority veto reserved for issues of majority concern would force the 
majority to bargain. See infra note 317. See generally, A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 36-38 
(fact of veto more important than its use). The minority veto is a form of supermajority rule. 
Unanimity or supermajority decisional rules give numerical minorities power to protect their 
interests and provide incentives for more thorough and inclusive deliberation and decisionmak· 
ing. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (consensus building voting rule ordered as 
part of the remedy on remand for structural vote dilution). Deviations from pure majority rule 
that force everyone into indispensable coalitions could provide real power to minority representa-
tives. Minority group members would become "acceptable role partners." See W. RIKER, supra 
note 171, at 95-96 (within a theory of minimum winning coalitions, the role of the minority 
opposition may be to create value in the majority coalition unless the minority is perceived as an 
"acceptable role partner," meaning a potential coalition follower or leader). I treat these issues 
more comprehensively elsewhere. See L. Guinier, supra note 291. 
303. Id. The concurrent majority is a particular type of supermajority requirement. It was 
initially promulgated by John Calhoun to protect the minority interests of the South. J. CAL· 
HOUN, A DISQUISmON ON GOVERNMENT 25, 28 (1943) (in order to pass, legislation would need 
the support of a majority of minority representatives, however defined, as well as a majority of 
majority representatives); cf. A. LDPHART, supra note 291, at 25-52 (defining comparable idea of 
consociational democracy in terms of four essential elements of communal representation: grand 
coalition of political leaders from all significant population segments; mutual veto or concurrent 
majority; proportionality; and segmental autonomy). Rotating officials may also empower blacks 
throughout the jurisdiction and invite alliances with white voters. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw 
County, 649 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986), ajfd. in part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246 
(11th Cir. 1987); see also First Woman in Swiss Cabinet Quits; Husband Is Scrutinized, N.Y. 
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Coalition building has always raised two issues: one, how to en-
courage alliances between members of the dominant white majority 
and economically depressed minorities; and two, how to keep those 
alliances reciprocal and empowering. Interest proportionality, com-
plemented by a minority veto, addresses both problems. 304 
Proportionate interest representation would urge courts, lawyers, 
and voting rights activists to consider black voters' claims in the con-
text of remedies that "soften the harshness of majority rule." 
Although remedies that deviate from pure majority rule may not al-
ways be feasible in litigation, such proposals may be expe.rimentally 
implemented through settlement negotiations or political initiatives. 305 
Three examples, two actual cases and one open-ended hypothetical sit-
uation, suggest distinctions between an agenda driven by black electo-
ral success theory and one that envisions remediation based on 
proportionate interest representation. 
Example 1. The first example involves a judicial interpretation of 
legislative unresponsiveness in Durham, North Carolina. In Durham, 
a black had been consistently elected over ten years to the North Caro-
Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1 (under Swiss rotating executive system, first woman was 
scheduled to become vice-president); Blacks and Whites Share Control in Selma, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 29, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (city council agreed to appoint 10 voting members on school board, 
five white and five black with a chair rotating annually between the two racial groups; when 
asked how the board would operate, the white mayor who helped negotiate agreement said, 
"Well, you're going to operate with the art of compromise"). 
304. Proportionate interest representation gives black voters the opportunity to form cross-
racial electoral and/or legislative constituencies through voluntary bargaining. This might seem 
inconsistent with the authenticity principle. If proportionate interest representation encourages 
cross-racial coalitions at the electoral level, candidates with broad appeal might prevail over 
candidates with strong community-based credentials. The concern that coalitional candidates 
will succeed at the expense of accountable representatives is legitimate, but not necessarily dis-
positive. Authenticity and coalitional politics are not inherently inconsistent goals. First, pro-
portionate interest representation allows a numerically significant group based on the threshold 
of exclusion to elect their most preferred candidate. Thus, the option of electing authentic black 
representatives is available. Proportionate interest representation allows the voters themselves to 
determine the importance of authentic representation. Second, it allows self-defined voluntary 
constituencies to evolve because it disaggregates the majority into groups that may perceive their 
own self-interest sympathetically with black self-interest. Third, even if tension exists between 
the authenticity and coalitional values and blacks choose the latter, at least blacks are in a posi-
tion to keep the coalition reciprocal. Under proportionate interest representation, they have 
many more options to leave one coalition in favor of another. In other words, blacks are less 
permanently locked into a particular bargaining strategy or particular set of allies. 
305. Given the firmly entrenched mythology surrounding majority rule, see Whitfield v. 
Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365, 370 (E.D. Ark. 1988), affd. by equally divided court, 890 
F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (majority vote a "bedrock ingredient of democratic political 
philosophy"), proportionate interest proposals to deviate from pure majority rule may be con-
templated initially only by parties in settlement negotiations or as political initiatives. See supra 
note 303 (as result of negotiations between city council and two black civic clubs, Selma School 
Board to operate with a rotating racial majority); Engstrom, Cincinnati's 1988 Proportional Rep-
resentation Initiative, 9 ELECTORAL STUD. 217 (1990) (describing 1988 Cincinnati proportional 
representation referenda). 
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lina General Assembly from a three-person multimember district. 
Nevertheless, in 1982, black Durham voters challenged the use of the 
multimember district format. 306 Influenced by black electoral success 
theory, plaintiffs argued that blacks, who constituted slightly more 
than 30% of the Durham voting population, would be better repre-
sented by a black elected from a majority-black single-member Dur-
ham subdistrict. Plaintiffs asserted that persistent racial bloc voting 
caused the one black representative to be elected only as a result of 
single-shot voting by blacks. 3o1 
Although supported by Durham black voters, the successful black 
candidate also depended upon support from some moderate to con-
servative whites. To appease the white voters, the successful black did 
not "effectively represent" plaintiffs' interests in the legislature. He 
"sail trimmed" and relied on black legislators elected from majority-
black single-member districts elsewhere in the state, to protect the in-
terests of blacks in Durham. 3os 
Black electoral success theory, however, gave the Supreme Court 
no mechanism through which to examine, under section 2, the quality 
of the representative's legislative participation. Black electoral success 
theory apparently convinced the Court that nothing more than pro-
portionate, "descriptive" representation was required. On remand, 
this aspect of the case was ultimately dismissed. 
· A lawsuit informed by the concept of proportionate interest repre-
sentation would highlight plaintiffs' concerns with legislative partici-
pation. Evidence that racial bloc voting in an unmodified at large 
system disabled the descriptive black representative in Durham from 
representing within the legislature the interests of his black constitu-
ents would substantiate the violation. If a violation were established, a 
court could order as a remedy, or plaintiffs could attempt to negotiate 
306. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom., Thornburg 
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
307. Single-shot or bullet voting exists where voters voluntarily abnegate their right to vote 
for a full slate of candidates, casting only one ballot, for example, although three seats are open. 
By limiting its votes to express the intensity of their preference, Durham's politically cohesive 
black community maximized their voting strength, because racial bloc voting limited their ability 
to influence all three election contests. Single·shot voting, however, is unfair when compared to 
the threshold-lowering schemes proposed here. Single-shot voting forces a minority to limit its 
vote while the majority exercises its control over the full slate. As plaintiffs demonstrated in 
Durham, even with single-shot voting by blacks, whites still selected all three candidates: the two 
whites and the one black who were elected. Moreover, single-shot voting alone does not ensure 
any black election. The election of one black is conceivable only with the support of some whites 
and the wasting of votes by other whites. Even if black voters single-shoot for a black candidate, 
it is equally conceivable that under some circumstances only three whites will be elected. 
308. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. 345 (trjal transcript) (plaintiffs could not run their most preferred 
candidate who might aggressively advocate their views but never command enough white sup-
port to get elected); see also supra notes 150-5, 159-62. 
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through settlement, a modified at large system with a threshold of ex-
clusion lower than 51 %. In this case the threshold would be 26%.309 
Example 2. The second illustration, which arises in the context of 
the 1990s "dispersal gerrymander," responds to criticism that propor-
tionate interest representation fails to protect the autonomy of black 
neighborhoods.31° For example, housing controversies erupted when 
recently developers were encouraged to provide low income housing in 
outer perimeter "urban villages" in exchange for tax abatements and 
other benefits. Some black politicians and scholars claim that these 
relocation plans will erode the black political base. 311 These black 
electoral success proponents argue that black voting strength is realis-
tically recognized only to the extent that it is concentrated in inner-
city neighborhoods capable of electing a black representative.312 
A ballot initiative similar to one attempted by the Rainbow Coali-
tion in Cincinnati, however, could lead to at large proportionate inter-
est representation.313 Elections would be jurisdiction-wide with a 
lowered threshold of exclusion. Thus, no matter where blacks lived 
they could assert their political preferences on a self-identified basis. If 
implemented as part of a voter initiative, blacks could take advantage 
of both proportionate interest representation and intergroup solicitude 
without litigation.314 
309. Using cumulative voting, for example, the 30% black voting population could expect 
proportionate interest representation from a representative directly accountable to their interests. 
Using the formula of one divided by one plus the number of seats, see supra note 299, blacks who 
were more than 25% of the population could not be denied representation if they plumped all 
three of their votes on a representative. The modified system would be more fair than single-shot 
voting because blacks were now casting as many votes as whites and the black representative 
would be directly accountable to black interests. Moreover, because their numerical strength 
exceeded the threshold of exclusion, with foresight some blacks could use their extra, otherwise 
wasted votes to join with liberal whites to influence the election of one of the two white 
candidates. 
310. See Letter from Jim Blacksher to author (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author) (majority-
black districts important to recognize ethnic community autonomy). 
311. See, e.g., Note, Racial Geography, supra note 237, at 1264-65 nn.78-80 (citing scholars 
who criticize housing integration for overlooking necessity of black solidarity to black power, 
where voting rights determined along geographic lines); Transcript of tape number seven from a 
debate among John Calmore, Jean Cham, and john powell sponsored by The New Public Inter-
est Law Conference and entitled Race and Space: Housing and Minority Communities (com-
ments of J. Calmore) (spatial equality, not racial integration, needed to redress black's 
socioterritorial disadvantage, meaning isolation and containment of inner city; integrationist 
strategies "dilute central city Black voting strength" and "rob central city Black communities of 
..• representation"). 
312. Similarly, politicians faced with redistricting decisions after the 1990 census must decide 
which black neighborhoods to aggregate into majority-black districts. See infra notes 343, 348. 
313. Engstrom, supra note 305, at 223-24 (cumulative voting remedy prompted by concerns 
over dispersal of the black community and likely gerrymandering). 
314. In the § 2 litigation context, however, several courts have approved these alternative 
remedies where blacks were geographically dispersed, making a single-member-district remedy 
implausible. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987); Dillard v. Chilton 
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Example 3. The final example addresses the third generation "de-
liberative gerrymander." In Etowah and Russell Counties, Alabama, 
a successful black challenge to the at large election system resulted in 
a court imposed majority-black single-member district, and the elec-
tion of the first black county commissioners.3 15 Once elected, how-
ever, these black commissioners were gerrymandered out of the one 
resource the commission controlled: the road shops. The holdover 
incumbent white commissioners, representing now majority-white dis-
tricts, refused to share fiscal responsibility for appropriating tax dol-
lars to maintain the roads. A three-judge court considering a 
subsequent challenge to this legislative exclusion dismissed the case 
because it did not involve the diminution of the minority constituents' 
electoral power. Rather, the challenge addressed the legislative influ-
ence of the black representatives.316 
Guided by the concept of proportionate interest representation, the 
lawsuit could have helped the court understand legislative exclusion as 
a serious threat to a "meaningful vote," comparable to direct interfer-
ence with the right to cast a ballot. Based on statutory language en-
suring a right "to participate equally" throughout the political 
process, plaintiffs could have asked the court to institute a minority 
veto for road shop resource allocations or to rotate fiscal responsibility 
among the commissioners. 317 
B. Criticism of Proportionate Interest Representation 
By making black representatives necessary participants in the gov-
erning process, by giving minority groups additional bargaining 
power, and by granting blacks a minority veto on issues affecting vital 
minority interests, proportionate interest representation helps protect 
substantive minority interests. Proportionate interest representation 
may split fixed, racially homogeneous majority constituencies into 
subgroups who would enjoy greater political leverage through preelec-
tion coalition building with other politically cohesive electoral 
County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. 1988), affd., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(adopting magistrate recommendation that cumulative voting be used for election of county com· 
mission and school board); Dillard v. Town of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (lim-
ited voting scheme acceptable under § 2 for city council elections). 
315. Mack v. Russell County, No. 90-712 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (three-judge court) cert. 
pending 59 U.S.L.W. 3460. 
316. Mack, No. 90-712. 
317. See Letter from S. Issacharoff to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (if plaintiffs establish 
nonresponsiveness, not as a matter of an evidentiary requirement of liability, but as proof of the 
scope of the remedial concern, then no policy should be effectuated on the areas of nonrespon· 
siveness without the assent of the minority representative). 
March 1991] The Triumph of Tokenism 1145 
minorities. 31s 
In addition to its strategic value, proportionate interest representa-
tion serves the collegial function of encouraging more open delibera-
tion. To the extent that legislators would be accountable to a larger, 
more heterogeneous electorate, threshold lowering arrangements 
might influence legislators to be more "public regarding" because 
technically, each legislator would be elected from the entire constitu-
ency. By giving dignity to strongly held sentiments of minorities, in-
terest proportionality principles may also produce more reasoned, just 
decisions. 319 
Finally, proportionate interest representation structures political 
competition so as to formalize coalitions and intergroup interaction. 
For example, formalizing intergroup coalitions might ultimately pro-
mote minority political parties by causing changes in election struc-
tures. 320 Formal coalitions, negotiated by a political party 
representing minority political interests, might be preferable to dif-
fused minority presence within an umbrella political organization. 321 
The proportionate interest representation principle proposed here 
is therefore based on a view of politics that is both interest-based and 
deliberative. 322 I self-consciously reject, however, several assumptions 
held by Abrams and Themstrom, as well as the more idealistic views 
of some civic republicans. Proportionate interest representation does 
not assume, as both Abrams and Themstrom apparently do, that the 
interests of black voters are fungible with those of whites. 323 Thus, 
318. It is this process of factionalizing the majority constituency and empowering politically 
cohesive minorities that raises concerns about the stability and efficiency of proportionate interest 
systems. Others call this the grand coalition. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 25-31. I intend to 
explore these issues elsewhere. See Guinier, supra note 291. 
319. Recognizing minority and dissenting viewpoints stimulates dialogue to enhance the 
political discourse. See supra notes 175, 179; see also Nemeth, supra note 220 at 38. 
320. If minority political factions were electorally sanctioned and empowered, they would 
enjoy a more formal role in formulating government policy. Existing umbrella political parties 
would be replaced by a proliferation of parties formally committed to expressing more intensely 
minority viewpoints. See infra note 348 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 318. On the 
other hand, organized groups of black voters could also coalesce to demand formalization of 
intergroup coalitions. 
321. Formal rules assist in exposing the contradiction between behavior and public norms. 
Similarly, the "confrontation" theory posits that formal public settings are safer for minorities. 
See supra note 214 and accompanying text. Structured, public settings better enforce the highly 
principled norms which inform the "American creed" to reject racism, unfairness, and inequal-
ity. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY 80 (1962). 
322. By deliberative I mean "an argumentative interchange among persons who recognize 
each other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect." Michelman, Conceptions of Democ-
racy, supra note 178, at 447. 
323. See supra notes 134-39, 246-47; cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 427-29 (Blacks "are in 
greater need of government sponsored programs and solicitude which whites often resent and 
vigorously oppose."). 
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authentic, black-community-based interest identification and represen-
tation are important. 
Moreover, the concept does not assume, as some civic republicans 
seem to, that coalitions can be sustained by appeals to conscience or 
sympathy. Coalitions require more than dialogue and deliberation by 
civically virtuous representatives. They require institutional changes 
in the structure of deliberation, formal incentives for interracial coop-
eration, and political prote<;tion for minority groups. Unlike either 
Abrams or Thernstrom, I therefore assume that coalitions are only 
possible between relatively equal groups that are in deliberative envi-
ronments where majoritarian controls are modulated. 324 
As an interest-based approach, proportionate interest representa-
tion nevertheless may be criticized on the ground that it contains all of 
the flaws of the pluralist bargain without its stabilizing thrust of ma-
jority rule. According to some critics, the potential for promoting spe-
cial interest representation is a fatal defect. These critics argue that 
despite institutional structures or incentives for fair minded bargaining 
special interest representation may not yield transformative politics. 
Proportionate interest representation is actually construed by some as 
an argument for legislative set-asides, electoral quotas, or equality of 
representation based simply on the election of descriptively black 
representatives. 325 
Proportionate interest representation arguably weakens the two-
party system by facilitating the formation of minor parties.326 By pro-
liferating the number of parties, and by highlighting the importance of 
interests, proportionate interest representation may facilitate the rep-
resentation of extremist viewpoints, make compromise more difficult, 
and simply lead to political paralysis or ungovernability because of the 
absence of a governing majority. In particular, disadvantaged minori-
ties with an interest in changing the status quo may not find salvation 
324. See supra note 289. Some civic republicans do profess concern with reducing the influ-
ence of exogenous inequalities. The response of others seems focused on ensuring proportionate 
"descriptive" representation and insulating all representatives from constituent,,pressure. See 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34, 82-85 (1985). Pro-
portionate descriptive representation fails to provide safeguards for the minority group from ma-
jority domination even within a "civically virtuous" deliberative process. I also claim that 
pressures toward cooptation affect minority group representatives who, like all other representa· 
tives, cannot be trusted to deliberate effectively on behalf of their constituents in the absence of 
constituent monitoring. Insulation from constituent pressure would simply enhance existing ma-
jority control. Yet, I share the civic republican desire to perfect the legislative process. 
325. The statutory disclaimer in § 2 was drafted to address similar fears. See supra notes 2 & 
134. The statutory language suggests that a litigant cannot make a prima facie case based only 
on the disproportionate absence of descriptively black members of the legislature. 
326. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 46-47, 78, 137 (because of the low threshold of exclu-
sion, proportionate representation linked to multiplication of parties). 
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by deviating from majority rule. Rules that protect minorities against 
unfriendly legislation may also make it more difficult to pass friendly 
legislation. 
Some scholars contend that district representation strikes a better 
balance between group representation and stalemate. Although dis-
trict representation assumes geography is an adequate proxy for inter-
ests, it does not emphasize unyielding interest representation. 
District-based representation simply facilitates community organiza-
tion because it focuses on a smaller geographic area and promotes 
knowledgeable voters whose representative is more socially and geo-
graphically accessible. 327 
Finally, many commentators object to proportionate interest rep-
resentation on separation of powers and judicial management grounds. 
Given the demand for justiciability that irresistibly shaped the black 
electoral success litigation strategy, judicial monitoring to remedy ine-
quality of consideration within the legislative process is arguably 
neither feasible nor desirable. Legal intervention to change legislative 
procedural rules may seem unlikely when those rules ensure that each 
person can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer sup-
port or criticisms of proposals. 
I am undeterred by these criticisms for five reasons. First, I em-
phasize the importance of disaggregating majority interests in a system 
dominated by irrational prejudice. By disaggregating the majority, 
proportionate interest representation promotes democratic decision-
making by a more diverse and engaged electorate. This result is con-
sistent with the original civil rights vision. 32s • 
Thus, proportionate interest representation emphasizes the illegiti-
macy of majority rule where the majority is permanent and con-
stituted on the basis of prejudice. 329 Proportionate interest 
representation weighs the illegitimacy of a permanent majority more 
heavily than concerns about efficiency and stability, which are used to 
327. See supra notes 237, 239 and accompanying text. 
328. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 194 (proportionate representation promotes compro-
mise and consensus rather than majoritarianism). Proportionate interest representation award& 
representation and political leverage in relation to voting shares, but it does not give all the power 
to the majority winner. It would no longer be possible for one group to exert complete domi-
nance over the entire political system. A. LUPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF 
MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TwENTY-ONE CoUNTRIES 23-30 (1984); 
see supra notes 287, 290. 
329. Winner-take-all systems undermine the legitimacy of governmental decisions where 
they create permanent minorities who are unable, because of widespread prejudice, tQ recruit 
defectors from the winning coalition. Systems empowering a simple majority exaggerate that 
group's power and "dilute" the minority group's power by increasing the number of minority 
votes cast in a losing cause. M. DURVERGER, PoLmCAL PARTIES (1964); D. RAE, THE POLIT-
ICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1971). 
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justify majoritarian regimes. 330 The argument for proportionate inter-
est representation therefore starts with a legitimacy critique. Mirror-
ing the theory of black electoral success, proportionate interest 
representation relies heavily on legitimacy considerations: people who 
have a meaningful voice in governmental decisions are more willing to 
lend their consent to decisions with which they disagree. 
Second, although proportionate interest representation rests on le-
gitimacy derived from minority representation, the concept is not es-
sentialist. Proportionate interest represe!ltation is an attempt to 
construct a deliberative decisionmaking body that represents, in pro-
portion to their presence in the population, minority group interests331 
not minority group voters. The concept is, however, also consistent 
with the one person/one vote principle because each voter gets the 
same number of votes. 332 
330. See B. Cain, supra note 287, at 5-7 (critics of proportionality weigh the trade-offs be-
tween legitimacy, efficiency, and stability differently). 
331. These interests are not altogether independent of minority group status, experience with 
racial discrimination, or historic and cultural identity. Cf supra note 145 and accompanying 
text. Interest representation simply allows voters to define the relative salience of these respec-
tive variables for themselves. It reduces the number of supporters needed for a winning coalition, 
or "threshold of exclusion," to something less than 51 % by allowing voters to plump or cumu-
late their votes to express the intensity of their political preferences. Thus, proportionate interest 
representation allows all politically cohesive interest groups, which are numerically relevant 
under the threshold of exclusion, to determine which interests are most important. Politically 
cohesive groups are not all composed of minority group members. Proportionate interest repre-
sentation is therefore not necessarily race-based and allows for the possibility that not all mem-
bers of a minority group share common interests or common perceptions of their interests. Nor 
does it assume that all members of the majority group are hostile to minority interests. 
332. At the electoral level, proportionate interest representation clearly satisfies one person/ 
one vote concerns. Indeed it may do so for more people than a district-based system and for any 
voluntary, self-defined minority. But proportionate interest representation also contemplates en-
forcement of the qualitative fairness principle at the legislative level. Here it is specifically lim-
ited to disadvantaged minorities specially protected under the Voting Rights Act. At the 
legislative level, proportionate interest representation defines procedural equality in the Reynolds 
v. Sims sense of fair representation, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964), meaning an equal voice in 
government or an equal opportunity to influence decisions. I do not argue that the one person/ 
one vote standard requires procedural equality defined as more than just procedural access. I do 
suggest that procedural equality at the legislative level is not necessarily inconsistent with ex-
isting equality norms as long as the majority is still proportionately represented. See United 
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (proportionately represented white voters had no 
complaint against a compensatory or race conscious remedy to increase minority representation). 
Even the minority veto might justify its deviation from pure mathematical equality in some his-
toric circumstances, see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), at the local level, Abate v. 
Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971), to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation, Avery v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968), and to equalize the likelihood that minority representatives 
can cast the decisive vote on legislation in relationship to their proportion of the population. See 
Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 252, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 
508 (1967); Franklin v. Krause, 32 N.Y.2d 234, 298 N.E.2d 68, 344 N.Y.S.2d 885 reargument 
denied 33 N.Y.2d 646, 303 N.E.2d 71, 348 N.YS.2d 554 and 33 N.Y.2d 658, 303 N.E.2d 710, 
348 N.Y2d 1030 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974) (approving plan that eliminated 
100% voting power for 56% population majority); League of Women Voters v. Nassau Count 
Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1984) cert. denied subnom. Schmertz v. Nassau County 
Bd. of Supervisors, 498 U.S. 1108 (1985) (constitutional principle of one person/one vote does 
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Moreover, proportionate interest representation recognizes that 
proportionate "descriptive"333 representation, as implicated by the au-
thenticity assumption in black electoral success theory, may supply 
some legitimacy to an otherwise majoritarian regime. Simple descrip-
tive proportionate representation, however, offers no guar:antee that 
voters will have equal chances of seeing their policy preferences satis-
fied. 334 Majority bias may still control the integrated legislature. 
Third, the promotion of self-identified, rather than geographically 
predetermined, interest preferences arguably sharpens issue conflict 
while it helps alleviate social conflict and political alienation. Black 
representatives elected under the proportionate interest model would 
be potentially more effective within legislative deliberations because 
they would not be elected from isolated districts. 335 If the minority 
also had a mutual veto, blacks would enjoy a valuable, strategic, bar-
gaining position, which assures that the majority would be able to get 
anything done without their assent. 336 
Fourth, the concept specifically addresses the mobilization and re-
sponsiveness aspects of representation. Once elected, minority repre-
sentatives would be more responsive to their constituents because 
individual incumbents would not be assured of reelection. 337 Effective 
representatives would be continuously engaged in issue identification 
and articulation. Indeed, proportionate interest representation hy-
pothesizes increased black turnout as elected officials respond to core 
black interests. 338 
not require a state to give absolute majority control to a population majority; cf. Town of Lock-
port v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977) motion 
denied 431 U.S. 902 (1973) (concurrent majority referendum requirement approved as constitu-
tional method for recognizing constituencies with separate and potentially opposing.interests). 
333. See supra note 114. 
334. Beitz, supra note 286, at 155, 162. "All that is promised is that the legislature will 
mirror in some sense the political preferences of the electorate as the voters themselves identify 
them. Popular minorities will be represented, but their representatives will constitute legislative 
minorities, unable except through compromise to effect their constituents' will." 
335. See supra note 304. 
336. See supra notes 302, 328. 
337. Thus, even after the first symbolic victory, black officials might face competitive electo-
ral contests. Because these election structures are more complicated, the candidates would need 
to develop political organizations that educate the electorate, keeping them informed about the 
candidate's policy views and mobilizing their support on an issue-based agenda. In addition, 
interest representation provides a more flexible tool for resolving conflicts between the elected 
incumbent and her constituents. Because her constituents are not geographic captives, they more 
easily switch allegiance if their interests are not represented. 
338. Cf. Applebome, Blacks and the Election, supra note 166, at 30, col. 2 (noting decline in 
black voting in mid-term elections because, "This is not 1964. Blacks aren't thrilled to death just 
because they have the right to vote. They have to have someone to vote for. One cost of moder-
ating the message by Democrats is that they aren't exciting their most loyal voter core"; widen-
ing gap between black and white voter turnout attributed to the failure of the political parties to 
address civil rights and other concerns of blacks); supra note 153. 
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In addition, the concept of proportionate representation would not 
deplete the electoral energy generated by black electoral success the-
ory. That proportionate interest arrangements depend on political co-
hesion and organization is a potential advantage for the black 
community. Despite their disproportionately depressed socioeco-
nomic status, political activity is salient for blacks. 339 
Fifth, by modifying the threshold of exclusion in at large election 
systems, proportionate interest representation also avoids the gerry-
mandering problem common to district-based systems. By avoiding 
the need to draw subdistrict boundaries, proportionate interest repre-
sentation obviates contemporary preoccupation with redistricting de-
cisions. 340 Any system that relies on district representation, no matter 
how subtly gerrymandered, cannot equalize prospects of electoral suc-
cess as effectively as a proportionate interest system. 341 Given geo-
graphical constituencies, some voters will always vote for losers. In 
addition, even where blacks are extremely geographically insular, they 
may not all be captured in a single relatively compact district. Some 
blacks will thus reside outside the district, and will be unrepresented 
or only virtually represented. 342 Other blacks, for reasons of political 
expediency, may be "packed" into a majority-black district, where 
their votes will be wasted. 343 
In other works, I explore further the implications of interest pro-
portionality for democratic representation in general and separation of 
339. Once convinced of political possibilities, blacks are able to mobilize collectively, creating 
"historical moments" of"magical quality." G. McWorter, D. Gills & R. Bailey, supra note 153, 
at 8-9, 23, 27 (Afro-American Studies and Research, University oflllinois, Urbana). Controlling 
for income, blacks are consistently more politically active than their white demographic cohorts, 
and may also be more politically specialized and motivated. See D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 
5, at 232, 244-49; Ackerman, supra note 175; Jones, Study Finds Americans Wont News But 
Aren't Well Informed, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, at 13, col. 1 (survey found higher proportion of 
blacks tl]an whites were consistent news consumers). 
340. See infra note 349. Proportionality achieved in the legislature via "gerrymandered dis-
trict representation" yields at best the presumed ranking of voters' interests according to the 
designers of the district. Beitz, supra note 286, at 163. The degree of fit between voter interest 
and voter residence is an empirical question which I intend to explore elsewhere. 
341. Id.; see also R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 115, 117-19 (1981) (single-
member districts with plurality elections, although consistent with popular assumptions regard-
ing democratic principles, do not ensure minority representation). 
342. See supra note 135. This is particularly important where blacks are dispersed through-
out the jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988). 
343. Parker, supra note 99, at 85, 96 (packing involves the overconcentration of minority 
voters in a single district). This is certain to become a critical issue in the redistricting efforts that 
follow the 1990 census where the number of black voters necessary to maintain a "safe" black 
district will be the source of contention between black incumbents interested in packing their 
districts to retain their seats and black activists committed to expanding the black community's 
base of power. 
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powers in particular.344 My response here is limited to the feasibility 
concern. If it is true, as I have argued, that representatives are equal 
only if existing distributions of power, resources and prejudices do not 
play an "authoritative" role in their deliberations, 345 then it is not 
clear that the remedial goal of equal political participation in the form 
of a fair and equal distribution of preference satisfaction is realistic, 
especially within a litigation context. 346 
Even if doctrinally acceptable as a remedial strategy, proportionate 
interest representation may be politically unsuccessful in a time of re-
trenchment and regression. The political status quo factors that defeat 
the traditional electoral success model will predictably dilute any con-
certed litigation effort to improve legislative performance on behalf of 
black interests.347 It may be that no electoral strategy, unaccompa-
nied by a protest-based model of insurgent politics, can mobilize sus-
tained commitment either to incremental reform or to more 
substantive conceptions of political justice. Moreover, the transforma-
tive effect of political power at the local political level is questionable. 
While formidable, these concerns do not alter the proposal's polit-
ical and doctrinal plausibility at the electoral.level and its aspirational 
value for legislative deliberation. Proportionate interest representation 
disaggregates the majority to benefit some whites as well as blacks. At 
the electoral level, lowering the threshold of exclusion potentially em-
powers all numerically significant groups, including minority political 
parties, organized groups of women, the elderly, as well as any group 
of working class or poor people presently politically disadvantaged 
under a majoritarian model. 348 Retaining at large elections eliminates 
344. See Guinier, supra note 291. 
345. See Cohen, supra note 204, at 22-23. 
346. Cf. supra notes 290, 314 and accompanying text. The concept of proportional interest 
representation and the concept of proportional interest satisfaction, however, are not cotermi-
nous and objections to the interest satisfaction approach do not necessarily vitiate the value of 
interest representation. 
347. Indeed, one might draw the lesson from my critique of black electoral success theory 
that no process-based reform, even one which attempts to enforce a substantive justice standard, 
may ultimately make a difference. One certainly could argue convincingly that blacks will never 
achieve political equality until they first achieve social and economic equality. As Professor Bell 
suggests with reference to the interest-convergence dilemma, see supra note 232, any alternative 
with real potential effectiveness will face fierce and politically powerful opposition. Others have 
also described this theme of pyrrhic victories. See Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does 
Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 106 (1990) (describing Law of Racial Thermodynamics 
in which "[r]acism is neither created nor destroyed" but merely has different guises, including 
"procedural" racism of seemingly neutral rules that predictably handicap black). 
348. Hybrid forms of electoral representation, such as those I have advocated to satisfy pro-
portionate interest representation, are better than exclusionary multimember election systems for 
all these groups. Depending on the particular facts, they are probably even preferable to single-
member districts that waste votes within the district presumably controlled by the group and do 
not use efficiently group member votes in other majority-controlled districts. In any event, self-
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the decennial contestation over political power, including the inevita-
ble fight between incumbent politicians and minority groups seeking 
representation. 349 
At the legislative level, though much more problematic, pursuit of 
a radically different litigation strategy is still worthwhile. As applied 
to legislative decisional rules, these proposals are necessarily fact spe-
cific. Given the special historic, social, and political circumstances of 
a particular case, alternative remedies may be desirable, even 
preferable. 350 
The constitutionality of alternative threshold lowering electoral 
approaches has been upheld in a number of states,351 although few 
courts and voting rights litigators have actually expressed a preference 
for these alternatives. But, even if litigators approach the violation 
stage of a voting rights case much as they do now, it may still be possi-
ble to strengthen, through proofs and briefs incorporating the propor-
tionate interest principle, the remedial side of the judicial inquiry. 
defining, voluntary political constituencies including blacks will probably not come out worse 
under a hybrid form of representation and probably will come out much better, because they will 
be able to preserve both authenticity and reciprocity values. These distinctive self-defined groups 
will be able not only to elect candidates of choice but to become members of a coalition large 
enough to influence policy outcomes. 
In addition, hybrid election reform "discards only the discriminatory part of the at-large 
system - the voting rule itself - and retains the part that is permissible - the underlying multi-
member district and the form of the elected body." Note, supra note 298, at 158-59 (citation 
omitted). 
349. See Berke, G.O.P. Tries a Gambit with Voting Rights, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1991, at DB, 
col. 4 (white Democratic incumbents who do not want to cede seats because of shifting 
demographics complain about "unholy alliance" between Republicans and minority groups seek-
ing majority minority single-member districts). 
350. See Still, Voluntary Constituencies: Limited Voting and Cumulative Voting as Remedies 
for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, YALE L. & POL. REV. (forthcoming 1991). Of 
course, at the legislative level those cases will be hard to prove. Plaintiffs will have to put the 
local government on trial. This is problematic both as to a quantitative evidentiary analysis as 
well as the divisiveness with which any such inquiry is necessarily associated. A court might see 
fit to order a qualitative fairness remedy for legislative decisional rules only if plaintiffs prove 
high polarization thresholds and obviously discriminatory policy outputs over an extended pe-
riod of time. This is also true if legislative remedies are implemented following proof of a viola-
tion at the electoral level. 
351. See, e.g., Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) (limited vot-
ing scheme for election of Commonwealth representative is "reasonable" and facilitates minority 
representation); Orloski v. Davis, 564 F. Supp. 526 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (limited voting for Com-
monwealth Court); Hechinger v. Martin, 411 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (uphold-
ing limited voting scheme for D.C. city council elections); LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743 
(D.Conn. 1972) (three-judge court) (limited voting for school boards); Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. 
Supp. 602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (limited voting scheme does not violate equal protection clause as 
long as each voter casts the same number of votes); Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 134, 243 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 439 (1964) (limited voting for New York City 
Council); cf. Engstrom, supra note 305 (challenges to basic plurality format increasing in U.S. 
driven by minority voter dissatisfaction with that representational format; number of local gov-
ernments have adopted, through settlements in voting rights lawsuits, semi-proportional 
arrangements). 
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Moreover, as referenda or ballot initiatives, it may be useful and prac-
tical to explore further the qualitative advantages of an interest pro-
portionality principle employed in conjunction with legislative 
decisionmaking changes. 352 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of proportionate interest representation represents an 
initial foray into a previously neglected field of research critically ex-
ploring pluralist theories of black political participation. Proportion-
ate interest representation, however, does not address all the defects I 
identified in black electoral success theory. I have argued, for exam-
ple, that black electoral success theory fails to address issues of false 
consciousness, cooptation, and the representational relationship be-
tween black voters and their representatives. By raising but not ad-
dressing concerns about the internal dynamic between black 
representatives and black voters, I have left open several related, addi-
tional responses to this dimension of the process of representation. 353 
I have merely assumed the possibility of developing a black repre-
sentative who can listen to her constituents as well as her colleagues 
without becoming coopted, and who may be held accountable to black 
interests by political parties or community-based arrangements. 354 
Similarly, the "role model" hypothesis and its delineation of the ex-
pectations and responsibilities in black elected officials warrants fur-
ther analysis. 355 
352. See Engstrom, supra note 305; supra notes 290, 302-05, 314. 
353. For example, a participatory model of "strong democracy" may be compelled based on 
further inquiry into the importance of interactive, continuous communication between the black 
representative and the voter. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 127. In this sense, the representa-
tional dynamic may require reviving a more activist, protest model for electoral processes. See, 
e.g., J. BUTION, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 236-41 (1989) (pluralist assumption flawed that 
conventional politics alone produces major change for outgroups; protest and unconventional 
politics are important supplements to mobilize and make visible the claims of disadvantaged 
groups). 
354. This new black representative is, or can become, an effective listener, Williams, supra 
note 1, at 411 (bridging gaps requires "listening at a very deep level to the uncensored voices of 
others"), who can bridge a dual consciousness, W.E.B. DUBOIS, supra note 133, at 3 (describing 
double consciousness of being black and being American); cf. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The 
Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1864, 1866 (1990) (describing dual consciousness as conscious perception of people of color that 
their lives and concerns are valued differently by the white majority). The new black representa-
tive consistently and confidently transforms constituent consciousness into mainstream discourse 
and appropriates the transformative power of mainstream texts. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 333-
42 (defining transformation in contrast to cooptation). 
355. For example, I plan elsewhere to investigate the nature of community-based leadership 
to analyze how merely focusing on the symbolic achievements of black elected role models dis-
tracts from their more important mentorship, teaching, and leadership functions. In particular, I 
will argue that spokesmodels have an affirmative responsibility to their constituents to create 
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The critique also contains the seeds for developing a model of com-
munity-based political parties organized around a specific set of de-
mands or interests. 356 Within this conceptual framework, even bolder 
attempts to dismantle existing district-based election systems may be 
necessary to promote and reinforce political organizations or third 
political parties dedicated to expressing minority viewpoints. 
Although my ideas are not yet completely formed, I offer this set 
of suggestions as a political and remedial position most advantageous 
to civil rights advocates. Proportionate interest representation con-
tains strategies for reform at both the electoral and legislative level to 
address some of the process defects in black electoral success theory 
that have failed to yield substantive justice .. Proportionate interest 
representation is tied both to the congressional and the civil rights vi-
sion underlying the Voting Rights Act. The proposals discussed here 
apply whether civil rights advocates adopt an exclusively pluralist con-
ception of political bargaining or a civically virtuous notion of 
deliberation. 
By extending my speculative reconstruction of political equality to 
legislative deliberations, however, I am not articulating a grand moral 
theory of politics. Nor do I argue that these proposals are statutorily 
or constitutionally required. My purpose has been to attempt to con-
ceive of a deliberative process in which racism does not control all 
outcomes. I do not articulate a general principle of judicial review, 
but have limited my suggestions to the specific context of racial dis-
crimination as a remedial approach to statutory violations. 
Without regard to the fact that these proposals may not be imme-
diately implemented, at least political and civil rights activists can 
measure the failures of the current model assisted by an understanding 
of political equality that begins to define a future vision. Even if un-
realistic, proportionate interest representation serves as an ideal to 
guide further efforts. Proportionate interest representation is an em-
powering concept to the extent it enables black voters to "name [their] 
political reality"357 or to develop their political imagination. 
their own template of how the representational role should be carried out, and ought not rely for 
legitimacy simply on their role model "status." 
356. See, e.g., J. Bond, supra note 260, at 27 (formation of independent political parties at the 
local level can promote minority interests in cross-cultural coalitions); letter from D. Cunning-
ham to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (on file with author) (effective interest representation builds on 
organizational models of trade unions, community-based nonhierarchical Baptist churches, and 
civil rights protest organizations such as the SNCC and SCLC); cf Fitts, supra note 274 (strong 
political parties help discipline representatives). 
357. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1336 (1988) (describing blacks' greatest political 
resource as the ability to "name [their] political reality"). 
